由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督...由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题,可运用进化博弈理论,在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素,构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型,对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明:政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素,另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。展开更多
With stepwise development of Chinese enterprise,management problem is increasingly prominent,especially human resource management issues. Facing international environment of entering into World Trade Organization,the ...With stepwise development of Chinese enterprise,management problem is increasingly prominent,especially human resource management issues. Facing international environment of entering into World Trade Organization,the country accelerates construction pace of human resource management subject in colleges and universities,which provides professional channel for management efficiency and market competition ability of Chinese enterprise,but it is still far from practice. In this paper,the concept,origin and inhibition factors of ingroup preference are elaborated. Based on the visual angle of ingroup preference,started from four dimensions( enterprise incentive system,talent management idea,psychological contract and employee communication consciousness),main problems existing in employee relationship management of modern enterprise are explored. It is specially emphasized that manager often holds the blame in front of dealing with the crisis after contradiction,which is " fatal point" neglected in employee relationship management of modern enterprise. To improve its core competitive power,enterprise must value harmonious relationship with employees.展开更多
文摘由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题,可运用进化博弈理论,在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素,构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型,对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明:政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素,另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。
文摘With stepwise development of Chinese enterprise,management problem is increasingly prominent,especially human resource management issues. Facing international environment of entering into World Trade Organization,the country accelerates construction pace of human resource management subject in colleges and universities,which provides professional channel for management efficiency and market competition ability of Chinese enterprise,but it is still far from practice. In this paper,the concept,origin and inhibition factors of ingroup preference are elaborated. Based on the visual angle of ingroup preference,started from four dimensions( enterprise incentive system,talent management idea,psychological contract and employee communication consciousness),main problems existing in employee relationship management of modern enterprise are explored. It is specially emphasized that manager often holds the blame in front of dealing with the crisis after contradiction,which is " fatal point" neglected in employee relationship management of modern enterprise. To improve its core competitive power,enterprise must value harmonious relationship with employees.