The article studies China＇s development assistance policy during the last decades. It shows the evolution of Chinese approach to providing foreign aid. The analysis is based on White Papers on China＇s Foreign Aid fr...The article studies China＇s development assistance policy during the last decades. It shows the evolution of Chinese approach to providing foreign aid. The analysis is based on White Papers on China＇s Foreign Aid from 2011 and 2014, theoretical studies, and reports on China＇s foreign aid. From the beginning of the 21st century, China has become one of the most important emerging donors. Chinese aid is primarily provided to Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific. Depending on the region, the assistance is directed to large-scale infrastructure projects, energy facilities, or natural resource development activities. The aid is combined with investments and trade arrangements. Generally, China＇s aid programme is driven by economic, diplomatic, and strategic objectives. The rules according to which Chinese assistance is provided to developing countries differ significantly from the rules established by Development Assistance Committee （DAC） members. Aid-receiving countries do not have to fulfil strict development assistance regimes and adopt specific economic policies and targets.展开更多
This paper, for the goal of revealing the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods, clarifies not only the background behind Japan＇s decis...This paper, for the goal of revealing the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods, clarifies not only the background behind Japan＇s decision of terminating development aid loan to China, but also the reason why the Chinese government decided to accept it. When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, like the case of Japan-China conflict over development aid, one country must always compromise regarding the specific method of coordination. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes （BoS） in game theory. It has been believed that countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the initial agreement under such a situation. This case study, however, reveals that it is not always true. From the analysis of this study, it will be concluded that the agreement reached in the initial negotiation would not be always stable even in a situation where countries agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. In this case, ＂institution＂ and ＂consensus＂ are pointed out as incentives to make countries accept a specific coordination method.展开更多
文摘The article studies China＇s development assistance policy during the last decades. It shows the evolution of Chinese approach to providing foreign aid. The analysis is based on White Papers on China＇s Foreign Aid from 2011 and 2014, theoretical studies, and reports on China＇s foreign aid. From the beginning of the 21st century, China has become one of the most important emerging donors. Chinese aid is primarily provided to Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific. Depending on the region, the assistance is directed to large-scale infrastructure projects, energy facilities, or natural resource development activities. The aid is combined with investments and trade arrangements. Generally, China＇s aid programme is driven by economic, diplomatic, and strategic objectives. The rules according to which Chinese assistance is provided to developing countries differ significantly from the rules established by Development Assistance Committee （DAC） members. Aid-receiving countries do not have to fulfil strict development assistance regimes and adopt specific economic policies and targets.
文摘This paper, for the goal of revealing the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods, clarifies not only the background behind Japan＇s decision of terminating development aid loan to China, but also the reason why the Chinese government decided to accept it. When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, like the case of Japan-China conflict over development aid, one country must always compromise regarding the specific method of coordination. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes （BoS） in game theory. It has been believed that countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the initial agreement under such a situation. This case study, however, reveals that it is not always true. From the analysis of this study, it will be concluded that the agreement reached in the initial negotiation would not be always stable even in a situation where countries agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. In this case, ＂institution＂ and ＂consensus＂ are pointed out as incentives to make countries accept a specific coordination method.
