An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Board of Directors Governance and Corporate Performance of Chinese Public Companies

Board of directors is an important component part of corporate governance. As a governance mechanism, we empirically study relationship among the scale of the board of directors, the structure of the board of directors and the duality leadership structure with corporate performance in Chinese public companies. The result shows that the smaller scale of the board of the directors is, the better performance is. With the ownership structure changing better, the structure of the board of directors will change better and promote the performance. The duality leadership structure doesn＇t affect the corporate performance. The fundamental method for the governance effectiveness of the board is to set up the reasonable ownership structure and the marketing mechanism for occurrences in human .

Corporate governance mechanisms and firm valuation in Malaysian listed firms： A panel data analysis

Corporate governance mechanisms emerge to tackle agency problems in ensuring that shareholders＇ funds are not expropriated or wasted on unprofitable activities. The issue arises as to whether these improvements have been effective in reducing agency costs, and therefore enhancing firm value. The objectives of this paper is to examine the effects of governance mechanisms of dividend, types of ownership structure, and board governance on firm value. This paper utilises a panel data analysis of 403 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a four-year period from years 2002 to 2005. A hierarchical regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses and the data is analysed using the generalized least square （GLS） estimation technique. Overall, the results highlight the importance of moderating role played by board governance variables with types of ownership structure to influence firm value. However, the benefits of better corporate governance through enhanced board governance are not the same across all firms since their incentives vary with respect to dividend and different types of ownership structure mechanisms.

Analysis of Boards of Directors of Listed Companies --Empirical Evidence from China Stock Market

Since stock markets came forth in China only about 15 years ago, there are many different characteristics of Chinese listed companies compared with those of western. According to the regulation on Chinese security markets, an effective internal governance system is composed of systems of general meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and managers. The general meeting of shareholders, as the highest agency of power, makes decisions on important affairs of the company and one of its most important rights is to select qualified members for the board of directors. Board of directors exercises the resolution made by general meeting of shareholders and fulfil the responsibilities authorized by general meeting of shareholder during adjournment. Among the system arrangements above-mentioned, board of directors is the most important. However, the efficiency of internal governing system of the whole company depends on board of directors. Combined with ownership structure analysis, this paper analyses the status quo of boards of directors in China and demonstrates every attribute of Chinese listed companies＇ board of directors.

The Legal Regulation of Irrational Elements in the Operations of Boards of Directors

The operating processes of boards of directors are delicate and complex, so corporate legislation cannot simply equate board structure law with board governance law. It is therefore necessary to start from China＇s actual conditions and grasp the operating processes of Chinese boards with a sober appreciation of the irrational elements in their operating mechanisms. Board governance has entered a new stage of institutionalization, and the law should shift from its emphasis on structure to give equal attention to structure and process in optimizing institutional structure. In the construction of board operating mechanisms, we should treat differently such ＂living laws＂ as customs, experiences and traditions, give full play to the functionality of boards＇ strategic choices, and provide legal regulation of irrational elements, so as to distinguish between different roles, develop consensus, select strong points and improve efficiency. We should build control over board operational procedures, improve the system of functional allocation, correct assessment mechanisms, develop a mechanism for judicial scrutiny of the affective relationships in society and curb such behavioral tendencies as relational identity, structural bias and group polarization, with a view to controlling such ＂living laws＂ within the framework of the basic values and principles of board governance.