Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

Convenience on Three Wheels China-made motor tricycles are transforming the way goods and people are transported in Uganda

In most cities,towns and villages in Uganda,Chinamade motor tricycles have become a game-changer for commuters and entrepreneurs alike.

Problems and Countermeasures of Bike-Sharing System in China Based on the theory of Public Goods

Under the new normal of China’s economic development,bike-sharing,a new product of the“Internet+”era,opens the door to a novel lifestyle for the society,and is in the stage of rapid development.Nevertheless,with the explosive growth of the number of bicycles,some new problems gradually come out,such as disorderly parking,serious damage and waste of resources,which in turn restrict its further development.Based on the theory of public goods,this article studies the quasi-public goods attributes and problems of bike-sharing,as well as provides feasible measures for its long-term development,so as to realize the co-governance and sharing among enterprises,consumers and government.

Changes in the Supply of Public Intermediate Goods,Fixed Wage,and the Relative Price in the Harris-Todaro Model

Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public intermediate goods provided by the government,the increase in the fixed wage rate in the urban sector,and the changes in the relative international prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods on labor employment,unemployment,and the economic welfare in the context of a small open economy.It also proposes relevant policies to reduce the unemployment rate while improving national welfare.

Factors Analysis of Affecting Loading and Reinforcing Scheme of Large Goods in Railway

Large goods transported in railway are kinds of special goods and they are very important in national construction. In order to transport safely, loading and reinforcing schemes must be made first. How to design a reasonable scheme will be affected by many factors. This paper presents the characteristic of the large goods, summarizes the process of designing a loading and reinforcing scheme of large good, then probes the factors of affecting the loading and reinforcing scheme and gives a detail analysis. It’s considered that those out-of-gauge and overweight degree of goods, center-of- gravity height of a loaded wagon, position of center-of-gravity of goods, type of wagon for using, reinforcement material and reinforcement method, transport expense and transport organization could affect a scheme in the aspects of safety, economy, rapidity and convenience. This conclusion will instruct and help to make a good scheme.

Implementation of Hybrid Genetic Algorithm for CLSC Network Design Problem—A Case Study on Fashion Leather Goods Industry

The implementation of closed loop supply chain system is becoming essential for fashion leather products industry to ensure an economically sustainable business model and eco-friendly industrial practice as demanded by the environmental regulations, consumer awareness and the prevailing social consciousness. In this context, this research work addresses a closed loop supply chain network problem of fashion leather goods industry, with an objective of minimizing the total cost of the entire supply chain and also reducing the total waste from the end of life product returns. The research work commenced with a literature review on the reverse and closed loop supply chain network design problems of fashion and leather goods industry dealt in the past. Then, the identified CLSCND problem is solved using a mathematical model based on Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programme (MINLP) and then a suitable Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) developed for the CLSCND is implemented for obtaining optimum solution. Both the MINLP model and HGA are customized as per the CLSCND problem chosen and implemented for the industrial case of an Indian Fashion Leather Goods Industry. Finally, the solutions obtained for MINLP model in LINGO 15 and for HGA in VB.NET platform are compared and presented. The optimum solution obtained from the suitable HGA is illustrated as an optimum shipment pattern for the closed loop supply chain network design problem of the fashion leather goods industry case.

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Punishment in optional public goods games

In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

The Supply-Demand Analysis and Mechanism Innovation of Chinese Rural Public Goods

The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers' demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers' demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers' demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

Global Development Initiative:An International Public Goods to Promote Common Development

The world today is facing turbulence and change,and global development is at a crossroads.At this critical juncture,President Xi Jinping put forth the Global Development Initiative(GDI)with the theme“implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda for more robust,greener and healthier global development”at the 76th General Assembly of the United Nations,which sheds light on the direction of global development.The GDI,proposed by China,has galvanized support from the international community as an international public goods to promote common development.Following the historical trends of human development,the GDI breaks through the limitations of the hegemonic stability theory and the free-riding curse to expand and innovate the theoretical perception of international public goods with the right approach to principles and interests.With a people-oriented approach and the basic principles of green and innovative development,the GDI both addresses urgent challenges and attaches importance to enhancing development capabilities and creating supporting conditions to offer a holistic solution to global challenges.Through the implementation of multiple pathways under international cooperation,the GDI will build a consensus on global development,increase the momentum of global development,and play an important role in creating a community with a shared future for mankind.

Toward inclusive list-making for trade liberalization in environmental goods to reduce carbon emissions

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)is contemplating expanding its list of environmental goods(EG)for trade liberalization to fight climate change.In support of doing so,this study proposes that a long list that retains controversies is better for carbon emission reduction than a short common list.This study examines four mechanisms of longer lists:enlarging market scales,enriching product mixes,enhancing product sophistication,and enriching trade patterns.Using China’s emerging EG trade during the 2001-2015 period as a case study,this study compares four EG lists with different EG.The results show that:(1)a longer list reduces carbon emissions from both imports and exports,making domestic regions with different advantages have better chances of improving carbon efficiencies.(2)Product sophistication reduces the emission gap between trading partners,regardless of the length of EG lists.(3)China’s EG exports contribute to carbon reduction in leading regions,while EG imports provide laggard regions with better chances of reducing carbon emissions.These findings provide three implications for future list-making:it is important to(1)seek a long and inclusive list rather than a short common list,(2)shift the focus from environmental end-use to the technological contents of products,and(3)balance the demand of laggard regions to import and the capacity of leading regions to export.

Combining Stated Preference and Revealed Preference Methods for the Valuation of Non-market Goods

In this paper,we introduce the combining stated preference and revealed preference methods which is the state-ofthe-art method for the valuation of non-market goods.Revealed preference methods and stated preference (SP) methods have both been applied by economists in valuing non-market goods;however both methods have inherent weaknesses.In order to exploit the strengths of the various approaches while minimizing their weaknesses,combining the two methods has become an important methodological option.Up to now,a growing number of literatures of studying combing the two types of data have evolved,and researchers developed three types of models to estimate combining revealed preference and stated preference data in academic fields:discrete choice model,continuous choice model and mixed choice model.Combining stated and revealed preference methods have been developed fast especially in the transport study field in which ideas could also be leant for environmental economic studies.

The Theoretical Foundation and its Mode Transformation of Rural Public Goods Supply in the Perspective of Organizational Competition

Theoretical expositions of public goods supply by the liberalism,new institutionalism and the school of public choice are conducted in the perspective of organizational competition.And the theoretical foundation of rural public goods is put forward.Then,the changes of the supply mode of rural public goods are discussed before and after the tax reform,that is,the "Community Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods before the tax reform and the "Organization Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods after the tax reform.Finally,the diversification of rural public goods supply in China in future is forecasted.

Applying Network Flow Optimization Techniques to Improve Relief Goods Transport Strategies under Emergency Situation

Given the seriously damaged emergency situation occurring after a large-scale natural disaster, a critical and important problem that needs to be solved urgently is how to distribute the necessary relief goods, such as drinking water, food, and medicine, to the damaged area and how to transport them corresponding to the actual supply and demand situation as quickly as possible. The existing infrastructure, such as traffic roads, bridges, buildings, and other facilities, may suffer from severe damage. Assuming uncertainty related with each road segment’s availability, we formulate a transshipment network flow optimization problem under various types of uncertain situations. In order to express the uncertainty regarding the availability of each road segment, we apply the Monte Carlo simulation technique to generate random networks following certain probability distribution conditions. Then, we solve the model to obtain an optimal transport strategy for the relief goods. Thus, we try to implement a necessary and desirable response strategy for managing emergency cases caused by, for example, various natural disasters. Our modeling approach was then applied to the actual road network in Sumatra Island in Indonesia in 2009, when a disastrous earthquake occurred to develop effective and efficient public policies for emergency situations.

Globalization and Public Goods:Too Big to Tackle?

The massive Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 will have unforeseeable effects on the themes addressed here,from international regime change to infra-structural re-orientation to value changes.Here we concentrate on the positive cycle of effects globalization has brought about before the new war in Europe,mainly economic growth and(some)pressures for democratic development,as well as the negative cycle that originates in(relative)economic decline,elite dissent,even failed states and regime change,often in the direction of counter-democracy.The causal links between 13 independent and intervening variables and public goods as the dependent variable are specified in this explanatory sketch.There is need for broadening the view in explaining causal paths between globalization factors and the production of public goods.In doing that we focus in particular on variables like elite dissent,immigration,and new minorities,all three weakening the capacities of states to respond.Further we state that all four:ecological challenges,economic and social inequality and polarization,regime change,and international terrorism can be viewed as to their joint effects on the production of public goods.Selectorate theory is crucial.It explains political regimes on the base of the size of the selectorate with large(s)electorates producing public goods,as in democracies,and small ones only private ones,as in sultanist regimes and dictatorships.

Globalization Under the Spells of Breakdowns in Supply Chains, Regime Change, Regime Formation, and Alliance Restructuring: How Much Is Left for Public Goods?

In a paper conceived about five years ago(“Globalization and Public Goods:Too Big to Tackle?”)roughly a dozen factors were linked to explain important causal paths from globalization to the potential output of public goods.The Russian invasion of Ukraine,the corona epidemic,and the increased hegemonic rivalry between China and the U.S.interrupted or even destroyed many of the linkages between globalization and potential public good production.About five important detrimental paths involved in the meantime.In the present article we aim at linking what is left from the previous level of globalization or emerging to form a new and simplified causal model for likely linkages between truncated or(re-)emerging globalization,and the deadly needed output of public goods.These linkages refer to rules of climate control,go to trade linkages and arbitrary tariffs and trade interventions.Regime change,regime formation,and alliance restructuring address aspects of domestic rule and international stability.Selectorate theory,regime type,and exit options for political elites provide key explanatory factors in explaining globalization and public goods productions,or their decay.Where possible we use some data and transformation experiences corroborating our arguments.In other instances need for further empirical macro research will become clear.

SIMULATION OF A COLD ROLLING PLANT'S GOODS DELIVERY FORECASTING SYSTEM

The goods delivery process of one cold rolling plant was analyzed and the result shows it is necessary to reengineer and optimize this process. The goods delivery forecasting system was proposed after choosing suitable sampling methods. It is necessary to verify the efficiency of this optimization before the real system adjustment, which is costly and dangerous to some distance. A Simulation method, which employs object oriented paradigm to construct simulation system and stochastic approach to calculate process parameters, was put forward. The simulation result shows the feasibility of this method.