The dual agency relation and lack of effective incentive and restraint mechanism make stock right structure of China's listed companies special.This special stock right structure will inevitably exert direct and p...The dual agency relation and lack of effective incentive and restraint mechanism make stock right structure of China's listed companies special.This special stock right structure will inevitably exert direct and profound influence on formulation of cash dividend policies.Based on the 2007 to 2010 data of China's agricultural listed companies and focusing on the stock right structure,this paper selected 6 indicators and the BP ANN to build the cash dividend policy identification model,in the hope of helping investors accurately predict influence of stock right structure on cash dividend policies,so as to reduce investment risk to some extent.展开更多
Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of...Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies.Our results indicate that(1)family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms;(2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies;and(3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms.Somewhat surprisingly,we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ(the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem Ⅱ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy.In contrast,a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.展开更多
This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors valu...This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership control than those of firms with higher ownership control. This is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. However, when investment opportunities are considered, the free cash flow hypothesis better explains firms' dividend policy. Investors value more the cash dividends of firms with fewer investment opportunities and higher probability of expropriation. This study indicates that investors are concerned with the potential asset expropriation through cash payouts, unless firms possess high growth opportunities.展开更多
文摘The dual agency relation and lack of effective incentive and restraint mechanism make stock right structure of China's listed companies special.This special stock right structure will inevitably exert direct and profound influence on formulation of cash dividend policies.Based on the 2007 to 2010 data of China's agricultural listed companies and focusing on the stock right structure,this paper selected 6 indicators and the BP ANN to build the cash dividend policy identification model,in the hope of helping investors accurately predict influence of stock right structure on cash dividend policies,so as to reduce investment risk to some extent.
基金supported by the Program for New Century Excellent Talent at University(Grant No.NCET-06-0565)the Foundation of the Key Research Institution of Humanities and Social Science at University(Grant No.07JJD630009)of the Ministry of Education of Chinathe National Nature Science Foundation of China(Grant No.G0205-70572092)
文摘Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies.Our results indicate that(1)family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms;(2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies;and(3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms.Somewhat surprisingly,we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ(the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem Ⅱ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy.In contrast,a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.
文摘This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership control than those of firms with higher ownership control. This is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. However, when investment opportunities are considered, the free cash flow hypothesis better explains firms' dividend policy. Investors value more the cash dividends of firms with fewer investment opportunities and higher probability of expropriation. This study indicates that investors are concerned with the potential asset expropriation through cash payouts, unless firms possess high growth opportunities.
基金This paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 7032053), 2003 Key Research of the Humanities & Social Science Program, Ministry of Education, P.R.C (No. 03JD630035), and Education Department of Shaanxi Provice Scientific Research Program (No. 02JK011).