The Effect of Real Activities Manipulation on Accrual Earnings Management： The Case in Indonesia Stock Exchange （IDX）

There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation. Usually, real activities manipulation is conducted on the going period. The action will increase the loss for the firms at the end of the period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through accruals （discretionary accruals）. Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesia Stock Exchange （IDX）. Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 196 firms from the year 2003 to 2007. The results of this study support the research hypothesis that real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. The higher the real activities manipulation effects, the higher the accruals earnings management at the end of the period.There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation. Usually, real activities manipulation is conducted on the going period. The action will increase the loss for the firms at the end of the period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through accruals （discretionary accruals）. Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesia Stock Exchange （IDX）. Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 196 firms from the year 2003 to 2007. The results of this study support the research hypothesis that real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. The higher the real activities manipulation effects, the higher the accruals earnings management at the end of the period.

Does investor protection affect the choice of earnings management methods through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation？ Asian comparison

This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor protection, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditors or regulators scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. The study findings are consistent with prediction. Despite being in economies with high investor protection, managers still have bigger discretion in managing earnings through real activities rather than accrual manipulation.

The Comparison between Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management

Earnings management is an important topic in modern financial accounting. With the development of social economy, practical circles and theory circles have studied the earnings management more and more carefully. In this paper, we will contrast accrual earnings management with real earnings management in definition, motivation, approach, and economic consequences, and hope to provide some suggestions for our government.

Earnings Management and Fraudulent Financial Reporting： The Malaysian Story

Earnings management research has a long and rich history. The agency conflict, incentives, rationalization, opportunity plus having the capability among the managers to manipulate the financial statements lead them to commit fraud. The loopholes in the standards or the deviation from real operational activities promote this situation to prolong. In relation to this issue, this study examines the earnings management behavior among fraud firms in Malaysia. Further, this study examines the relationship between accruals earnings management as a proxy variable for discretionary accruals and real earnings management as the proxy variable for discretionary cash flow. Sample of 57 alleged fraud firms was selected based on the fraudulent financial reporting offences announced in Bursa Malaysia website. The sample data are collected from public firms which committed fraud from 2001 to 2013. This study found a significant negative relationship between accruals earnings management and real earnings management among the fraud firms in Malaysia suggesting that these firms aggressively manage earnings downwards or upwards essentially to avoid regulators scrutiny apart from aiming to achieve personal incentives. The study significantly finds evidence that fraud firms manage earnings on a sequential basis between accruals earnings management and real earnings management prior to fraud year. The findings indicate that firms opt for real earnings management and make full use of its distinguished features of not easily traceable to continue managing earnings immediately subsequent to fraud year. This study may assist regulators, auditors, and policymakers to curb earnings management patterns that have high likelihood of becoming part of fraud antecedent.

Is Earnings Management a Technique to Reduce Cost of Capital？ Exploratory Study on Indian Companies

Earnings management has attracted lots of academicians towards the research due to the emerging frauds and downfall of great corporate giants of the world. Mainly earnings measurement is based on the accounting estimates which managers can easily manipulate for their self-interest. The study investigates the relationship between cost of capital and the earnings measurement for the Indian firms. Measurement of earnings is mostly computed by taking either discretionary accruals （DAC） or non-discretionary accruals （NDAC）. Present study has used Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney （1995） model for earnings measurement and for analyzing the results. Panel data regression has also been used. Findings of the study conclude that DAC has a significant influence on cost of capital, but NDAC has no influence.

Financial Statements Frauds: Does Their Intensity Have a Connection with Earnings Management?

This study investigates the relationship between earnings management and financial statements frauds.We examine how earnings management practices;done in the two years before the fraud,impact the likelihood of fraud occurrence.Moreover,we introduce a new measure for the fraud intensity.Using a sample of 70 fraud and 70 no-fraud firms,we find that firms committing fraud of higher intensity have managed earnings in the two years before the fraud occurrence.This paper contributes to the literature about fraud antecedents because it is the first study measuring the relationship between earnings management and the intensity of the fraud,and it can be also useful for practitioners,because using the analysis of earnings management practices,analysts can foresee and prevent financial statements frauds.

Toward the Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management——Empirical Evidence from Manufacturing Enterprises Listed in Shanghai Stock Market

Nowadays, earnings management is a hot issue, but most of the researches focus on the incentives of earnings management and few of them refer to the effect of audit quality on earnings management. In this study, we directly examine the effect of external audit quality on earnings management by using discretionary accruals. We find that the discretionary accruals of non-dual audit companies are significantly greater than those of dual audit companies. We also find that clients of non-First Ten auditors intend to report greater discretionary accruals than those of First Ten auditors.

Earnings Management Practices in Indian Companies： A Cross-Sectional Analysis

Corporate accounting frauds over the last two decades have caused massive erosion of investor wealth and shattered public confidence in regulators and capital markets. Deliberate manipulation of financial numbers by a company is rarely a one-off event; it is more a culture of widespread earnings management that permeates an organization and eventually leads to a full-blown accounting fraud. This paper looks at earnings management practices in Indian companies and examines the extent of earnings management prevalent across firms of varying market capitalization. The present study examines 130 listed Indian companies during the period of 2013-2015. The findings of this study provide a measure of the quality of financial reporting in India. Modified Jones model （1995） is used to estimate discretionary accruals （DA）, which is considered as a proxy for earnings management. The average DA is estimated at 5.6% of the total assets of the firms, which is comparable to the estimates in other parts of the world （about 1%-5% of total assets）. A sector-specific analysis reveals presence of higher earnings manipulation in the consumer durable and energy sectors. Large cap companies are found to show a lower level of eamings management as compared to the small-cap firms. The study also finds a dip in the magnitude of DA in 2015, which is the first year of application of the new Companies Act 2013. Subsequent years will reveal the true success of the new Act in enforcing a stricter regime of corporate governance and greater accountability of corporate boards and audit committees. International studies point towards a high degree of correlation between effective audit committees and lower levels of earnings management in companies. Further work in this field from an Indian context will help identify factors that have a constraining effect on earnings management, and ultimately help preserve the sanctity of reported financial numbers.

The Importance of Earnings Management Detection Models to Identify Fraud： A Case From Italian Listed Firms

Markets can get the confidence of investors enhancing the quality of governance and audit systems surrounding a firm. Financial reporting is a main component of them, being the basis for information necessary to investors＇ decisions. Managers have a chance to manipulate information provided in financial statements, in order to offer a better image of a firm to its potential and effective investors. The objective of this study is to evaluate the possibility of detecting extreme cases of earnings management and to check the predictive ability of the discretionary accruals models on the event of fraudulent earnings restatement. Through the abuse of reporting incentives, a manager gives out false information that should be averted and punished by regulators in a fair market system. The authors check the efficacy of different earnings management detection models in predicting discretionary manipulations and study the correlation between the frequency of manipulation and the event of fraud.

An Empirical Study on Earnings Management of Loss Listed Companies in China

This paper studies the issue of earnings management of loss listed companies in our country. We find that the loss llsted companies did not make any significant profit-making earnings management during the first loss year, while in the turning-around year, they made clear profit-making earnings management. This shows that the loss listed companies in order to avoid continuous losses, to prevent the company＇s stock price continued to decline, will be in the loss-making annual profit management.

Empirical Research on Earnings Management of Listed Companies in China

This paper studies the issue of earnings management of loss listed companies in our country. We lind that the loss listed companies did not make any significant profit-making earnings management during the first loss year, while in the turning-around year. they made clear profit-making earnings management. This shows that the loss listed companies in order to avoid continuous losses, to prevent the company＇s stock price continued to decline, will be in the loss-making annual profit management.

审计费用与高管政治关联对盈余管理的影响

选取2010-2021年期间我国A股市场上的上市公司为对象,形成分析模型,并探讨审计费用、高管政治关联与应计和真实盈余管理之间的相关关系。研究发现:审计费用支出越多,应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理越弱;相对而言,高管存在政治关联的上市公司,其对应的应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理较强;高管政治关联会降低审计费用对真实盈余管理行为的抑制作用,而并没有减弱审计费用对应计盈余管理行为的抑制作用。

基于制度建设与职务消费的盈余管理行为抑制研究

盈余管理是常见的财务操纵行为,其原因是多方面的,于国有企业而言,高管职务消费则是可能原因之一。基于沪深股市国有企业样本的研究表明,职务消费现象普遍存在,但仅当其规模超出行业平均水平时,才会通过盈余管理加以掩饰。同时,制度建设工作加强所带来的环境优化,有助于抑制盈余管理这种财务操纵行为,具体表现为随着制度建设力度的加强,职务消费与应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理间的正向关系都趋于弱化。研究结论为从外部环境视角抑制职务消费及衍生的盈余管理行为提供了线索和依据。

企业R&D支出费用化资本化与会计盈余管理行为选择研究——基于中国部分上市公司的经验数据

本文基于中国部分上市公司的数据,选取R&D支出全部费用化、全部资本化、部分资本化3个虚拟变量及R&D支出费用化金额、资本化金额用以表征R&D支出披露形式,研究上市公司R&D支出会计政策选择是否与盈余管理程度相关,进而检验R&D支出会计处理盈余管理路径,即检验R&D支出费用化、资本化的确定依据是否受其他非准则因素影响。研究结果显示,有条件资本化会计处理可能成为管理层盈余管理手段,包括应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理。在确定R&D支出费用化金额、资本化金额及R&D支出费用化强度上,管理层除了依据会计准则,还要依据当期利润情况、所得税负、利润质量、审计成本、利润平滑和公司独立性的影响。

盈余管理对上市公司未来经营业绩的影响研究——基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理比较视角

本文对比分析了应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理对我国上市公司未来经营业绩的不同影响。研究结果表明,应计与真实盈余管理都会对公司未来经营业绩产生负面影响,且应计盈余管理对公司短期经营业绩的负面影响更大,真实盈余管理对公司长期经营业绩的负面影响更大;公司管理层会使用应计盈余管理或真实盈余管理来满足"盈余阈值";满足"盈余阈值"的真实盈余管理对公司未来经营业绩具有显著负效应,而满足"盈余阈值"的应计盈余管理对公司未来经营业绩具有显著正效应;仅通过应计盈余管理满足"盈余阈值"的公司比仅通过真实盈余管理满足"盈余阈值"的公司具有更优的未来经营业绩。本文研究结论有助于深化利益相关者对盈余管理经济后果的理解。

薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理

本文以2002-2004年间沪深两地上市公司为研究样本,分行业采用修正的截面Jones模型对上市公司的可操控性应计利润进行计算,以此作为衡量盈余管理程度的代理变量;在此基础上,考察了高管人员薪酬激励、董事会监管与盈余管理之间的关系。在控制了上市公司资产规模和债务水平之后,研究发现,管理层薪酬水平与调高的操控性应计利润高度正相关,表明薪酬激励构成了中国上市公司盈余管理的一个基本诱因;董事会监管机制对于盈余管理的制约作用并不明显,但本文研究发现董事会规模与调高的操控性应计利润显著负相关,规模较大的董事会能够降低盈余管理的程度。

股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以"上市公司股权激励管理办法"颁布以来沪深两市首次披露股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,运用单样本T检验和配对样本T检验的方法,研究了股权激励计划公告日前经理人的盈余管理行为。研究发现:股权激励计划公告日前的三个季度,经理人通过操纵"操纵性应计利润"进行了向下的盈余管理,公告日后盈余存在反转现象;但是,并没有显著的证据表明经理人在股权激励计划公告日前通过操纵"非经常性损益"进行盈余管理。

会计弹性与真实活动操控的盈余管理关系研究

以真实活动操控的盈余管理为研究视角,以我国A股市场的上市公司为研究对象,在考虑行业特征对会计弹性影响的基础上,通过对比分析在不同的会计弹性下真实活动操控程度的差异,验证了会计弹性与真实活动操控程度之间存在此消彼长的关系,得出了会计弹性大的公司较少利用真实活动操控盈余,会计弹性小的公司则更多利用真实活动操控盈余的结论,拓展和丰富了盈余管理的研究方向和内容。

大股东控制、机构投资者持股与盈余管理

本文利用我国A股上市公司2009-2012年的数据,从应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理两个方面分析机构投资者持股对盈余管理的影响,并结合我国上市公司"一股独大"的实际情况,采用分组检验方法进一步验证了大股东控制对二者作用机制的影响。研究发现,上市公司机构投资者持股比例同盈余管理程度呈显著的负相关性;在将样本依据控股股东持股比例分组后,这种负相关性在大股东非绝对控制组中仍然成立,而在绝对控制组中则不成立;进一步检验发现,机构投资者持股对真实活动盈余管理的抑制作用在非国有上市公司中更为显著。

高管变更与盈余管理——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控的实证研究

本文将应计项目操控和真实活动操控纳入分析框架,研究上市公司发生总经理变更后的盈余管理行为。理论分析表明,新任总经理在上任当年利用应计项目负向盈余管理可"一举多得",利用真实活动进行盈余管理却可能会"损公不利己";而在后续年度利用真实活动正向盈余管理虽会"损公"却可"利己"。以沪深A股上市公司2005-2010年数据为样本进行的实证检验结果显示,在总经理变更当年,上市公司存在利用应计项目调减利润的盈余管理行为,但不存在利用真实活动的盈余管理行为。在新任总经理上任后第一、二个完整会计年度,上市公司存在利用应计项目和真实活动调增利润的盈余管理行为。总经理变更当年,如果董事长也发生变更,则上市公司在变更当年利用应计项目调减利润的程度更大,在变更后第一、二个完整会计年度利用应计项目和真实活动调增利润的程度也显著更大。