Since the commence of 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the CPC Central Committee represented by General Secretary Xi Jinping, has attached unprecedented importance to anti corruption constructio...Since the commence of 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the CPC Central Committee represented by General Secretary Xi Jinping, has attached unprecedented importance to anti corruption construction and has strengthened the investigation degree on the disciplinary offence behaviors of the party member the leading cadres, which kills rampant misbehaviors around the people from the source. State-owned enterprises are the pillar of the national economy, which should respond to call of the country, in a bid to strengthen the construction of honest and integrity, prevent risks, and build a perfect internal control mechanism. Focusing on the state-owned enterprise’s anti-corruption risk prevention mechanism and internal control construction, this paper conducts a research aiming at starting a discussion.展开更多
The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a n...The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a new anti-corruption policy. In this paper, we examine the impact of this recently enacted anti-corruption policy on the investment efficiency of subsidized enter- prises from the perspective of government subsidies. We conclude that govern- ment subsidies have a significant positive impact on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises and that the anti-corruption work done by the govern- ment has effectively restrained the excessive investment behavior of government-subsidized enterprises. Further, we find that the anti-corruption policy is more effective in restricting overinvestment in subsidized stateowned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. We examine the impact of the anti-corruption policy on excessive investment caused by government subsidies and enrich the body of research related to investment efficiency.We also provide empirical support for further research on the anti-corruption policy at the macro-market and micro-enterprise levels. The findings highlight the need to establish new cooperation between governmentand enterprises, to rationalize the distribution of administrative resources, and to promote the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.展开更多
文摘Since the commence of 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the CPC Central Committee represented by General Secretary Xi Jinping, has attached unprecedented importance to anti corruption construction and has strengthened the investigation degree on the disciplinary offence behaviors of the party member the leading cadres, which kills rampant misbehaviors around the people from the source. State-owned enterprises are the pillar of the national economy, which should respond to call of the country, in a bid to strengthen the construction of honest and integrity, prevent risks, and build a perfect internal control mechanism. Focusing on the state-owned enterprise’s anti-corruption risk prevention mechanism and internal control construction, this paper conducts a research aiming at starting a discussion.
基金financial support from National Natural Science Foundation of China (Approval No. 71872014)
文摘The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a new anti-corruption policy. In this paper, we examine the impact of this recently enacted anti-corruption policy on the investment efficiency of subsidized enter- prises from the perspective of government subsidies. We conclude that govern- ment subsidies have a significant positive impact on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises and that the anti-corruption work done by the govern- ment has effectively restrained the excessive investment behavior of government-subsidized enterprises. Further, we find that the anti-corruption policy is more effective in restricting overinvestment in subsidized stateowned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. We examine the impact of the anti-corruption policy on excessive investment caused by government subsidies and enrich the body of research related to investment efficiency.We also provide empirical support for further research on the anti-corruption policy at the macro-market and micro-enterprise levels. The findings highlight the need to establish new cooperation between governmentand enterprises, to rationalize the distribution of administrative resources, and to promote the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.
