Earnings seasonality,management earnings forecasts and stock returns

We examine whether management earnings forecasts(MEFs)help reduce the stock return seasonality associated with earnings seasonality around earnings announcements(EAs)in Chinese A-share markets.We find that firms in historically low earnings seasons outperform firms in high earnings seasons by 2.1%around MEFs.Firms in low earnings seasons also have higher trading volume and return volatility than their counterparts around EAs and MEFs.MEFs significantly reduce the ability of historical seasonal earnings rankings to negatively predict announcement returns,volume and volatility around EAs.The reduction effects are stronger when MEFs are voluntary or made closer to EAs.The evidence suggests that MEFs facilitate the correction of investors’tendency to extrapolate earnings seasonality and its resulted stock mispricing.

Business and financial information integration and voluntary management earnings forecasts

In this study,the impact of business and financial information integration(BFⅡ)on the voluntary management earnings forecasts(VMEFs)of listed firms in China between 2008 and 2018 is investigated.Drawing on litigation cost and ability signaling theories,we find that the adoption of BFⅡencourages top managers to disclose VMEFs.BFⅡfirms are identified through the textual analysis of management discussion and analysis(MD&A)reports,and the empirical results indicate that BFⅡfirms have a higher probability and frequency of issuing VMEFs than non-BFⅡfirms.The results remain robust after we identify causality by applying a propensity score matching and difference-in-differences(PSM-DID)test and use an alternate measure of BFⅡ.Further tests show that BFⅡfirms issue more accurate VMEFs and are able to issue them at an earlier stage.We also find that the positive relationship between BFⅡand VMEFs is weakened if the media expresses concern about the uncertainty of BFⅡadoption.

Customer concentration and management earnings forecast

Customers are one of the key external stakeholders for a company.Using Chinese listed companies’data from 2007 to 2015,this paper examines the impact of customer concentration on information disclosure from the perspective of management earnings forecast.Empirical results show that a more concentrated customer base induces companies to disclose more positive earnings forecast.In addition,the positive association between customer concentration and management earnings forecast is more pronounced with higher economic policy uncertainty.Further analyses reveal that companies issue more positive earnings forecast to reduce the financing risk and protect their relationshipspecific investment.Also,customer concentration reduces the consistency of earnings forecast since the deviation of the forecast performance and the actual performance is greater.This paper enriches the literature on the determinants of management earnings forecast and the effects of stakeholders on corporate financial behaviour.Our findings also provide implications for investors,regulators,and various stakeholders to understand management earnings forecast decisions.

Major government customer and management earnings forecasts

This paper examines whether customer base composition in the US,that is,whether a firm's major customers are government entities or publicly traded companies,affects the properties of its management earnings forecasts(MEFs).Using a sample of 1,168 MEFs from 1998 to 2014,we find that firms whose major customers are government entities(i.e.,govemment suppliers)issue more precise and more accurate MEFs than firms whose major customers are public companies(i.e.,corporate suppliers).Moreover,when managers disclose negative information to the market,earnings forecasts issued by government suppliers have greater price impact than those issued by corporate suppliers.Collectively,our empirical results suggest that having major govemment customers has a positive impact on the quality of MEFs.

Does an abnormal change in deferred tax assets interfere with analysts' earnings forecasts?

In 2007,China adopted the single balance sheet liability method for tax accounting,but its shortcomings have emerged.I sample A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 to study whether an abnormal change in deferred tax assets interferes with analysts’earnings forecasts and find that an abnormal change in deferred tax assets increases the error and divergence of these forecasts.Compared with a negative abnormal change in deferred tax assets,a positive abnormal change has a greater impact on earnings forecasts.Additionally,the level of corporate governance,audit quality and analysts’professional ability have moderating effects on the correlation between an abnormal change in deferred tax assets and earnings forecasts.However,an abnormal change in deferred tax liabilities does not have a significant impact on that correlation.

The effect of non-recurring items on analysts' earnings forecasts

This article discusses the effects of non-recurring profits and losses on statement users' decision-making processes from the perspective of securities analysts. We examine the relationship between analysts' forecast revisions and firms' non-recurring earnings. We find that 1) non-recurring gains and losses can influence analysts' earnings forecast revision; 2) compared with nonrecurring items resulting from policy changes, analysts are more concerned about those attributed to changes in business scope; 3) if listed companies use non-recurring items to turn losses into gains during earnings management,it will weaken the effects of non-recurring items on analysts' earnings forecast revision. The results suggest that non-recurring items that result from changes in business scope incorporate information that users need for the future operation of the business. This article verifies the information relevance of nonrecurring items and provides evidence for the necessity of non-recurring item disclosure.

The relationship between political connections and the mutual fund performance:Evidence from the US

This paper examines the effect of political connections between mutual fund managers and politicians on the fund performance.Using the publicly available data of individual political donations,we regard the mutual funds as politically connected when their managers make financial contributions to politicians.First,we show that aggregated stock holding changes of politically connected funds predict subsequent abnormal stock returns around the earnings announcement day,implying that the political connection promotes managers’stock picking abilities.Further evidence derived from the sample of entry buys and exit sells shows that politically connected funds outperform politically non-connected funds by 82 basis points annually.Second,we provide evidence that earnings forecast accuracy for the firms whose stocks are held by politically connected funds is improved significantly when time is approaching the announcement date,highlighting the importance of political channels through which information flows between firms and the market are facilitated.