Over the last decade or so, private sector＇s financing through public-private partnerships （PPPs） has become increasingly popular as a way of procuring and maintaining public-sector infrastructure. Albania in the l...Over the last decade or so, private sector＇s financing through public-private partnerships （PPPs） has become increasingly popular as a way of procuring and maintaining public-sector infrastructure. Albania in the last few years had improved the legal frame so as to give the local authorities the right to initiate PPP projects. The local authorities have not built the expertise for such projects yet. The aim of this paper is to help the local authorities in Albania to support the building of the expertise for such projects. A financial model is used to make the required calculations for the bid at various phases of the project, although this paper is not intended to cover financial modeling in depth, the key inputs and outputs for the financial model are reviewed, including the financing costs. The model has to work within the constraints of： （I） the public authority＇s requirements for the PPP contract term and service fee profile; and （2） lenders＇ requirements for the term and payment profile of their debt.展开更多
We have examined whether institutional ownership and family control in Malaysia are linked to capital spending.Using panel data from 220 listed companies in Malaysia,we showed that institutional ownership is positivel...We have examined whether institutional ownership and family control in Malaysia are linked to capital spending.Using panel data from 220 listed companies in Malaysia,we showed that institutional ownership is positively associated with capital expenditure(CAPEX).Consistent with institutional investors’monitoring role in corporate governance,the results indicate that this relationship was driven by the presence of growth opportunities.However,we found that family control was negatively associated with CAPEX.Additional analyses showed that this relationship was moderated by company size.While larger family firms invest less in CAPEX,smaller family firms invest more in CAPEX,indicating that the benefits of lower agency conflicts in family firms hold only for smaller firms.Our results are robust to alternative empirical measurements that account for firm characteristics and the endogeneity of institutional shareholding.展开更多
文摘Over the last decade or so, private sector＇s financing through public-private partnerships （PPPs） has become increasingly popular as a way of procuring and maintaining public-sector infrastructure. Albania in the last few years had improved the legal frame so as to give the local authorities the right to initiate PPP projects. The local authorities have not built the expertise for such projects yet. The aim of this paper is to help the local authorities in Albania to support the building of the expertise for such projects. A financial model is used to make the required calculations for the bid at various phases of the project, although this paper is not intended to cover financial modeling in depth, the key inputs and outputs for the financial model are reviewed, including the financing costs. The model has to work within the constraints of： （I） the public authority＇s requirements for the PPP contract term and service fee profile; and （2） lenders＇ requirements for the term and payment profile of their debt.
文摘We have examined whether institutional ownership and family control in Malaysia are linked to capital spending.Using panel data from 220 listed companies in Malaysia,we showed that institutional ownership is positively associated with capital expenditure(CAPEX).Consistent with institutional investors’monitoring role in corporate governance,the results indicate that this relationship was driven by the presence of growth opportunities.However,we found that family control was negatively associated with CAPEX.Additional analyses showed that this relationship was moderated by company size.While larger family firms invest less in CAPEX,smaller family firms invest more in CAPEX,indicating that the benefits of lower agency conflicts in family firms hold only for smaller firms.Our results are robust to alternative empirical measurements that account for firm characteristics and the endogeneity of institutional shareholding.
