By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumu...By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to de...Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dyn...The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the shortterm interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics,the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.展开更多
Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic kno...Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.展开更多
With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why ...With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in different historical periods.However,the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientific,universal,and long-term.In this study,we constructed an evolutionary game model of local governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory(EGT),which is used to explore the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise of mutual influence and restriction.Besides,the study also included the analysis about the impacts of different influence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model.At the same time,numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn.Firstly,the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization,and its results and speed show consistent interdependence.Secondly,the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost,and the high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages.Thirdly,the dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different influence factors will have an impact on the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders,which provides the basis for them to effectively restrict the decision-making of each other.This study eliminates the weaknesses of existing research approaches and provides scientific and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages,which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and regulations.展开更多
Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering data.Access and sharing limitations are stringent for user...Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering data.Access and sharing limitations are stringent for users,power companies,and researchers,demanding significant resources and time for permissions and verification.This paper proposes a blockchain-based architecture for secure and efficient sharing of electric energy metering data.Further,we propose a data sharing model based on evolutionary game theory.Based on the Lyapunov stability theory,the model’s evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)is analyzed.Numerical results verify the correctness and practicability of the scheme proposed in this paper,and provide a new method for realizing convenient,safe and fast data sharing.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71071119)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
文摘By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71071119 and 60574071
文摘Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71371093)the Natural Science Foundation of the Higher Education Institutions of Jiangsu Province(17KJB120006)
文摘The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the shortterm interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics,the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.
文摘Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.
基金funded by the Southwest Minzu University 2021 Graduate Innovative Research Master Key Project(320-022142043).
文摘With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in different historical periods.However,the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientific,universal,and long-term.In this study,we constructed an evolutionary game model of local governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory(EGT),which is used to explore the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise of mutual influence and restriction.Besides,the study also included the analysis about the impacts of different influence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model.At the same time,numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn.Firstly,the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization,and its results and speed show consistent interdependence.Secondly,the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost,and the high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages.Thirdly,the dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different influence factors will have an impact on the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders,which provides the basis for them to effectively restrict the decision-making of each other.This study eliminates the weaknesses of existing research approaches and provides scientific and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages,which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and regulations.
文摘Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering data.Access and sharing limitations are stringent for users,power companies,and researchers,demanding significant resources and time for permissions and verification.This paper proposes a blockchain-based architecture for secure and efficient sharing of electric energy metering data.Further,we propose a data sharing model based on evolutionary game theory.Based on the Lyapunov stability theory,the model’s evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)is analyzed.Numerical results verify the correctness and practicability of the scheme proposed in this paper,and provide a new method for realizing convenient,safe and fast data sharing.
