The Relevance of Nigeria＇s Freedom of Information Act （2011） to the Country＇s Anti-corruption War

This essay is centred on Nigeria＇s Freedom of Information Act, with special interest in its relevance in the country＇s anti-corruption war. The paper reiterates that the law was passed to enable the public to access certain government information, in order to ensure transparency and accountability. The FOI Act aims to make public records and information more freely available and to protect public records and information, in accordance with the public interest and protection of personal privacy. It enables citizens to hold the government accountable in the event of the misappropriation of public funds or failure to deliver public services. It also seeks to protect serving public officers against any adverse consequences from the unauthorized disclosure of certain kinds of official information, and to establish procedures for the achievement of these purposes. The Act further regulates conflicts between its provisions and those of other legislations. The paper contends that Freedom of Information is a fundamental indicator of economic development and progress, civic engagement and a properly functional democracy in every economy, describing it as a promising start in ensuring good governance and rule of law in Nigeria. The paper stresses the need for vigorous implementation of the FOI Act if the country is to make any significant breakthrough in the enthronement of good governance, transparency and accountability, adding that a strengthened FOI regime will enhance citizens＇ demand for accountability and check corruption in Nigeria.

Anti-corruption needs a Party law

The tide of anti-corruption swept across China, anti-corruption within the Party is a top priority. It needs sound legal regulation, but now our country doesn＇ t have a specific law to regulate the Party, leading to Party members has not been well constrained about the execution of the power. The author analyzes the necessity of making a Party law from the perspective of curbing corruption, and puts forward some suggestions on strengthening the supervision function of Party law.

A Research on the State-owned Enterprise’s Anti-Corruption Risk Prevention Mechanism and Internal Control Construction

Since the commence of 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the CPC Central Committee represented by General Secretary Xi Jinping, has attached unprecedented importance to anti corruption construction and has strengthened the investigation degree on the disciplinary offence behaviors of the party member the leading cadres, which kills rampant misbehaviors around the people from the source. State-owned enterprises are the pillar of the national economy, which should respond to call of the country, in a bid to strengthen the construction of honest and integrity, prevent risks, and build a perfect internal control mechanism. Focusing on the state-owned enterprise’s anti-corruption risk prevention mechanism and internal control construction, this paper conducts a research aiming at starting a discussion.

Do anti-corruption campaigns affect IPO underpricing?Evidence from a central discipline inspection of the CSRC in China

The system of central discipline inspections has become a key anti-corruption governance tool in China since 2013.This paper investigates the impact of a central discipline inspection of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)on initial public offering(IPO)underpricing.We find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period exhibit greater IPO underpricing than those listed outside the inspection period.The reason is the increased focus of the CSRC on maintaining capital market stability,which makes it more inclined to approve IPO firms with lower issue prices during the inspection period compared with other periods.We also find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period have better short-term market performance but poorer long-term returns than those listed outside the inspection period.Moreover,the effect of the anti-corruption inspection on IPO underpricing is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises,firms with low-quality auditors and firms located in regions with high corruption.Overall,our paper enriches the literature on IPO underpricing and the economic consequences of the central discipline inspection system.

Anti-corruption, government subsidies, and investment efficiency

The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a new anti-corruption policy. In this paper, we examine the impact of this recently enacted anti-corruption policy on the investment efficiency of subsidized enter- prises from the perspective of government subsidies. We conclude that govern- ment subsidies have a significant positive impact on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises and that the anti-corruption work done by the govern- ment has effectively restrained the excessive investment behavior of government-subsidized enterprises. Further, we find that the anti-corruption policy is more effective in restricting overinvestment in subsidized stateowned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. We examine the impact of the anti-corruption policy on excessive investment caused by government subsidies and enrich the body of research related to investment efficiency.We also provide empirical support for further research on the anti-corruption policy at the macro-market and micro-enterprise levels. The findings highlight the need to establish new cooperation between governmentand enterprises, to rationalize the distribution of administrative resources, and to promote the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.

Are foreign monks better at chanting? The effect of ‘airborne’ SDICs on anti-corruption

The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission(SDICs)were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China(‘airborne’SDICs)to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases.To investigate the effect of this policy reform,we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014,and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method.We find that there is no significant effect of these‘airborne’SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption.This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples.We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency,because local discipline inspection commissions(DICs)are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel,funds and property.This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.

The Anti-corruption Discourse of China: Cracking down on "Tigers"

Fighting corruption has been a signature theme in the governance of China since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CCCPC)in 2012.Among the extensive attention from academic and policy discourse to this unprecedented anti-corruption elfort in CPC's history,there are studies that take the one-sided view that the effort under way is not anti-corruption in its strict sense as it relies on the Party mechanism rather than the legal system,scripted,and calculated for the narrow self-interest of factional power enhancement.Reviewing contemporary fundamental anti-corruption discourses,anchored in critical discourse analysis,and assisted by 134 circulars of intra-Party disciplinary punishments of corrupt high-ranking officials(“tigers”,dalaohu),this interdisciplinary study reveals that,by contrast,China adopts an integrated approach to corruption,which incorporates republican and liberal-rationalist beliefs and values.Specifically,it is characterized by CCCPC as leadership,the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as political agency,both following a mentality of the rule of law,and by the coordination between intra-Party disciplinary rules and state laws.This approach is appropriate because it conceptualizes corruption by targeting the main feature of the corruption-related problem.This study contributes from a discoursal perspective to the understanding of China's anti-corruption in the Xi Jinping Era.

Anti-corruption, marketisation and firm behaviours: evidence from firm innovation in China

China has launched an anti-corruption campaign since theEighteenth CPC National Congress, which has exerted widespreadinfluences on Chinese politics and economy. This paper examinesthe effect of the anti-corruption initiative on firm behaviours fromthe perspective of research and development (R&D) investments. Itshows that pursuing political connections and improving innovation are two mutually exclusive alternatives for firm growth inChina. The anti-corruption campaign raises the cost of seeking forpolitical bond and strengthens the incentive for firm innovation.After anti-corruption policies and regulations were issued, R&Dexpenditure in politically connected firms increases significantly;the anti-corruption initiative has positive effects on firm innovation.Further research shows that the effects vary with different types offirms. For state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the anti-corruptioninitiative only increases the R&D investments of firms with seniorexecutives who used to serve in the government;while for nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), this campaign has all-aroundpositive effects on their R&D investments. In the meantime, a heterogeneity at the provincial level is observed: R&D investments offirms with political connections increase more significantly in provinces with more intense anti-corruption efforts. Finally, marketisation also has a role to play. For regions with a more developedmarket economy, anti-corruption increases the innovation of firmswith political connections;whereas in regions with a less developed market economy, this effect is insignificant. This paper provides evidence for the opinion that anti-corruption is favourable toeconomic growth in China. To solve the endogeneity problem, ituses data obtained from the anti-corruption policy experimentsince the Eighteenth CPC National Congress and the difference-indifferences (DID) method to further test the hypotheses.

SPECIAL ISSUE： ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA-- China＇s Anti-corruption Strategies from the Viewpoint of Criminal Justice

A high incidence of corruption cases is a conspicuous feature of China＇s present stage of social transition. Responding to the demands of combating corruption, Chinese criminal justice has developed a unique set of investigative methods and principles for handling of such cases, placing a high value on relying on the masses to find and act on cases of corruption and promptly adjusting its focus to the key areas of such crimes. It concentrates on enhancing investigative capacity and strengthening the standardization of anti-corruption criminal justice. These practices represent the concrete embodiment in the field of criminal justice of the government＇s anti-corruption strategies. At the same time, China also faces some challenges in adjusting these procedures to accord with international practice. This is one of the aims of the judicial reform in China.

SPECIAL ISSUE： ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA --China＇s System of Anti-corruption Charges： The Tightening-up Process and Future Development

In step with reform and opening up, the Chinese system of anti-corruption charges has been progressively refined and elaborated. Its successive refinements and comprehensive transformation have resulted in a tight-knit network of anti-corruption criminal law and a dual system of charges. This system has made a remarkable contribution to combating corruption over the last three decades. More than the outcome of the natural evolution of legal logic, it also involves complex considerations of social transformation and reflects lawmakers＇ expectations of being able to prevent corruption at the institutional level. With the deepening and widening of reform and opening up, China＇s system of anti-corruption charges will inevitably develop towards the thorough abolition of the dual system of charges and the complete restoration of the unitary system.

SPECIAL ISSUE： ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA --Construction of Anti-corruption Institutions and Culture in Traditional China and Its Implications for Modern China

China has a rich tradition of anti-corruption institutional design and cultural construction. Anti-corruption institutions in traditional China were based on a detailed system of anti- corruption charges as well as a dynamic system of prevention, monitoring, and punishment, facilitated by a unique system of supervision and salary increases to encourage honesty. At the same time, the idea of ＂ruling for the people＂ was advocated as a part of cultural construction, providing a non-institutional impetus for curbing corruption starting from the very source of power. The honesty and integrity of officials was transformed from a political ethic to an everyday ethic which was at the heart of anti-corruption efforts in traditional China. Moral administration, official integrity and cultivation of a professional ethic were stressed so that social education and family education shared the same goals and political ideals and goals were socialized. These experiences have implications for us even today, and should not he overlooked in the present worldwide struggle against corruption.

The impact of anti-corruption measures and risk effects on equity incentives and financial misreporting in China

This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007-2017 period.Our key findings suggest that managers’shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’financial misreporting,and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance.Furthermore,managers’motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises(nonSOEs),suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the"absence of ownership"problem believed to affect SOEs.Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.

The politics of anti-corruption reforms and reversals in Uganda’s changing political terrain

The article discusses the increasing levels of public sector corruption despite the NRM government’s pursuing of accountability reforms and anti-corruption policy strategies.It asserts that having an impressive legal and institutional framework in place to enhance accountability and control corrupt tendencies may not be enough if political factors are ignored.In the absence of exemplary political leadership and support to institutions that enforce compliance,fighting corruption will remain a far cry.The article further argues that in circumstances where the political terrain ascribes to patron-client and neo-patrimonial instruments to consolidate and retain power,curbing public sector corruption will be elusive.The article insists that fighting public sector corruption largely depends on political commitment and less on the semblance of laws,institutions and technocrats.

Should 'Anti-Corruption' Accounts Be Abolished?

The "account against corruption" originated in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. At the beginning of 2000, after Xu Yunhong, former Secretary of the Ningbo Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, and some other top officials were arrested on corruption charges, the municipal government set up

Disciplinarian Heads Anti-Corruption Bureau

China has recently ramped up its anti-corruption efforts by establishing the National Corruption Prevention Bureau(NCPB).Appointed to lead the bureau,which falls under the Chinese Central Government。

Legal-Ease EU Anti-Corruption Measures for European Businesses in China

Currently, the European Union (EU) has few provisions in place to deal with the risks to EU business, relating to corruption, in developing countries like China. In this respect, the EU lags well behind the United States. According to our recent research, plans to rectify this are in the pipeline. When these plans will emerge, however, is an open question. Existing provisions and policy In 1995, EU ministers adopted the Convention on

Are Numeric Targets Suitable for Anti-corruption Work?

A new accountability system was recently adopted by the Henan Provincial Higher People’s Procuratorate to enable local anticorruption agencies to deal with a greater number of corruption cases more effectively. Under the system, heads of the least effective bureaus

The Analysis of China’s Integrity Situation Based on Big Data

In order to study deeply the prominent problems faced by China’s clean government work,and put forward effective coping strategies,this article analyzes the network information of anti-corruption related news events,which is based on big data technology.In this study,we take the news report from the website of the Communist Party of China(CPC)Central Commission for Discipline Inspection(CCDI)as the source of data.Firstly,the obtained text data is converted to word segmentation and stop words under preprocessing,and then the pre-processed data is improved by vectorization and text clustering,finally,after text clustering,the key words of clean government work is derived from visualization analysis.According to the results of this study,it shows that China’s clean government work should focus on‘the four forms of decadence’issue,and related departments must strictly crack down five categories of phenomena,such as“illegal payment of subsidies or benefits,illegal delivery of gifts and cash gift,illegal use of official vehicles,banquets using public funds,extravagant wedding ceremonies and funeral”.The results of this study are consistent with the official data released by the CCDI’s website,which also suggests that the method is feasible and effective.

关于防腐倡廉的社会文化基础（英文）

The fight against corruption is the foundation of a permanent topic of statehood is not a slight relaxation of the basic work of building a socialist harmonious society is the essential part. Social development is multifaceted, spiritual civilization and political civilization, civilization or system is one of the important aspects of the fight against corruption and both are closely related. "People are going to a little spirit." With lofty lofty ideals and beliefs, will working hard. Effectively preventing corruption is an inevitable requirement of anti-corruption construction depth development. Major cases and typical cases continue to be exposed and dealt with, demonstrates our continued efforts to increase the party's anti-corruption. We must also realize, to carry out anti-corruption work, increase the intensity of only handling the investigation and punish corrupt elements were not enough, you must firmly establish the concept of focusing on prevention, increasing efforts to prevent corruption from the source.

Policy uncertainty and land transaction prices in China

Economic policy uncertainty has prominent effects on investment and output.Using unique transaction-level data in China,this paper explores the impact of economic policy uncertainty on land transaction premiums in China.On average,a 1%increase in the policy uncertainty level reduces land transaction premiums by 3.907 percentage points.The impact of policy uncertainty is more profound for firms with tighter financial constraints and land located in cities with lower rent-to-price ratios.The influence of policy uncertainty becomes weaker after the anti-corruption campaign in China,especially in provinces scrutinised by the central inspection teams,implying that improvements in the political environment alleviates the impact of policy uncertainty.