In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the...In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.展开更多
Maximum likelihood recursions were used by Wu （1985） to estimate extreme quantiles of a quantal response curve. For certain choices of initial designs, Wu＇s method performs well. In many fields of application, ther...Maximum likelihood recursions were used by Wu （1985） to estimate extreme quantiles of a quantal response curve. For certain choices of initial designs, Wu＇s method performs well. In many fields of application, there often exist some different initial designs which are known as the up-and- down designs. Based on the existing data set from such a design, the authors propose three sequential empirical Bayesian designs by quickly and efficiently exploiting the information in the testing data and known knowledge. The improvement obtained by using the new procedures for the estimation of extreme quantiles is substantial.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China (70071012)
文摘In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.
基金This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 10971012.
文摘Maximum likelihood recursions were used by Wu （1985） to estimate extreme quantiles of a quantal response curve. For certain choices of initial designs, Wu＇s method performs well. In many fields of application, there often exist some different initial designs which are known as the up-and- down designs. Based on the existing data set from such a design, the authors propose three sequential empirical Bayesian designs by quickly and efficiently exploiting the information in the testing data and known knowledge. The improvement obtained by using the new procedures for the estimation of extreme quantiles is substantial.
