Considering individual game behavior and time delay in the multi-channel rumor propagation model

The rapid development of the Internet has accelerated the spread of rumors,posing challenges to social cohesion and stability.To address this,a multi-channel rumor propagation model incorporating individual game behavior and time delay is proposed.It depicts individuals strategically choosing propagation channels in the rumor spread process,capturing real-world intricacies more faithfully.Specifically,the model allowing spreaders to choose between text and video information base channels.Strategy adoption hinges on benefits versus costs,with payoffs dictating strategy and the propagation process determining an individual's state.By theoretical analysis of the model,the propagation threshold and equilibrium points are obtained.Then the stability of the model is further demonstrated based on Routh-Hurwitz judgment and Descartes'Rule of Signs.Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the correctness of the theoretical results and the sensitivity of the model to key parameters.The outcomes reveal that increasing the propagation cost of spreaders can significantly curb the spread of rumors.In contrast to the classical ISR model,rumors spread faster and more widely in the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model in this paper,which is a feature more aligned with real-world scenarios.Finally,the validity and predictive ability of the model are verified by using real rumor propagation data sets,indicating that the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model has good practical application and predictive value.

Game analysis of building energy saving behaviors between government and developers

Information asymmetry phenomenon and the differences between the main body's earning targets,which are existing in the building energy saving field,have made the game behaviors of its economic activities become inevitable.There are strategies choice between government departments and the developers,when the building energy saving work is carried out under the government control.Based on the players based assumptions,the path of player's behavior strategy choices is analyzed,expected revenue models are established and mixed Nash equilibrium is obtained in this paper.Based on the analysis results,the incentive strategy enlightenment could be concluded that it is particularly important to design the scientific incentive system for developers to develop energy-saving buildings reasonably and for the government to implement effective control;the role of informal system in encouraging developers to develop energy-saving buildings should not be ignored.

Game Analysis on Heathcliff's Behaviors in the Wuthering Heights

Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It depicts a story of strong love and extreme hatred.This paper used the game theory to analyse the behaviors of Heathcliff in the Wuthering Heights.Some basic strategies and game models were used to illustrate the choices of the characters.This paper can be divided into four parts.The introduction is to introduce the novel,the description of the research approach and the definition of basic theories.It emphasizes on the introduction of basic strategies and some game models which would be used for the later analysis.The second part is to discuss the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality and analyses its causes.Heathcliff was very cruel in his revenge,but he also has a tender side in love,that is the manifestation of his dual personality.The formation of his dual personality dates back to his childhood suffering,the abnormal family environment,the pressure from long labor and finally his only love—Catherine's betrayal.The third part focuses on discussing how his dual personality affects Heathcliff's choices in the game plays with others.His tender personality affected Heathcliff's choice when facing Catherine's betrayal.He could not choose a grim strategy to totally break up with her,but choose a Tit for Tat and to combine with her after a revenge.His cruel personality made him harm other people indifferently which hide the foreshadowing for his death.The conclusion summarizes the arguments of this paper.This paper analyses from the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality,and then analyzes how his dual personality affected his choices in the game plays with others.

Insensitivity to Unethical Behavior in Dictator Game When Indirectly Intermediated-Implications of Indirect Blindness for Safety Management

The aim of this study was to demonstrate that indirect mediation in behaviors leads to insensitivity to unethical behavior through a dictator game and to give some implications for safety management. The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior such as the violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility and the criticism from others for the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in it. The instruction condition for the evaluator of behavior in a dictator game was taken up as an experimental variable. Instruction condition 1 was to pay attention to the behavior of only a dictator. In instruction condition 2, the participant (evaluator) was required to review all players’ behavior and evaluate a dictator. It has been investigated whether allowing indirect actions (mediations) leads to reduced punishment as a function of the instruction condition. While the punishment to the indirectness did not get smaller for instruction condition 2, the punishment to the indirectness tended to get smaller only for instruction condition 1.

智慧医疗情境下四方主体隐私行为的交互机理及演化趋势研究

[目的/意义]本文针对智慧医疗情境下隐私行为研究在博弈主体、模型参数等方面的不足,探寻患者、医疗机构、智慧医疗平台和政府四方主体之间的隐私行为交互机理与演化趋势。[方法/过程]基于演化博弈理论,构建患者、医疗机构、智慧医疗平台和政府四方博弈模型。根据不同参数调节下各方行为策略的收益、成本、损失等计算收益矩阵,求解主体的演化稳定策略,并考虑不同因素对主体行为策略及系统稳定状态的影响。[结果/结论]患者的隐私披露行为与披露隐私后获得的服务收益密切相关,医疗机构的隐私保护投入成本和隐私泄露概率对其隐私保护行为有显著影响,智慧医疗平台的政府奖惩、罚款收益和投入成本是影响其严格管理行为的关键因素,政府的监管行为与奖惩机制等因素密切相关。通过应用本文模型和方法,可以动态调整隐私保护机制,明确各方职责,推动智慧医疗可持续健康发展。

Hysteresis behavior and nonequilibrium phase transition in a one-dimensional evolutionary game model

We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.

Virtual Reality Driving Simulation for Measuring Driver Behavior and Characteristics

This article provides new insights regarding driver behavior, techniques and adaptability. This study has been done because: 1) driving a vehicle is critical and one of the most common daily tasks;2) simulators are used for the purpose of training and researching driver behavior and characteristics;3) the article addresses driver experience by involving new virtual reality technologies. A simulator has been used to assist novice drivers to learn how to drive in a very safe environment, and researching and collecting data for researchers has become easier due to this secure and user-friendly environment. The theoretical framework of this driving simulation has been designed by using the Unity3D game engine (5.4.f3 version) and was programmed with the C# programming language. To make the driving environment more realistic we, in addition, utilized the HTC Vive Virtual reality headset which is powered by Steamvr. We used Unity Game Engine to design our scenarios and maps because by doing this we are able to be more flexible with designing. In this study, we asked 10 people ranging from ages 19 - 37 to participate in this experiment. Four Japanese divers and six non-Japanese drivers engaged in this study, some of which do not have a driver’s license in Japan. A few Japanese drivers have a license and car, while others have a license but no car. In order to analyze the results of this experiment we are used MatlabR2016b to analyze the gathered data. The result of this research indicates that individual’s behavior and characteristics such as controlling the speed, remaining calm and relaxed when driving, driving at appropriate speeds depending on changes in road structures and etc. can affect their driving performance.

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。

情绪因素影响下的煤矿企业冲突管理演化博弈分析

为了系统地研究非理性情绪对于煤矿企业中矿工和管理者冲突的影响,构建了基于RDEU理论的矿工与管理者冲突博弈演化模型,并对收益赋值,进行模拟仿真分析,得到了情绪对于博弈主体行为策略的影响。研究结果表明,当博弈主体带有悲观情绪时易于采取对抗性的强硬策略,反之当其带有乐观情绪时,倾向于采取让步性的缓和策略。且矿工和管理者的情绪以及对另一方选择策略的概率判断对其自身的行为决策具有显著影响。为煤矿企业有关部门实现冲突的有效管控提出了合理建议。

Dynamical Systems Theory Compared to Game Theory: The Case of the Salamis’s Battle

In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that have passed since this famous naval battle which took place in late September 480 B.C. The suggested model describes very well the most effective strategic behavior between two participants during a battle (or in a war). Moreover, we compare the results of the Dynamical Systems analysis to Game Theory, considering this conflict as a “war game”.

Spatial snowdrift game in heterogeneous agent systems with co-evolutionary strategies and updating rules

We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each＇agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance VT as well as the initial composition of agents faO. Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including VT, faO, and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 〈 r 〈 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems.

Effect of Strategy-Homogeneity on the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in a Square Lattice

We investigate the effect of strategy-homogeneity on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice. Strategy-homogeneity means that the population contains at least one connected group in which individuals maintain the same strategy at each iteration and may update according to updating rule at next iteration. The simulation results show that the introduction of strategy-homogeneity increases the cooperation in the evolutionary stable state. For any value of temptation to defect, the density of cooperators in equilibrium state increases firstly and then decreases as the level of strategy-homogeneity increases constantly, and there exists an appropriate level of strategy-homogeneity, maximizing the density of cooperators. The results may be favorable for comprehending cooperative behaviors in societies composed of connected groups with coherent strategy.

高阶结构对无标度网络上合作行为演化的影响

为研究高阶结构对无标度网络上合作行为演化的影响,构建基于囚徒困境博弈的网络博弈模型。在无标度网络上引入二阶高阶结构,定义含成对博弈的三角形面博弈,用高阶结构参数联系成对博弈收益与面博弈收益,并通过仿真实验分析高阶结构对合作行为演化的影响。结果表明,当高连接度个体优先合作并获得高收益时,会促使其他连接度个体也选择合作,博弈个体间一旦形成稳定的“全合作”三角形策略结构,就能显著提高每个合作者收益,进而促进合作行为的产生。

市场环境下需求响应行为特性及模型研究综述

研究市场环境下需求响应(DR)行为,挖掘需求侧灵活资源参与市场的真实动因和特点,有利于促进负荷侧灵活资源参与电网运行,修正和优化电力市场机制,增强新型电力系统的灵活调节能力。首先,针对市场环境下DR行为特性及模型研究进行回顾和综述,分别从欧美成熟电力市场和中国电力市场建设两个角度梳理了DR资源参与的多样化市场环境;其次,从偏好多样性、效用趋优性、行为关联性、行为博弈性、价格弹性和响应不确定性6个方面分析市场环境下需求侧灵活资源的响应行为特性;然后,结合行为经济学原理,构建了DR行为的通用数学模型,从响应机理和数据驱动两个角度梳理适应不同行为特征的市场响应行为建模方法,并进行适应性分析;最后,从社交影响、信息不充分、用户有限理性、多市场最优决策、综合DR等角度展望了后续研究方向。

基于消费者耦合行为的综合需求响应建模与主从博弈运行策略研究

多种异质能源的集成利用在带来互补耦合效益的同时,通常忽略了需求侧多能耦合转换对用户用能满意度的影响,并且当前主流的需求响应单边定价机制大多难以应对系统与用户间复杂的利益交互与迭代关系。据此,提出一种考虑消费者耦合行为的综合需求响应建模与主从博弈运行策略。首先,考虑消费者耦合行为对用户满意度的影响,建立一种适用于综合能源系统负荷聚合商的综合需求响应改进模型。其次,以系统运营商为领导者、多个负荷聚合商为跟随者,提出一种基于主从博弈的综合能源系统优化运行策略,并对所建立的一主多从互动模型的Nash均衡解存在性与唯一性进行了证明。最后,结合标准IEEE33节点系统与比利时20节点天然气系统构建算例分析系统,所得结论验证了所提出的消费者耦合行为需求响应模型的准确性与所提策略方法在兼顾博弈主体双方利益方面的有效性。

家庭康复训练及模拟游戏训练对自闭症患儿行为及病情严重程度的影响

目的探讨家庭康复训练及模拟游戏训练在自闭症患儿中的应用效果。方法88例自闭症患儿,按随机数字表法分为观察组及对照组,各44例。对照组实施常规康复训练,观察组在对照组基础上实施家庭康复训练+模拟游戏训练。对比两组行为情况、病情严重程度、发育情况、家属满意度。结果训练前,两组孤独症儿童行为量表(ABC)评分相比无显著性差异(P>0.05);两组训练后ABC评分均较训练前降低,与对照组训练后的(77.79±7.24)分相比,观察组ABC评分(58.15±4.31)分更低(P<0.05)。观察组病情严重程度轻于对照组(P<0.05)。训练前,两组大运动行为、适应性行为、个人社交能力、语言能力及精细动作评分相比无显著性差异(P>0.05);与对照组训练后的(80.87±6.33)、(71.86±5.73)、(69.63±5.37)、(65.43±4.92)、(81.83±6.88)分相比,观察组大运动行为评分(86.33±7.24)分、适应性行为评分(75.88±5.90)分、个人社交能力评分(74.79±5.22)分、语言能力评分(69.72±5.11)分及精细动作评分(86.85±6.92)分均较高(P<0.05)。观察组家属总满意度95.45%高于对照组的81.82%(P<0.05)。结论家庭康复训练及模拟游戏训练在自闭症患儿中具有较好的应用效果,利于改善其行为情况,减轻病情严重程度,促进患儿生长发育,家属满意度较高。

体操游戏干预促进幼儿自我控制和运动协调能力的实验研究

目的:检验体操游戏干预对幼儿自我控制、运动协调的影响。方法:以杭州市某幼儿园两个园区的114名3~5岁幼儿为实验对象(其中实验组58人),采用准实验不等同比较组前后测设计,对实验组进行为期10周、每周2次、每次20~30 min的体操游戏干预,同时对照组进行户外身体活动,干预前后测量幼儿的认知自控、行为自控和运动协调能力。结果:2(时间)×2(实验处理)重复测量方差分析显示,认知自控的交互作用显著(F=6.72,P<0.05,η_(p)^(2)=0.064),行为自控的变化不具有统计学意义(F=0.15,P>0.05,η_(p)^(2)=0.002);精细动作、运动协调总分的交互作用非常显著(F_(精细动作)=12.48,P<0.001,η_(p)^(2)=0.11;F_(运动协调总分)=10.76,P<0.001,η_(p)^(2)=0.099),定位和抓取的交互作用显著(F=5.93,P<0.05,η_(p)^(2)=0.057),动静态平衡的变化不具有统计学意义(F=1.10,P>0.05,η_(p)^(2)=0.011)。结论:体操游戏干预能够促进幼儿认知自我控制和运动协调能力及精细动作、手眼协调能力的发展。

面向自动驾驶测试的交互场景策略建模与仿真

自动驾驶汽车与人类驾驶汽车的交互能力对未来新型混合交通的运行安全和效率至关重要。为测试高等级自动驾驶汽车的交互能力,测试场景中的背景车须具备自然驾驶交互特征并反映人类驾驶员异质性交互策略。本文基于博弈论框架,建立了驾驶交互策略模型(game-theoretical strategic interaction model, GSIM)。GSIM通过在个体效用函数中引入可差异化取值的交互社会性表征参量,实现背景车交互策略的定向调控。十字路口无保护左转场景的测试实验表明,GSIM可保留自然驾驶逐步规划、双向交互的可解释性,保障交互行为的仿真精度;同时,可有效复现高风险场景中人类驾驶的交互策略,有助于提供具有挑战性的高测试价值场景。对比传统智能驾驶人模型,GSIM模型在无保护左转场景中轨迹仿真精度平均提升42.8%,严重冲突事件复现率提升25.8%。

校园足球政策执行利益主体决策行为的演化博弈研究

校园足球政策执行涉及利益主体众多,均衡各方主体利益是校园足球政策有效执行的关键所在.从利益视角出发,构建地方校足办、学校和家长三方利益主体的动态演化博弈模型,以Matlab为工具仿真分析三方主体决策行为的演化路径和演化规律.结果表明:地方校足办、学校、家长三方初始策略概率相互影响,不同概率取值对三方主体向理想状态收敛速度产生差异化影响,当三方达到较高水平的初始概率时,动态系统更易达到理想稳定状态;地方校足办的收益水平对系统趋于理想状态具有正向作用,收益越高,系统收敛于理想稳定状态的速度越快.为促使三方策略选择趋向利益均衡状态,从加大理念价值传播、提高三方参与意愿、建立利益表达机制、降低信息不对称程度、完善执行考核机制、构建监督评价体系等方面提出相应的政策建议.

作品演绎行为的决策机制构建

著作权法调整原作品著作权人与演绎作者基于作品演绎行为产生的法律关系,通过改变原作品产生新的独创性表达,以实现著作权制度鼓励作品创作和传播的基本目标。演绎行为的规则适用直接决定了作品演绎行为的法律性质,而演绎行为的合法性直接影响原作品著作权人与演绎作者的决策选择。帕累托最优的经济学标准要求制度规则的设计最大化规则适用的收益,整体上减少规则适用的成本。作品演绎行为的决策机制构建应当完善规则共识形成的制度性规范,以明确的规则与稳定的预期促进行为主体在决策过程中实现帕累托最优结果。