Electronic Auction Scheme Based on Smart Contract and IPFS

Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.

Cooperative management of an emission trading system:a private governance and learned auction for a blockchain approach

Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading schemes(ETS).This study intends to address existing gaps in the literature by creating and simulating an ETS system based on blockchain technology.Using the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption algorithm and the Fabric network to build a platform may optimize the amount of data available while maintaining privacy security.Considering the augmentation of information interaction during the auction process brought about by blockchain,the learning behavior of bidding firms is introduced to investigate the impact of blockchain on ETS auction.In particular,implementing smart contracts can provide a swift and automatic settlement.The simulation results of the proposed system demonstrate the following:(1)fine-grained access is possible with a second delay;(2)the average annual compliance levels increase by 2%when bidders’learning behavior is considered;and(3)the blockchain network can process more than 350 reading operations or 7 writing operations in a second.Novel cooperative management of an ETS platform based on blockchain is proposed.The data access control policy based on CP-ABE is used to solve the contradiction between data privacy on the firm chain and government supervision.A learned auction strategy is proposed to suit the enhancement of information interaction caused by blockchain technology.This study provides a new method for climate change policymakers to consider the blockchain application of the carbon market.

Optimal social welfare:A many-to-many data transaction mechanism based on double auctions

With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.

Auction-based profit maximization offloading in mobile edge computing

Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.

A Few Notes on Auctions:The Boom in the Asymmetric Art Auction Market

The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.

基于CPN模型Auction智能合约的形式化验证

区块链智能合约是运行在区块链网络中的代码,它能够根据外部环境条件自动执行相应的规则,完成对应的交易和数字资产的转移.Auction合约是一个公开拍卖的智能合约,广泛应用到竞拍、游戏和博彩等行业,吸引了众多用户参与.近年来,该合约暴露出了拒绝服务攻击漏洞,导致很多参与者无法竞拍成功.为此,本文基于CPN模型对Auction合约进行形式化验证,检测漏洞并确定漏洞位置.首先使用CPN中的建模工具分别对Auction合约整体、无攻击操作和有攻击操作进行建模,然后使用CPN中的仿真工具对合约的执行过程进行仿真.结果表明,通过该方法,不仅可以发现和定位Auction合约的逻辑漏洞,而且也可以发现Auction合约语言的局限性.

最短路径Auction算法及其在路径诱导中的应用

通过采用C#语言程序,对比传统路径算法,并在实际道路网络和随机网络中进行了试验,测试了算法在求解网络"一对一"最短路径问题时的运算性能.结果表明,Auction算法在求解此类问题时,体现算法自身原理的优势,虽然整体性能表现不及经典的路径算法,即迭代步骤略多,但仍有改进的余地.

最短路问题的Auction算法在无圈网络中的改进

提出了Auction算法在无圈网络中的一种改进。在改进的新算法中,采取了新的推进(extension)方式,从而成功地降低了算法的复杂性。改进后算法的复杂性为O(m),此处m是图的弧数。

U-Auction:面向真实利用率的频谱拍卖机制

在频谱拍卖机制设计中,最关键的挑战是在满足主用户的利益及次用户的频谱需求的同时提高频谱利用率。然而,如果某些次用户通过抬高出价以获得多于他真实需求的频谱资源,采用现有频谱拍卖机制可能会导致较低的真实频谱利用率。通过引入真实频谱利用率,提出了一个新的频谱拍卖机制来解决这类问题。该拍卖机制为拍卖者提供了一个在真实频谱利用率及社会福利/收入间取得权衡的机制,设计了多项式时间复杂度的针对单信道及多信道的诚信拍卖算法。实验表明,该拍卖机制可以极大地提高真实频谱利用率。

Commission Strategy of the Auction House

In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.

Multi-band spectrum auction framework based on location information in cognitive radio networks

Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.

Secure Power and Subcarrier Auction in Uplink FullDuplex Cellular Networks

We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.

Genetic Algorithm Based Combinatorial Auction Method for Multi-Robot Task Allocation

An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.

A secure spectrum auction scheme without the trusted party based on the smart contract

With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.

Study on the Winning Probability for a Bid in Procurement Combinational Auction with Tree Structure

In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.

Determining winner in multi-attribute procurement auction:a method based on technical and business experts' evaluation information

A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.

Multi-Dimensional Customer Data Analysis in Online Auctions

In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.

Power auction and allocation for network-coded cooperation

Optimal resource allocation is critical to the efficiency of cooperative communiCations. In this paper, we develop an auction-based power allocation mechanism for network-coded cooperation in wireless networks, in which the sources compete for the relay power for maximum utility, while the relay node assigns the resource in accordance with the bids from the sources. Moreover, to improve the resource utilization, the relay node is allowed to perform network coding across the received information for the same destination. Finally, numerical results validate the performance of the proposed algorithm, and show that there exists a tradeoff between the system outage probability and the power consumed at the relay node.

A New Protocol for Multi-Item Electronic Auctions

The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.

An Auction-Based Recommender System for Over-The-Top Platform

In this era of digital domination,it is fit to say that individuals are more inclined towards viewership on online platforms due to the wide variety and the scope of individual preferences it provides.In the past few years,there has been a massive growth in the popularity of Over-The-Top platforms,with an increasing number of consumers adapting to them.The Covid-19 pandemic has also caused the proliferation of these services as people are restricted to their homes.Consumers are often in a dilemma about which subscription plan to choose,and this iswhere a recommendation systemmakes their task easy.The Subscription recommendation system allows potential users to pick the most suitable and convenient plan for their daily consumption from diverse OTT platforms.The economic equilibrium behind allocating these resources follows a unique voting and bidding system propped by us in this paper.The systemis dependent on two types of individuals,type 1 seeking the recommendation plan,and type 2 suggesting it.In our study,the system collaborates with the latterwho participate in voting and invest/bid in the available options,keeping in mind the user preferences.This architecture runs on an interface where the candidates can login to participate at their convenience.As a result,selective participants are awarded monetary gains considering the rules of the suggested mechanism,and the most voted subscription plan gets recommended to the user.