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Franchise Value Change Information of State-owned Commercial Bank and Securities Investment Risk
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作者 HE Yun-long 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2007年第2期70-76,共7页
The investment strategy choice of state-owned commercial bank is related to its franchise value change information. This paper analyzes the franchise value change information of state-owned commercial bank. The franch... The investment strategy choice of state-owned commercial bank is related to its franchise value change information. This paper analyzes the franchise value change information of state-owned commercial bank. The franchise value change information shows that the franchise value of state-owned Commercial Bank is descending. Along with the descending of the franchise value, state-owned commercial bank strengthens its high risk investment motive when it chooses its investment strategy. State-owned commercial bank tends to run the high risk of investing securities because its investment variety is very sparse. Based on the theoretical principle of how to control securities investment risk, this paper proposes some countermeasures and suggestions that state-owned commercial bank strengthen the control of its securities investment risk in order to perfect its investment strategy. 展开更多
关键词 state-owned commercial bank franchise value change information investment strategy risk management
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Corporate Governance,Government Regulation and Bank Stability
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作者 王宇明 曲洪建 高长春 《Journal of Donghua University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2015年第4期700-704,共5页
By using the data collected from the years 2006 to 2012 of16 listed banks as samples,an empirical test was set up to analyze the impacts of corporate governance and government regulation towards bank stability. The re... By using the data collected from the years 2006 to 2012 of16 listed banks as samples,an empirical test was set up to analyze the impacts of corporate governance and government regulation towards bank stability. The results show that the nature and percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder,as well as the top10 shareholders, have no significant impact on bank stability.Supervision of board of directors increases bank stability, while independent directors could not play the role of supervision. Higher executive compensation increases bank stability,while shareholding of executives does not show much incentive function. Franchise value has self-regulatory effects. Capital regulation also improves bank stability. Implicit insurance covers the entire banking system.Improving corporate governance and government regulation to increase bank stability are put forward. 展开更多
关键词 corporate governance franchise value capital regulation recessive Insurance bank soundness
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