Research on the Development Model ofE - commerce Finance： A Case Study of the Cross-border Cooperation in Finance between banks and E-commerce companies

This purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the research situation and the development model of the E-commerce finance. This article takes the cross-border cooperation in finance between banks and E-commerce companies. This paper introduces three development models of E-commerce finance. Banks set up their own E-commerce platform. The banks take advantage of E-commerce platform. The E-commerce companies run financial business. The theoretical findings reported in this paper pave the way for embarking on the promising and relevant future research.

Financing Decisions Analysis of E-commerce Supply Chain Finance for Fresh Agricultural Products in China

The supply chain finance(SCF)solutions are becoming increasingly diversified with the continuous perfection of the economic system.However,financing for small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs)is still a difficult issue waiting to be solved by enterprises and the government in China.SCF solutions based on e-commerce platforms have developed rapidly in China that provide an alternative for SMEs when few studies have been conducted on e-commerce SCF solutions which focus on fresh agricultural products.Therefore,this research focuses on the SCF solutions applicable to e-commerce enterprises of fresh agricultural products.

Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges:a multi‑leader–follower game approach

This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a supply chain finance framework by designing two novel coordinating contracts based on trade credit financing for different problem settings.These contracts are modeled in the form of multi-leader Stackelberg games that address horizontal and vertical competition in a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a financially constrained manufacturer.However,previous studies in the trade credit literature have addressed only simple vertical competition,that is,seller-buyer competition.To solve the proposed models,two algorithms were developed by combining population-based metaheuristics,the Nash-domination concept,and the Nikaido-Isoda function.The results demonstrate that the proposed supply chain finance framework can eliminate supply chain inefficiencies and make a large profit for suppliers,as well as the financially constrained manufacturer.Furthermore,the results of the contracts’analysis showed that if the manufacturer is required to settle its payments to suppliers before the end of the period,the trade credit contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because of a lack of incentive for suppliers.However,if the manufacturer is allowed to extend its payments to the end of the period,the proposed trade credit financing contract can coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the sensitivity analysis results indicate that the worse the financial status of the manufacturer,the more bargaining power suppliers have in determining the contract parameters for more profit.

Evolutionary game analysis of information service quality control of e-commerce platforms under information ecology

Due to the information asymmetry and imperfect supervision system,the problem of information service quality of e-commerce platforms is becoming increasingly prominent.Based on the perspective of information ecology,this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model including merchants,e-commerce platforms and governments,and analyzes the dynamic process of the threeparty game under bounded rationality,thereby characterizing the behavior and optimal strategies of information service quality control.We carry out numerical simulation using data of the Pinduoduo platform.The results show that the cost of each party,control strength of e-commerce platforms,proportion of margin deducted and other factors are important factors affecting the quality of information service;Only when the sum of the costs of passive management of e-commerce platforms,penalties for merchants,and the additional revenue generated from the active management exceeds the cost of the active management of the e-commerce platforms,it ensures effective control over the quality of information service in a stable market environment.Finally,some suggestions are put forward to optimize the e-commerce information service quality control.

Price Masking Strategy of Cross-Border E-Commerce Platform Financing

E-commerce platform financing is a new service pattern of supply chain finance.However,this pattern may bring some new issues when considering the problem of cash flow shortage and financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.When enterprises use this service,they worry about the leakage of preferential wholesale price when applying the full loan amount and providing the true transaction information.Based on the model consisting of a supplier,a retailer and a cross-border e-commerce platform,the authors design a price masking strategy to prevent the retailer’s preferential wholesale price information from leakage.The authors analyze the profit of the retailer and the platform before and after adopting the price masking strategy.The authors find that the price masking strategy always benefits the retailer.Besides,the optimal profit of the retailer and the platform are both affected by the loan interest rate.Moreover,there exists a range of loan interest rates that can benefit both the retailer and the platform if the price masking strategy is adopted.The research emphasizes that platform can expand the total business volume by allowing retailers to use price masking strategy.In other words,there will be more and more retailers attracted by the strategy,which benefits the long-term growth of cross-border e-commerce platform financing.

Research on Credit Regulation Mechanism of E-commerce Platform Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

In the growing e-commerce industry,the problem of malicious business operations has become increasingly prominent,exposing many problems such as weak supervision of e-commerce platforms and no way for consumers to complain.In order to solve the problems of counterfeit and shoddy products on e-commerce platforms and promote the sustainable development of the e-commerce industry in China,this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of e-commerce platforms,merchants,and consumers,investigates the influence of each influencing factor on each party’s strategy choice,and provides targeted suggestions to e-commerce platforms based on relevant factors.Finally,the impact of several important parameters on the equilibrium solution is discussed through sensitivity analysis.The results show that:1)the smaller the cost difference between active and negative regulation,the more the e-commerce platform tends to active regulation strategy,but increasing fines for dishonest merchants and consumer complaints have little impact on the e-commerce platform;2)increasing consumer compensation,creating an honest business environment,and reducing the cost of honest business all help companies tend to operate in good faith;3)the only factor that affects the tendency of consumer complaint strategies is the cost of complaints.The loss suffered by silence and the compensation given to consumers have little effect on consumers’tendency to complain strategy.The results can provide theoretical guidance for participants to make useful strategic decisions in the e-commerce market.

Dynamic Pricing Model of E-Commerce Platforms Based on Deep Reinforcement Learning

With the continuous development of artificial intelligence technology,its application field has gradually expanded.To further apply the deep reinforcement learning technology to the field of dynamic pricing,we build an intelligent dynamic pricing system,introduce the reinforcement learning technology related to dynamic pricing,and introduce existing research on the number of suppliers(single supplier and multiple suppliers),environmental models,and selection algorithms.A two-period dynamic pricing game model is designed to assess the optimal pricing strategy for e-commerce platforms under two market conditions and two consumer participation conditions.The first step is to analyze the pricing strategies of e-commerce platforms in mature markets,analyze the optimal pricing and profits of various enterprises under different strategy combinations,compare different market equilibriums and solve the Nash equilibrium.Then,assuming that all consumers are naive in the market,the pricing strategy of the duopoly e-commerce platform in emerging markets is analyzed.By comparing and analyzing the optimal pricing and total profit of each enterprise under different strategy combinations,the subgame refined Nash equilibrium is solved.Finally,assuming that the market includes all experienced consumers,the pricing strategy of the duopoly e-commerce platform in emerging markets is analyzed.

Behavior Analysis of Bank into E-Commerce under Network Externalities

With the advent of Internet financial innovation,many commercial banks quietly have started to enter into the Ecommercial in order to prevent oligarchs from eroding financial market.From the perspective of industrial division,this paper reveals the nature of a phenomenon that E-commercial enterprises and banks have stepped into each other's field,which E-commerce of banks can give full play to network effects.Then it uses game theory to analyze the motions of banks to involve into E-commerce and the short-term competitive equilibrium of large incumbent Ecommercial enterprises as well.For individual rationality,the dominant strategy of banks and E-commercial enterprises is(enter,counterattack).Considering network externalities,it constructs a competing model on banks and incumbent E-commercial enterprises and simulates competitive trends and balanced results of their behaviors,which illustrates that banks can obtain network effect after choosing E-commerce strategy.

The Entrepreneurial Perspective:Financing of the Production of Digital Games

The article describes funding models in Germany,France,UK and in Poland.The second part of the article concentrates on entrepreneurial implications and the context.At the end of the article of financing path is described including public funding opportunities in Europe from a game developers’perspective.

Research on Financing Game Model of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises based on Different Risk Categories

With the development of market economy and the deepening of economic system reform, some of the Small and medium-sized（SME） enterprises have become the most dynamic economic growth point in the national economy. Nevertheless, SMEs are facing a lot of problems in the market competition, such as technical backwardness, information lag, lack of talents, etc.. The healthy development of SMEs is very important, whereas, SMEs’ financing is a worldwide problem, and the result of financing game between banks and enterprises depends on a variety of decision-making factors. In this paper, from the point of view of bank, we analyze the diffi culties of external financing of SMEs, and establish a financing game model based on different risk categories, in order to better solve the problems that remain in the process of financing and promote the healthy and sustainable development of SMEs.

Current Status and Trend of Internet and E-Commerce Market in Korea

After the remarkable increase of Internet users and broadband Internet subscribers at the end of the 20th century, the size of Korean Internet and e-commerce market steadily increased but the growth rate has been either stagnant or decreased. Trends of Korean Internet and e-commerce market are summarized in this paper the trends on Internet usage are introduced. Trends of online games, blogs and wireless Internet are introduced. The trends of Korean Internet market may have implications for China and Japan.

Research on the Selection of Supply Chain Marketing Models Based on E-commerce Service Levels

Based on the game theory,the service sensitivity coefficient is introduced to construct four marketing game models,which include a single flagship store,a single self-operated store,a direct sales-flagship store,and a direct sales-self-operated store,in combination with numerical analysis methods to analyze manufacturers and e-commerce platforms in different situations.The study found that the service levels affected the profit of each entity in the supply chain.The service levels of self-operated stores were higher than those of the flagship stores,and the opening of direct sales channels had a stimulating effect on the service levels of e-commerce platforms to a certain extent.In consideration of the service levels and the ability to build direct sales channels,the direct sales-flagship store marketing model is the best choice for manufacturers whereas e-commerce platforms are more inclined to open self-operated stores.However,the opening of manufacturers'direct sales channels is not necessarily beneficial to e-commerce platforms.

政府参与下考虑有限注意力的CCUS项目股权投资决策分析

碳捕获、利用与封存(carbon capture, utilization and storage, CCUS)项目的规模化需要风险资本支撑,然而气候政策与项目研发的不确定性造成注意力有限的风险投资机构投资意愿较低。为打破“能源企业不改造,风险投资机构不投资”的“囚徒困境”,本文基于投资方的注意力驱动交易行为构建了能源企业-风险投资机构-政府的演化博弈模型,从政策的“显著性”事件特征入手探讨政府在CCUS项目推广中的激励作用。结果表明:(1)向风险投资机构传递“显眼”信息的政府政策有助于打破当前融资困境;(2)三方参与概率高于30%即可实现CCUS项目股权投资的帕累托最优,且概率越高,演化速度越快;(3)政府实施的补贴和风险分担机制对融资的促进作用均显著,但初期风险分担机制因无法呈现“显著性”特征而难以吸引投资方注意力,效果弱于补贴机制。鉴于此,本文从引导多主体参与,建立信息披露机制,完善政府激励机制和提高碳资产管理效率等方面提出建议,以期为加快CCUS项目商业化提供理论借鉴。

贸易信用中账期对供应链上下游及供应链绩效的影响研究

贸易信用是供应链中上游企业允许下游企业延期支付的供应链内部融资方式。有观点认为供应链下游企业会通过延长账期挤占上游企业的利益,特别是一些处于优势地位的下游,他们不仅延长账期,同时还向上游提供供应链金融服务。针对这一观点,本文构建了含有一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链模型,对比分析了三种供应商资金模式下(自有资金充足、自有资金不足通过银行融资和自有资金不足通过零售商融资)账期对供应链上下游和供应链绩效的具体影响。研究发现:(1)对于供应商和供应链绩效,账期并非越短越好,对于零售商,账期并非越长越好;(2)当供应商资金不足时,相比银行融资,零售商融资会导致账期延长,但这有利于供应链各成员的利润;(3)账期和零售商融资并存有可能让供应链各成员获得更多利润,甚至会比供应商资金充足情况更优。本文的研究有助于厘清贸易信用中账期对供应链成员的收益以及供应链整体绩效的影响,从而有利于供应链金融业务的健康开展。

考虑利他偏好的绿色供应链运营与融资决策

文章针对绿色供应链上游企业遇到资金约束需要获取融资的问题,在银行融资渠道和供应链内部预付款融资渠道两种选择方式下,研究核心企业的利他偏好行为对融资决策和供应链运营决策的影响。研究发现,核心企业制造商的利他偏好行为改变了供应链成员间的利润分配格局,可帮助供应链整体实现帕累托改善,无论采取何种融资模式,制造商的利他偏好都会提升原材料批发价格、产品绿色度水平和供应链整体利润。在上游企业受到资金约束的绿色供应链中,核心企业的利他偏好有利于绿色供应链的发展,建立更加稳定的合作关系。

数字技术赋能绿色供应链金融融资决策分析——基于演化博弈的数值仿真视角

绿色供应链金融作为供应链金融在“双碳”背景下的创新发展产物,对中小企业绿色发展和融资约束贡献着重要力量。但与传统供应链金融模式相似,绿色供应链金融同样面临信息不对称、严重依赖于交易主体征信等问题。以简单汇供应链金融在线平台在绿色供应链金融模式中“绿色碳链通”票据贴现融资业务为背景,构建中小企业、金融机构和核心企业三方演化博弈模型,探究影响主体策略选择的重要因素和数字技术赋能绿色供应链金融发展的影响机制,并运用矩阵实验室(MATLAB)软件进行仿真实验。研究结果表明,数字技术赋能下三方博弈演化到理想稳定状态的条件更容易满足。具体而言,依托于供应链票据价值拆分、区块链技术增加违约损失、绿色评级差异化的融资利率、业务效率提升及信用奖励,促进了三方主体选择积极的融资策略。

科技型新创企业供应链融资多主体行为策略的演化与仿真

科技型新创企业研发投入大、回报周期长的特性使其有着“短、频、散、小”的融资需求,但其所能依赖的融资手段却十分有限,供应链融资被认为是解决科技型新创企业融资问题的有效途径。基于科技型新创企业所面临的融资难、融资贵现实情境,建立供应链融资多主体行为策略的演化博弈模型,通过求解模型找到系统的演化稳定策略,而后结合Matlab仿真进一步探究相关因素变化对演化结果的影响。研究表明:三方都参与或三方都不参与的行为策略为该系统的稳定策略;当各主体初始参与意愿大于等于60%时,随着时间变化各主体倾向于选择参与的行为策略,否则将选择不参与;当各主体参与供应链融资获得的收益大于临界值或获得的成本小于临界值时,各主体也会随着时间变化选择参与的行为策略。研究丰富了供应链融资的相关研究,为科技型新创企业解决融资困境提供了理论支撑。

智能合约下考虑破产风险的保理融资演化博弈分析

数字化推动了供应链金融的变革,其中智能合约技术在保理融资领域展现出独特优势。本文研究供应商、销售商和银行构成的融资链系统,通过演化博弈分析,发现供应商破产风险增加会使其更倾向保理融资,进而影响其他主体策略。银行保理保证金设定影响系统稳定性,适度保证金可激励销售商正常还款,过高则导致系统不稳定。销售商延期还款额外收益低时,最优策略才能实现。因此需要智能合约设定合理滞纳金与保证金,激励正常还款与保理采用,维护融资链长期稳定。研究表明智能合约技术可降低供应商破产风险,增加银行利润与销售商信誉,实现共赢。

农村普惠金融供给协同机制与效率分析

推算政府与农村金融机构协同供给农村普惠金融的演化稳定策略,并基于30个省(自治区、直辖市)的宏观面板数据,使用SBM与超效率SBM模型测算两者之间的供给协同效率,进一步通过Tobit模型分解政府和农村金融机构各投入变量对协同效率的影响。结果表明:政府在农村普惠金融实施过程中的主导性决定了其协同决策能够考量自身的成本与收益,而农村金融机构的协同决策较大程度上受政府决策的影响;整体上,我国的农村普惠金融供给协同效率呈逐年上升趋势,其中东部和较发达的中部地区协同效率较高,而西部和欠发达的中部部分地区协同效率偏低;农村基础设施投入、金融机构网点数与协同效率分别呈倒U型和正U型关系,当前这两种要素的投入量均处于不足状态;涉农贷款补贴、金融机构从业人员数和人均农业贷款对协同效率存在正向促进作用,而金融风险对冲机制和农业保险赔付率为负向影响。

基于Stackelberg博弈的电炉企业供应链渠道选择模型

为了提升电炉企业供应链渠道的风险抵抗力,设计一种基于Stackelberg博弈的电炉企业供应链渠道选择模型。在Stackelberg博弈中,分析电炉企业供应链成员的Stackelberg博弈条件,作出相关假设;将Stackelberg博弈基本元素与电炉企业供应链元素一一对应,计算实际市场需求量和收益函数,确定电炉企业渠道选择的影响因素,建立物流企业供应链渠道选择模型;设计电炉企业供应链渠道选择步骤,选择最优的电炉企业供应链渠道。实验结果表明:研究方法选择的供应链渠道在内部风险和外部风险条件均获得较高收益,具有较优的抗风险能力。