This paper highlights the internecine struggle within the top management team in listed companies in China. Drawing on a power perspective, we longitudinally examine the antecedents of CEO dismissal followed by inside...This paper highlights the internecine struggle within the top management team in listed companies in China. Drawing on a power perspective, we longitudinally examine the antecedents of CEO dismissal followed by inside succession in dual-path CEO career. It examines the influence of followers＇ power on the dismissal of incumbent CEO and demonstrates the liability of newness and outsiderness, which is strengthened by the power of followers. It also highlights conflicts of interest and team and the joint effects of followers＇ and outsiderness. competition within the top management power on both the liability of newness展开更多
The current study compares the firm performance in China＇s listed companies by distinguishing the governance controlling of three types of state-shareholder. The results indicate that the performances in firms with d...The current study compares the firm performance in China＇s listed companies by distinguishing the governance controlling of three types of state-shareholder. The results indicate that the performances in firms with direct government controlling are significantly weaker than other firms. In contrast, the performances in firms without direct government controlling are not significantly different. The results suggest that the introduction of market-oriented state-share holders is a desirable process during the transition economy in China.展开更多
文摘This paper highlights the internecine struggle within the top management team in listed companies in China. Drawing on a power perspective, we longitudinally examine the antecedents of CEO dismissal followed by inside succession in dual-path CEO career. It examines the influence of followers＇ power on the dismissal of incumbent CEO and demonstrates the liability of newness and outsiderness, which is strengthened by the power of followers. It also highlights conflicts of interest and team and the joint effects of followers＇ and outsiderness. competition within the top management power on both the liability of newness
文摘The current study compares the firm performance in China＇s listed companies by distinguishing the governance controlling of three types of state-shareholder. The results indicate that the performances in firms with direct government controlling are significantly weaker than other firms. In contrast, the performances in firms without direct government controlling are not significantly different. The results suggest that the introduction of market-oriented state-share holders is a desirable process during the transition economy in China.
