In this paper,we consider distributed Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking in potential games over a multi-agent network,where each agent can not observe the actions of all its rivals.Based on the best response dynamics,we des...In this paper,we consider distributed Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking in potential games over a multi-agent network,where each agent can not observe the actions of all its rivals.Based on the best response dynamics,we design a distributed NE seeking algorithm by incorporating the non-smooth finite-time average tracking dynamics,where each agent only needs to know its own action and exchange information with its neighbours through a communication graph.We give a sufficient condition for the Lipschitz continuity of the best response mapping for potential games,and then prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm based on the Lyapunov theory.Numerical simulations are given to verify the resultandillustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.展开更多
基金This work was supported by the Shanghai Sailing Program(No.20YF1453000)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.22120200048).
文摘In this paper,we consider distributed Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking in potential games over a multi-agent network,where each agent can not observe the actions of all its rivals.Based on the best response dynamics,we design a distributed NE seeking algorithm by incorporating the non-smooth finite-time average tracking dynamics,where each agent only needs to know its own action and exchange information with its neighbours through a communication graph.We give a sufficient condition for the Lipschitz continuity of the best response mapping for potential games,and then prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm based on the Lyapunov theory.Numerical simulations are given to verify the resultandillustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.
