Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searc...Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack on 6, 7, 8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8, 9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The 128-bit key of 6 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 210 chosen plaintexts and 215 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 7 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 212 chosen plaintexts and 254.5 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2112.1 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2113.6 chosen plaintexts and 2121 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2111.1 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2175.6 encryptions. The 256-bit key of 10 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 214 chosen plaintexts and 2239.9 encryptions.展开更多
The cryptographic hash functions Extended MD4 and RIPEMD are double-branch hash functions, which consist of two parallel branches. Extended MD4 was proposed by Rivest in 1990, and RIPEMD was devised in the framework o...The cryptographic hash functions Extended MD4 and RIPEMD are double-branch hash functions, which consist of two parallel branches. Extended MD4 was proposed by Rivest in 1990, and RIPEMD was devised in the framework of the RIPE project (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation, 1988-1992). On the basis of differential analysis and meet-in-the- middle attack principle, this paper proposes a collision attack on the full Extended MD4 and a pseudo-preimage attack on the full RIPEMD respectively. The collision attack on Extended MD4 holds with a complexity of 237, and a collision instance is presented. The pseudo-preimage attack on RIPEMD holds with a complexity of 21254, which optimizes the complexity order for brute-force attack. The results in this study will also be beneficial to the analysis of other double-branch hash functions such as RIPEMD-160.展开更多
In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introd...In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introduced via chosen-message pairs.This attack method is that the key parameters dp and dq are segmented by byte,and the modular multiplication collisions are identified by k-means clustering.The exponents dp and dq were recovered by 12 power traces of six groups of the specific message pairs,and the exponent d was obtained.We also propose a second order clustering collision power analysis attack against RSA implementation with CRT,which applies double blinding exponentiation.To reduce noise and artificial participation,we analyze the power points of interest by preprocessing and k-means clustering with horizontal correlation collisions.Thus,we recovered approximately 91%of the secret exponents manipulated with a single power curve on RSA-CRT with countermeasures of double blinding methods.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.60373047)the State 863 Project(Grant No.2003AA144030)973 Project(Grant No.2004CB318004)
文摘Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack on 6, 7, 8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8, 9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The 128-bit key of 6 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 210 chosen plaintexts and 215 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 7 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 212 chosen plaintexts and 254.5 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2112.1 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2113.6 chosen plaintexts and 2121 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2111.1 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2175.6 encryptions. The 256-bit key of 10 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 214 chosen plaintexts and 2239.9 encryptions.
基金This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61103238, the "Chen Guang" project of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and Shanghai Education Development Foundation of China under Grant No. 09CG29, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China.
文摘The cryptographic hash functions Extended MD4 and RIPEMD are double-branch hash functions, which consist of two parallel branches. Extended MD4 was proposed by Rivest in 1990, and RIPEMD was devised in the framework of the RIPE project (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation, 1988-1992). On the basis of differential analysis and meet-in-the- middle attack principle, this paper proposes a collision attack on the full Extended MD4 and a pseudo-preimage attack on the full RIPEMD respectively. The collision attack on Extended MD4 holds with a complexity of 237, and a collision instance is presented. The pseudo-preimage attack on RIPEMD holds with a complexity of 21254, which optimizes the complexity order for brute-force attack. The results in this study will also be beneficial to the analysis of other double-branch hash functions such as RIPEMD-160.
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China(No.2017YFB0802300)the Key Research and Development Project of Sichuan Province(No.2020YFG0307,No.2018TJPT0012)the Key Research and Development Project of Chengdu(No.2019-YF05-02028-GX).
文摘In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introduced via chosen-message pairs.This attack method is that the key parameters dp and dq are segmented by byte,and the modular multiplication collisions are identified by k-means clustering.The exponents dp and dq were recovered by 12 power traces of six groups of the specific message pairs,and the exponent d was obtained.We also propose a second order clustering collision power analysis attack against RSA implementation with CRT,which applies double blinding exponentiation.To reduce noise and artificial participation,we analyze the power points of interest by preprocessing and k-means clustering with horizontal correlation collisions.Thus,we recovered approximately 91%of the secret exponents manipulated with a single power curve on RSA-CRT with countermeasures of double blinding methods.