Executive Stock Option, Mediation of Agency Costs and Allocation of Power in Levered Firms

The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.

Can differences in the background characteristics of the chairperson-CEO vertical dyad reduce management agency costs?——A perspective Based on the internal configuration of the top management team

We test whether differences in the background characteristics of firms’chairperson and CEO can reduce management agency costs.We find that when the chairperson is older,has a higher level of education,and has more overseas experience than the CEO,the management agency costs will be lower.A series of robustness tests do not change our conclusions.In further analysis,we find that the negative relationship between the two is more significant for SOEs or firms experiencing fierce market competition.Finally,we also find that the chairman-CEO’s vertical dyad background characteristics differences can help to improve firm performance.Our study provides theoretical and practical implications for companies on how to best configure their top management team.

Annual report readability and corporate agency costs

Annual reports are the main sources of information for outside investors' investment decisions and enable shareholders to supervise the management.Difficulties with the readability of these reports may therefore have serious consequences. Using 19,221 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between annual report readability and corporate agency costs, where readability is proxied by report file length and/or file size. We find that firms with better annual report readability experience lower agency costs, and the negative association between readability and agency costs is more pronounced in firms with higher external audit quality, internal control quality or analyst coverage. These results hold after several robustness checks. The positive effect of annual report readability is stronger in private firms than in state-owned enterprises, and becomes stronger after the implementation of new accounting standards in 2007. Readable annual reports can help in monitoring corporate insiders' opportunistic behavior and thus reduce agency costs.

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and High-Quality Development of Enterprises:From the Perspective of Agency Cost and Innovation Incentive

High-quality economic development can be achieved if a major strategic direction for China are delivered from the macro level to the micro level.Taking A-listed enterprises in China from 2005 to 2018 as samples,this paper studies the impact of directors and officers liability insurance(D&O insurance)on the high-quality enterprise development.The research results show that D&O insurance can promote high-quality development.In addition,the mechanism test shows that D&O insurance can reduce agency costs and improve innovations and high-quality enterprise development.Further analysis shows that when state-owned enterprises including their internal controls has no major defects,D&O insurance has more significant positive impact.Thus,this paper suggests that the insurance should be promoted for realizing high-quality enterprise development.

Fraud Detection and Prevention:A Review of the Latest Developments in U.K.Audit

Proposed reforms to U.K.audit are reviewed from a fraud detection and prevention perspective.A holistic four-actor model that encompasses:the directors,auditor,shareholders,and the regulator,is used to frame the discussion.Focus is drawn to the mediating role of the Audit and Assurance Policy.The paper argues that the proposed reforms have some potential to reduce the audit expectations gap.However,the problem of agency costs and the advisory nature of shareholder voting on the Audit and Assurance Policy significantly limit the possible effectiveness of the reforms from a fraud detection and prevention perspective.Suggestions for future research are made.

Life-cycle cost analysis of optimal timing of pavement preservation

Optimal application of pavement preservation or preventive maintenance is critical for highway agencies to allocate the limited budget for different treatments. This study developed an integrated life-cycle cost analysis （LCCA） model to quantify the impact of pavement preservation on agency cost and vehicle operation cost （VOC） and analyzed the optimal timing of preservation treatments. The international roughness index （IRI） data were extracted from the long-term pavement performance （LTPP） program specific pavement studies 3 （SPS-3） to determine the long-term effectiveness of preservation treatments on IRI deterioration. The traffic loading and the initial IRI value significantly affects life extension and the benefit of agency cost caused by pavement preservation. The benefit in VOC is one to two orders greater in magnitude as compared to the benefit in agency cost. The optimal timing calculated based on VOC is always earlier than the optimal timing calculated based on agency cost. There are considerable differences among the optimal timing of three preservation treatments.

Non-actual controllers and corporate innovation:Evidence from China

As the number of“ownerless”enterprises in China’s capital market increases,so does the importance of paying attention to their behavior.From the perspective of enterprises’control rights allocation,we find that non-actual controllers can inhibit corporate innovation by intensifying agency conflicts,reducing corporate risk-taking and strengthening financing constraints.We also find that a larger proportion of independent directors,higher audit quality,greater managerial ownership and less environmental uncertainty weaken the negative effect of non-actual controllers on corporate innovation.In contrast,multiple large shareholders strengthen the inhibitory effect of nonactual controllers on corporate innovation,but this inhibitory effect comes from over-supervision rather than from collusion.We further divide nonactual controllers into real and hidden types and find that real non-actual controllers still have a significant inhibitory effect on corporate innovation.Finally,we rule out the competitive explanation of equity dispersion,whereby non-actual controllers inhibit corporate innovation.This study enriches the literature on the factors influencing corporate innovation and provides evidence of the adverse impact of non-actual controllers.