This paper studies the proactive spec-trum monitoring with one half-duplex spectrum moni-tor(SM)to cope with the potential suspicious wireless powered communications(SWPC)in dynamic spec-trum sharing networks.The jamm...This paper studies the proactive spec-trum monitoring with one half-duplex spectrum moni-tor(SM)to cope with the potential suspicious wireless powered communications(SWPC)in dynamic spec-trum sharing networks.The jamming-assisted spec-trum monitoring scheme via spectrum monitoring data(SMD)transmission is proposed to maximize the sum ergodic monitoring rate at SM.In SWPC,the suspi-cious communications of each data block occupy mul-tiple independent blocks,with a block dedicated to the wireless energy transfer by the energy-constrained suspicious nodes with locations in a same cluster(symmetric scene)or randomly distributed(asymmet-ric scene)and the remaining blocks used for the in-formation transmission from suspicious transmitters(STs)to suspicious destination(SD).For the sym-metric scene,with a given number of blocks for SMD transmission,namely the jamming operation,we first reveal that SM should transmit SMD signal(jam the SD)with tolerable maximum power in the given blocks.The perceived suspicious signal power at SM could be maximized,and thus so does the correspond-ing sum ergodic monitoring rate.Then,we further reveal one fundamental trade-off in deciding the op-timal number of given blocks for SMD transmission.For the asymmetric scene,a low-complexity greedy block selection scheme is proposed to guarantee the optimal performance.Simulation results show that the jamming-assisted spectrum monitoring schemes via SMD transmission achieve much better perfor-mance than conventional passive spectrum monitor-ing,since the proposed schemes can obtain more accu-rate and effective spectrum characteristic parameters,which provide basic support for fine-grained spectrum management and a solution for spectrum security in dynamic spectrum sharing network.展开更多
In current researches on spectrum leasing, Common model and Property-right model are two main approaches to dynamic spectrum sharing. However, Common model does not consider the obligation of Primary System (PS) and i...In current researches on spectrum leasing, Common model and Property-right model are two main approaches to dynamic spectrum sharing. However, Common model does not consider the obligation of Primary System (PS) and is unfair to Secondary System (SS), while the cooperation based on Property-rights model has problems on its feasibility. This paper proposes a novel system model, in which a Cost-Prediction scheme for Spectrum Leasing (CPSL scheme) is designed to forecast the cost that PS would pay for leasing spectrum. Cost Function is introduced as a criterion to evaluate the potential cost of spectrum leasing for PS. The simulation results show that compared with Common model based scheme, CPSL scheme substantially improves the QoS of the delay-sensitive traffic in SS at the cost of a small degradation of PS performance.展开更多
Extensive research in recent years has shown that dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising ap- proach to'address the artificial spectrum scarcity problem by improving spectrum utilization. This new communication parad...Extensive research in recent years has shown that dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising ap- proach to'address the artificial spectrum scarcity problem by improving spectrum utilization. This new communication paradigm, however, requires a well-designed spectrum allocation mechanism. This paper designs a double spectrum auction framework that allows unlicensed secondary users to obtain selected idle spectra assigned to licensed primary users. This is a win-win game because primary users can earn extra revenue and secondary users can obtain spectra they desperately need. The competition among primary users in the auction framework is studied combining game theory with a double spectrum auction in a non-cooperative game with the Nash Equilibrium (NE) as the best solution. Primary users use the prices obtained from the NE as their bid strategies to participate in the auction. In this auction sellers and buyers bid privately and confidentially, which means that the secondary users do not actually know the price and the spectrum size offered by the primary users, then a new net utility function was developed for the primary users with an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium point. Simulations demonstrate that this design effectively improves spectrum utilization.展开更多
基金the Natural Science Foun-dations of China(No.62171464,61771487)the Defense Science Foundation of China(No.2019-JCJQ-JJ-221).
文摘This paper studies the proactive spec-trum monitoring with one half-duplex spectrum moni-tor(SM)to cope with the potential suspicious wireless powered communications(SWPC)in dynamic spec-trum sharing networks.The jamming-assisted spec-trum monitoring scheme via spectrum monitoring data(SMD)transmission is proposed to maximize the sum ergodic monitoring rate at SM.In SWPC,the suspi-cious communications of each data block occupy mul-tiple independent blocks,with a block dedicated to the wireless energy transfer by the energy-constrained suspicious nodes with locations in a same cluster(symmetric scene)or randomly distributed(asymmet-ric scene)and the remaining blocks used for the in-formation transmission from suspicious transmitters(STs)to suspicious destination(SD).For the sym-metric scene,with a given number of blocks for SMD transmission,namely the jamming operation,we first reveal that SM should transmit SMD signal(jam the SD)with tolerable maximum power in the given blocks.The perceived suspicious signal power at SM could be maximized,and thus so does the correspond-ing sum ergodic monitoring rate.Then,we further reveal one fundamental trade-off in deciding the op-timal number of given blocks for SMD transmission.For the asymmetric scene,a low-complexity greedy block selection scheme is proposed to guarantee the optimal performance.Simulation results show that the jamming-assisted spectrum monitoring schemes via SMD transmission achieve much better perfor-mance than conventional passive spectrum monitor-ing,since the proposed schemes can obtain more accu-rate and effective spectrum characteristic parameters,which provide basic support for fine-grained spectrum management and a solution for spectrum security in dynamic spectrum sharing network.
基金supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China ('863' Program, No.2009AA01Z242)National Natural Science Foundation of China (60972080)
文摘In current researches on spectrum leasing, Common model and Property-right model are two main approaches to dynamic spectrum sharing. However, Common model does not consider the obligation of Primary System (PS) and is unfair to Secondary System (SS), while the cooperation based on Property-rights model has problems on its feasibility. This paper proposes a novel system model, in which a Cost-Prediction scheme for Spectrum Leasing (CPSL scheme) is designed to forecast the cost that PS would pay for leasing spectrum. Cost Function is introduced as a criterion to evaluate the potential cost of spectrum leasing for PS. The simulation results show that compared with Common model based scheme, CPSL scheme substantially improves the QoS of the delay-sensitive traffic in SS at the cost of a small degradation of PS performance.
文摘Extensive research in recent years has shown that dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising ap- proach to'address the artificial spectrum scarcity problem by improving spectrum utilization. This new communication paradigm, however, requires a well-designed spectrum allocation mechanism. This paper designs a double spectrum auction framework that allows unlicensed secondary users to obtain selected idle spectra assigned to licensed primary users. This is a win-win game because primary users can earn extra revenue and secondary users can obtain spectra they desperately need. The competition among primary users in the auction framework is studied combining game theory with a double spectrum auction in a non-cooperative game with the Nash Equilibrium (NE) as the best solution. Primary users use the prices obtained from the NE as their bid strategies to participate in the auction. In this auction sellers and buyers bid privately and confidentially, which means that the secondary users do not actually know the price and the spectrum size offered by the primary users, then a new net utility function was developed for the primary users with an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium point. Simulations demonstrate that this design effectively improves spectrum utilization.