Research on Children’s Game Activity Design Strategies Based on Embodied Cognition Theory

Edutainment,in the kindergarten education stage,emphasizes the game as the basic activity and combines the content of education with the form of the game,thus it also forms the educational method of gamification teaching.Through investigation and analysis,it is found that the current kindergarten game activity design has the problem of improper combination of educational content and game form.The current kindergarten game activity design has problems such as stereotypes,children’s lack of active learning opportunities in activities,teachers’insufficient theoretical understanding,inappropriate teacher guidance methods,and so on.Embodied cognition theory attaches importance to the important role of the body in the development of cognition,provides new guidance for classroom teaching,and opens up a new path for classroom teaching reform.Based on the perspective of embodied cognition theory,the concept of body and mind integration should be adhered to in kindergarten teaching with games as the basic activity,experiential teaching situation should be created,children’s subjective experience should be respected,and games and interactions should be designed to promote children’s physical and mental participation,thus laying a foundation for the realization of children’s individual freedom,autonomy,and all-round development.Therefore,this paper aims at the existing problems in the current kindergarten gamification teaching and discusses the design strategy of children’s game activities based on embodied cognition theory.

Weaknesses of Chomsky's Theory of Language

As seemingly persuasive as Chomsky's theory is, it is significantly flawed in four aspects: 1. ignoring a much fundamental creative force in early infancy; 2. equation of first-language learning with second-language learning; 3. methodology; 4. employment of terms.

Energy-Efficient Clustering Using Optimization with Locust Game Theory

Wireless sensor networks(WSNs)are made up of several sensors located in a specific area and powered by a finite amount of energy to gather environmental data.WSNs use sensor nodes(SNs)to collect and transmit data.However,the power supplied by the sensor network is restricted.Thus,SNs must store energy as often as to extend the lifespan of the network.In the proposed study,effective clustering and longer network lifetimes are achieved using mul-ti-swarm optimization(MSO)and game theory based on locust search(LS-II).In this research,MSO is used to improve the optimum routing,while the LS-II approach is employed to specify the number of cluster heads(CHs)and select the best ones.After the CHs are identified,the other sensor components are allo-cated to the closest CHs to them.A game theory-based energy-efficient clustering approach is applied to WSNs.Here each SN is considered a player in the game.The SN can implement beneficial methods for itself depending on the length of the idle listening time in the active phase and then determine to choose whether or not to rest.The proposed multi-swarm with energy-efficient game theory on locust search(MSGE-LS)efficiently selects CHs,minimizes energy consumption,and improves the lifetime of networks.The findings of this study indicate that the proposed MSGE-LS is an effective method because its result proves that it increases the number of clusters,average energy consumption,lifespan extension,reduction in average packet loss,and end-to-end delay.

Weakly Stable Sets of NTU Game

In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.

Muscular atrophy and weakness in the lower extremities in Behçet’s disease: A case report and review of literature

BACKGROUND In Behçet’s disease(BD),very few cases of muscular involvement have been reported previously.The natural history and therapeutic protocol for muscular involvement in BD are obscure due to the low incidence of peripheral neuropathy or myopathy in BD.The purpose of our study was to report a rare case of BD with chronic,focal forms of neuromyopathy and review the relevant literature.CASE SUMMARY We herein report the case of a 54-year-old man who presented with progressive muscular atrophy and weakness of both thighs 2 years after the presentation of the cardinal symptoms of BD.The past medical history,electrophysiological study,neurological examination,blood tests,magnetic resonance imaging study,and histological exam were performed for the differential diagnosis.Relevant literature on muscular involvement in BD was reviewed.Neurological examination revealed that muscular involvement was predominantly localized in the proximal parts of the lower extremities.Heterogeneous enhancement of several thigh muscles was observed on magnetic resonance imaging,which corresponded with the clinical manifestations.Histological study of one of the enhanced muscles showed denervation atrophy of the muscle with superimposed myopathic changes,while electrophysiological studies only suggested denervation.CONCLUSION To our knowledge,this is the first case of neurogenic muscular atrophy with a specific set of clinical,radiological,electrophysiological,and histological findings reported in BD.

CHINA-U.S. COMPETITION ON KOREAN PENINSULA-ADVANTAGES AND WEAKNESSES

America is the only hegemonic power in the world today and is looking vigilantly at every other country that may take its hegemonic position.In Northeast Asia,America is focused on reinforcing its alliance with Japan and South Korea and is working quickly to deploy the THAAD system in

Weak~*(S)-积分的极限定理(英文)

在引进了 Weak* (S) -积分的基础之后 ,对 Weak* (S) -积分的极限定理进行研究 ,并给出了两个重要的Weak* (S)

可剖分函数与Weak~*(S)积分(英文)

引进了 weak*(S) -积分的概念 ,并研究了积分 weak*(S) -与 Gel’fand积分之间的关系 .主要结果是 :当 X**是赋予 weak*拓扑的局部凸向量空间时 ,Weak*(S) -积分与

关于Banach空间值L^1S-games与随机变量阵列完全收敛性的几个注记

设B是一实可分的Banach空间,具有Radon-Nikodyn性质(RNP).{Xn,n≥1}是L1B中的序列,其子序列{Xs,s∈S}是一L1极限鞅.证明了{Xn,n≥1}是L1S-game的充分必要条件是{Xn,n≥1}在条件liminfnE‖XSn‖<∞下或条件∫{τ<∞}‖XSτ‖dP<∞,τ∈下依概率收敛,其中是由{Fn,n∈N}的停时组成的集合,Sn=inf{s∈S:n≤s},n∈N.这个结论推广与改进了Luu的相关结果.而行独立的B值随机变量阵列完全收敛性的两个结果则改进与推广了T.C.Hu等人的相应结果.

The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit

The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.

Generalized constrained multiobjective games in locally FC-uniform spaces

A new class of generalized constrained multiobjective games is introduced and studied in locally FC-uniform spaces without convexity structure where the number of players may be finite or infinite and all payoff functions get their values in an infinite-dimensional space. By using a Himmelberg type fixed point theorem in locally FC-uniform spaces due to author, some existence theorems of weak Paxeto equilibria for the generalized constrained multiobjective games are established in locally FC-uniform spaces. These theorems improve, unify and generalize the corresponding results in recent literatures.

关于Pseudo Weakly J-clean环（英文）

一个环R叫做pseudo weakly J-clean环,如果R中的每一个元素都可以写成a=e+w+(1-e)Ra或a=-e+w+(1-e)Ra的形式,其中e是幂等元,w属于Jacobson根.文章探究了pseudo weakly J-clean环的各种性质.环R是pseudo weakly J-clean环当且仅当幂级数环R[[x]],Hurwitz级数环H(R),平凡扩张T(R,M)和S(R,σ)分别是pseudo weakly J-clean环.更进一步证明以下几点是等价的:任意的n∈N,Sn(R)是pseudo J-clean;任意的n∈N,R[x]/(xn)是pseudo J-clean,(xn)是由xn生成的理想.特别的,阐述了在某种条件下S=R[D,C]是pseudo weakly J-clean;并且得出结论:当2是R中的可逆元时,R是pseudo J-clean当且仅当群环RC2是pseudo J-clean.

Zero-determinant strategy:An underway revolution in game theory

Repeated games describe situations where players interact with each other in a dynamic pattern and make decisions ac- cording to outcomes of previous stage games. Very recently, Press and Dyson have revealed a new class of zero-determinant （ZD） strategies for the repeated games, which can enforce a fixed linear relationship between expected payoffs of two play- ers, indicating that a smart player can control her unwitting co-player＇s payoff in a unilateral way [Proc. Acad. Natl. Sci. USA 109, 10409 （2012）]. The theory of ZD strategies provides a novel viewpoint to depict interactions among players, and fundamentally changes the research paradigm of game theory. In this brief survey, we first introduce the mathematical framework of ZD strategies, and review the properties and constrains of two specifications of ZD strategies, called pinning strategies and extortion strategies. Then we review some representative research progresses, including robustness analysis, cooperative ZD strategy analysis, and evolutionary stability analysis. Finally, we discuss some significant extensions to ZD strategies, including the multi-player ZD strategies, and ZD strategies under noise. Challenges in related research fields are also listed.

THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner＇s Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two con- trol strategies are proposed： compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a coop- erator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can＇t prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）. On the other hand, compensation for the coopera- tor can＇t prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

Modeling and Analysis of Single Machine Scheduling Based on Noncooperative Game Theory

Considering the independent optimization requirement for each demander of modernmanufacture, we explore the application of noncooperative game in production scheduling research,and model scheduling problem as competition of machine resources among a group of selfish jobs.Each job has its own performance objective. For the single machine, multi-jobs and non-preemptivescheduling problem, a noncooperative game model is established. Based on the model, many prob-lems about Nash equilibrium solution, such as the existence, quantity, properties of solution space,performance of solution and algorithm are discussed. The results are tested by numerical example.

关于Schmidt's game的一个注记

Schmidt的(α,β)-game是由Schmidt所引入的研究分形集的一个非常有力的工具。在Schmidt's game意义下winning的集合具有满的Hausdorff维数,且具有可数交稳定性。已有的结论表明,存在(α,β)-winning的集合S,当α减小时不再是winning的。本文将通过数的展式构造(α,β)-winning的分形集S,证明当β增大时,此时S不再是(α,β)-winning的。

(S,T)-WEAK TRACTABILITY OF MULTIVARIATE LINEAR PROBLEMS IN THE AVERAGE CASE SETTING

The purpose of this article is to investigate (s, t)-weak tractability of multivariate linear problems in the average case set ting. The considered algorithms use finitely many evaluations of arbitrary linear functionals. Generally, we obtained matching necessary and sufficient conditions for (s,t)-weak tractability in terms of the corresponding non-increasing sequence of eigenvalues. Specifically, we discussed (s, t)-weak tractability of linear tensor product problems and obtained necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the corresponding one-dimensional problem. As an example of applications, we discussed also (s,t)-weak tractability of a multivariate approximation problem.

Justifying the Choice and Use of a Game and a Song in My Lesson

Games and songs can bring a lot of pleasure to children. They are useful tools in children's language learning. As English teachers, we should know how to make full use of them to stimulate children's interest and promote their learning. In this essay, I will take one primary English lesson as an example to demonstrate my point. First I am going to talk about the advantages of using a game and a song, and then analyze the teaching or learning context and the activities in the lesson. At last I am going to focus on how and why to use the game and the song in the classroom. In a word, I am going to justify my choice and use of a game and a song in a revision lesson.

Integrating the environmental factor into the strategy updating rule to promote cooperation in evolutionary games

Many previous studies have shown that the environment plays an important role for social individuals. In this paper, we integrate the environmental factor, which is defined as the average payoff of all a player＇s neighbours, with the standard Fermi updating rule by introducing a tunable parameter, w. It is found that the level of cooperation increases remarkably, and that the cooperators can better resist the invasion of defection with an increase in w. This interesting phenomenon is then explained from a microscopic view. In addition, the universality of this mechanism is also proved with the help of the small-world network and the random regular graph. This work may be helpful in understanding cooperation behaviour in species from unicellular organisms up to human beings.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner＇s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.