In this paper,a generalized form of the symmetric Banzhaf value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed.Three axiomatic systems of the symmetric Banzhaf value are given by extending crisp ca...In this paper,a generalized form of the symmetric Banzhaf value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed.Three axiomatic systems of the symmetric Banzhaf value are given by extending crisp case.Furthermore,we study the symmetric Banzhaf values for two special kinds of fuzzy games,which are called fuzzy games with multilinear extension form and a coalition structure,and fuzzy games with Choquet integral form and a coalition structure,respectively.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the coopera...This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectively. The explicit form of the generalized Owen value for this kind of games is given, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Eklrthermore, two special cases of this kind of games are researched. The corresponding Davoff indices are also stHdied. Fin~.llv ~n ilhl^r~'i, ~r^l~ to ~展开更多
With respect to multichoice games with a coalition structure,a coalitional value named the generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value is defined,which is an extension of the Shapley value for multichoice games an...With respect to multichoice games with a coalition structure,a coalitional value named the generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value is defined,which is an extension of the Shapley value for multichoice games and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for traditional games with a coalition structure.Two axiomatic systems are established:One is enlightened by the characterizations for the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value,and the other is inspired by the characterizations for the Banzhaf value.展开更多
In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions...In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value.展开更多
Coalitional skill games (CSGs) are a simple model of cooperation in an uncertain environment where each agent has a set of skills that are required to accomplish a variety of tasks and each task requires a set of sk...Coalitional skill games (CSGs) are a simple model of cooperation in an uncertain environment where each agent has a set of skills that are required to accomplish a variety of tasks and each task requires a set of skills to be completed, but each skill is very hard to be quantified and can only be qualitatively expressed. Thus far, many computational questions surrounding CSGs have been studied. However, to the best of our knowledge, the coalition structure generation problem (CSGP), as a central issue of CSGs, is extremely challenging and has not been well solved. To this end, two different computational intelligence algorithms are herein evaluated: binary particle swarm optimization (BPSO) and binary differential evolution (BDE). In particular, we develop the two stochastic search algorithms with two-dimensional binary encoding and corresponding heuristic for individual repairs. After that, we discuss some fundamental properties of the proposed heuristic. Finally, we compare the improved BPSO and BDE with the state-of-the-art algorithms for solving CSGP in CSGs. The experimental results show that our algorithms can find the same near optimal solutions with the existing approaches but take extremely short time, especially under the large problem size.展开更多
基金supported by Natural Science Foundation Youth Project of China (No. 71201089)National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71071018 and 71271217)Natural Science Foundation Youth Project of Shandong Province,China(No. ZR2012GQ005)
文摘In this paper,a generalized form of the symmetric Banzhaf value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed.Three axiomatic systems of the symmetric Banzhaf value are given by extending crisp case.Furthermore,we study the symmetric Banzhaf values for two special kinds of fuzzy games,which are called fuzzy games with multilinear extension form and a coalition structure,and fuzzy games with Choquet integral form and a coalition structure,respectively.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71201089, 71271217,and 71071018the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province,China,under Grant No. ZR2012GQ005
文摘This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectively. The explicit form of the generalized Owen value for this kind of games is given, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Eklrthermore, two special cases of this kind of games are researched. The corresponding Davoff indices are also stHdied. Fin~.llv ~n ilhl^r~'i, ~r^l~ to ~
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71201089,71201110,71271217,and 71271029the Natural Science Foundation Youth Project of Shandong Province,China under Grant No.ZR2012GQ005+1 种基金the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education under Grant No.20111101110036the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of China under Grant No.NCET-12-0541
文摘With respect to multichoice games with a coalition structure,a coalitional value named the generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value is defined,which is an extension of the Shapley value for multichoice games and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for traditional games with a coalition structure.Two axiomatic systems are established:One is enlightened by the characterizations for the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value,and the other is inspired by the characterizations for the Banzhaf value.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70771010,71071018)Innovation Ability Promotion of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education(TJSHS201310011004)
文摘In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value.
基金This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61573125 and 61371155, and the Anhui Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 1608085MF131, 1508085MF132, and 1508085QF129.
文摘Coalitional skill games (CSGs) are a simple model of cooperation in an uncertain environment where each agent has a set of skills that are required to accomplish a variety of tasks and each task requires a set of skills to be completed, but each skill is very hard to be quantified and can only be qualitatively expressed. Thus far, many computational questions surrounding CSGs have been studied. However, to the best of our knowledge, the coalition structure generation problem (CSGP), as a central issue of CSGs, is extremely challenging and has not been well solved. To this end, two different computational intelligence algorithms are herein evaluated: binary particle swarm optimization (BPSO) and binary differential evolution (BDE). In particular, we develop the two stochastic search algorithms with two-dimensional binary encoding and corresponding heuristic for individual repairs. After that, we discuss some fundamental properties of the proposed heuristic. Finally, we compare the improved BPSO and BDE with the state-of-the-art algorithms for solving CSGP in CSGs. The experimental results show that our algorithms can find the same near optimal solutions with the existing approaches but take extremely short time, especially under the large problem size.