Decentralization, Supervision, and Chinese Local Government Debt

Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.

Local Government Debt,Sectoral Linkage and Resource Allocation Efficiency

Increasing the efficiency of resource allocation is the basis and guarantee for boosting high-quality economic development.Based on the panel data of Chinese industrial enterprises and cities from 2008 to 2013,this paper studies the influence of infrastructure construction demand shocks represented by local government debt expansion on the efficiency of sectoral resource allocation from the perspective of sectoral linkage.According to the empirical findings,local government debt significantly reduces the resource allocation efficiency of manufacturing sector that is highly related to infrastructure construction.This conclusion is still tenable after the robustness test using the simulated local government debt as an instrumental variable.Further mechanism tests show that there are two reasons for the decline of the efficiency of resource allocation in manufacturing sector that is highly related to infrastructure construction.First,more product demands and investments brought by the expansion of local government debt flow to less productive enterprises in the sector.Second,resource misallocation reduces the probability of high-productivity enterprises entering the market and low-productivity enterprises exiting the market,and the effect is more prominent in cities with high dependence on state-owned enterprises and high pressure on officials to be promoted.According to this study,the performance management of local government debt should be further strengthened,and particular attention should be paid to the influence of local government debt on enterprise investment and financing crowding out and resource misallocation.

The Governance of Local Government Debt from the Perspective of Fiscal and Financial Coordination:Evidence from Financial Markets

Theories based on fiscal guarantees cannot explain either the fact that the continuously decline in local fiscal resources has not significantly increased local government financing costs,or the fact that local government debt has been rising at a time of strict central government regulation.The theoretical and empirical analyses provided in this study show that it is the financial resources under local government control that provide the implicit guarantee for local government debt.Such financial resources lower local governments’financing costs but have the potential to lead to the contagion of financial risk through local government to the financial sector.Therefore,to look at the question solely in terms of either fiscal or financial sector guarantees will not be sufficient to resolve the problem of local government debt.The central government needs to coordinate fiscal and financial policies under a joint management framework in a way that rationally disperses and resolves the risks attached to local government debt and avoids the assumption of excessive risk by either sector.At the same time,close attention should be paid to local financial institutions’asset quality and their money market reputation to avoid the risk of contagion from local financial institutions to local public finance.

Local Government Debt, Factor Misallocation and Regional Economic Performance in China

This paper examines total factor efficiency and productivity performance by taking into account local government debt （LGD） in 31 Chinese provincial regions for the period 2000-2013. The results show that neglecting LGD may overstate economic performance in Chinese provinces. The eastern region shows better performance in single jactor efficiency and total factor efficiency than the non-eastern regions. The western region shows the worst total factor performance. The north-eastern region is the only region that has experienced a decline in total factor performance. The state-dominated, investment- driven development model may help technological progress across Chinese regions but could lead to significant factor misallocation. We argue that biases towards more state- dominated investment and land supply in less productive western, central and north- eastern regions, at the expense of investment and land supply in more productive eastern regions, have contributed to the recent slowdown in economic growth in China. Therefore, .further market-oriented reforms in factor markets should be considered in the future.

Local Government Debt in China:Development in Seven Decades,Current Situation,and Reform Suggestions

Since 1949,local government debt in China has gone through the stages from scratch,then banned,and reintroduced,and then to the scale expansion,market construction and improvement under the system construction.In the past 70 years,although there have been twists and turns in its development,local government debt has undergone a“perfect transformation”.Based on a comprehensive review of the development of local government debt in China from 1949 to 2019,this paper refi nes its evolution logic,forecasts its development trend,and puts forward relevant policy recommendations for the future management and risk control of local government debt in China.

Local Government Debt Governance in China in the Past 70 Years:Review and Prospect

This paper gives an overview of local government debt governance in China in the past 70 years and looks ahead to its strategic prospect in the new era based on a theoretical analysis of debt characteristics in the transition period.For this purpose,we divide the past 70 years into fi ve stages:planned regulation,exploration,wide fl uctuations,pilot expansion,and comprehensive transformation,which is a prudent trade-off process between“incentive”and“control”objectives to deal with the strategic fi nancing game of local governments and striving to make debt governance regulated,transparent,and institutionalized.With the historic changes in social and economic development concepts in the new era,the debt governance mode needs to shift from the conventional GDP-based quantitative governance to performance governance which is oriented towards long-term benefi ts,with a focus on improving the quality and efficiency of debt financing.Guided by the new development concepts,debt governance in the new era can continue to unleash reform dividends and promote strategic adjustments at the institutional,structural,mode,and technical levels in an orderly manner,so as to lay a solid foundation for ensuring the security of fi scal operations and the sustainability of local government debt fi nancing.

Apples, oranges and lemons: public sector debt statistics in the 21st century

In both academic research and policymaking,public sector debt and debt-to-GDP ratios are relied on for a multitude of important economic,political and socioeconomic decisions,especially as public sector balance sheets expand to an unprecedented size in the midst of the 2019–2020 COVID pandemic.The reliance on available data from reputable sources often overlooks the question of whether the denominator in this ratio is accurately measured or how well the denominator is understood by the audience interpreting it.Building on past work in international financial statistics,and making use of a unique and newly created dataset on media reporting of public sector debt,the purpose of this article is to examine the quality,accuracy,interpretation and overall meaningfulness of public sector financial statistics.The main findings suggest that i)most of the world’s governments still do not seem to feel sufficient pressure to voluntarily provide comprehensive financial statistics based on well-defined modern methodological frameworks and ii)high profile financial statistics,which are reported,have become increasingly numerous and complicated,making it difficult for non-experts to know which is most appropriate in the context of their analysis.

基层转移支付与地方政府债务扩张--项目制的视角与四川省的实证

财政转移支付对地方政府债务规模的影响,不仅仅是一个公共财政或金融信贷问题,更是一个与我国基本治理结构紧密相关的政治经济学问题。论文以项目制治理为理论导向对此问题展开了实证研究。研究认为,在此治理模式下,基层地方政府可以将省以下的转移支付作为项目运作的资源配置杠杆,申请更多的信贷资金支持,从而推高其地方政府债务。利用对四川省2016-2019年县级面板数据的实证分析,论文揭示了二者之间的因果关联:基层转移支付收入在整体上会扩张地方政府债务规模,并加重其债务成本;这一扩张效应更多是由专项转移支付带来的,而一般转移支付则与债务付息支出更为相关。该发现说明,我国基层转移支付的预算软约束问题已经深深嵌入到更为宏观的政治激励与经济建设模式之中,从而也需要从完善官员治理、优化政府间财政关系以及加强各种财政资源有效配置等方面加以改善。

我国政府性公共机构强制执行制度的完善

当前我国政府性公共机构强制执行制度存在执行程序偏离预算法治轨道、司法实践与法律规范冲突、直接执行措施损害公共利益、间接执行措施效果不佳等问题。政府性公共机构强制执行需要遵循如下法律制度逻辑:生效裁判确定的政府性公共机构债务属于“公债”范畴;预算法治要求所有公共支出必须通过预算程序进行;人民法院强制执行权本质上属于“行政权”,理应受到行政法基本原则的约束。完善我国政府性公共机构强制执行制度,需要着力做好如下几个方面:坚持公益与私益平衡的原则;构建政府性公共机构强制支付预算特别通道;直接强制执行措施需遵循比例原则;严格控制间接执行措施;构建执行法院向各级人大提出司法执行建议制度。

财政透明度的提升缩小了政府性债务规模吗?——来自中国29个省份的证据

2008年国际金融危机爆发后,中国的地方政府性债务规模迅速膨胀,已深切影响到经济良性发展和金融体系安全。近年来,财政透明度成为认识政府性债务规模的又一新视角。笔者从理论与实证两个角度探讨了财政透明度对政府性债务规模的影响及其内在逻辑。理论研究表明,基于中国"晋升锦标赛"模式下的官员激励特色和向最优金融结构趋近的银行业发展现实,在财政透明度缺失的情况下,地方政府存在运用债务资金进行过度投资的冲动,因此通过财政透明度的提升能够缩小政府性债务规模。实证研究表明,财政透明度与政府性债务规模之间的负相关关系是显著的,提高财政透明度,有助于规范约束地方政府的举债行为,防范和化解财政风险。

论我国地方政府债务风险的四大成因

积极防范和化解地方政府债务风险的前提是对风险的成因做出系统、合理的分析，以便"对症下药"。基于此，本文对我国地方政府债务风险的形成机理做了初步的系统分析，认为，目前我国地方政府债务风险的形成与我国经济体制的转轨、财政体制的转换、现行地方政府债务管理制度改革的滞后以及市场经济风险性的逐步显现等四大因素密切相关。

我国政府性债务的测算框架和风险评估研究

近年来,关于我国政府性债务规模和风险大小的研究不断增多,但由于缺乏统一的测算框架和指标体系,学术界和相关部门得出的债务规模和风险状况差异较大,争议不断。为此,本文借鉴货币供应量的多层次统计方法,根据政府与债务偿还的紧密程度,分别构建了我国中央政府性债务和地方政府性债务的多层次测算体系。在此基础上,本文基于2010年的财政和经济数据,系统测算了我国政府性债务的规模及其风险大小。测算结果显示,我国最大口径的政府性债务规模为23.76万亿元,占2010年GDP的59%,接近负债率60%的国际警戒线。其中地方政府的负债率和债务率都要明显高于中央政府。与世界主要发达国家相比,我国的总体债务风险虽然不高,但地方政府性债务风险已处于较高水平。

债务融资的国民负担与可承受国债规模分析

本文在对债务融资的国民负担进行描述的基础上,给出了含有非排挤性投资的政府跨时预算约束,从而证明了政府非排挤性投资的积极作用。同时,根据多马的研究范式,进一步给出了含有税收增长率的最大可承受国债规模的决定条件,并对我国目前的财政状况进行了实证分析。分析表明,积极的财政政策并没有使我国的国债规模与赤字规模超出国民经济可承受范围,我国的财政政策仍然有相当宽余的实际运作空间。

论社会保障的政府责任

社会保障的发展与社会保障管理体制的变迁 ,政府责任义不容辞。我国社会保障管理体制在变革过程中 ,尤其是养老社会保障的转轨中 ,产生了巨额的转轨成本———养老金隐性债务。政府应该承担且有能力解决养老金隐性债务 ,可从财政角度采取措施化解养老金隐性债务。

政府债务探讨

简述了中国财政运行存在的问题 :财政基础薄弱 ,财政赤字持续扩大 ,国债迅速增加。提出一个政府债务极限的简单模型 ,定义了政府财政风险极限系数 ,给出影响极限系数的诸因素 ,并参照 OECD各国政府债务状况及其相应财政政策 ,进一步分析了中国政府的财政风险。在此基础上 ,提出了财政改革理论方面的建议 :优化国债结构 ,建立政府债务预警系统 ,实行政府债务全方位。

风险预警、地方政府性债务管理与财政风险监管体系催生

构建规范有序的地方政府性债务管理制度和风险预警机制是防范财政风险、实现政府债务融资健康发展的重要举措。我国地方政府性债务的快速扩张有其理性因素,不能轻易否定地方政府债务存在的合理性。地方政府投资范围过宽、事权和支出责任的非对称性、地方政府债务管理制度不健全构成地方政府负债融资的非理性因素。应深化体制改革,加快政府职能转变,调整政绩考核机制,继续深化政府间财政体制改革,逐步实现事权和支出责任相匹配;构建规范有序的地方政府性债务管理制度;有效构建地方政府性债务的风险预警和防范机制。

我国地方投融资平台债务运行现状及其治理之道

伴随着我国地方投融资平台的快速发展,地方政府投融资的债务规模也开始急剧扩张,地方政府债务日益膨胀。各方面对由此引发的债务风险乃至可能出现的严重的系统性风险颇为关注。当前,我国地方投融资平台债务正处于拐点的状态,即介于风险与危机之间的位置,因而必须通过建立控制和预警地方投融资平台债务存量、政府和银行联合规避风险、拓宽地方融资市场渠道以及增加地方财政收入的综合治理路径来有效治理地方投融资平台的债务风险。

转轨时期地方政府债务风险及其防范

我国正处于经济转轨时期,由于受多种因素的影响,地方政府债务规模急速膨胀,债务风险凸显。地方政府债务风险,特别是隐性债务风险已经成为威胁我国经济安全与社会稳定的重要因素。研究我国地方政府债务风险的表现,并提出防范与控制的对策,具有非常重要的现实意义。

试论地方政府债务规模及风险化解方式

近年来,地方政府债务规模急剧增加,部分地方政府偿债压力较大,存在一定的债务风险。其主要是因为地方政府财权与事权不对称、政府投融资体制改革滞后和行政管理体制存在缺陷造成的。化解地方政府债务风险,应完善分税制财政体制,增强防范与化解地方政府债务风险的能力;推进地方政府投融资体制改革,建立经济社会风险分散化解机制;深化行政管理体制改革,强化地方政府债务管理监督,确保国家经济社会稳步发展。

我国地方债务风险隐患、成因及化解对策

当前,我国地方债务的规模已十分庞大,并呈现不断扩张的趋势,不但偿债压力大、债务结构不合理,而且债务隐性化趋势明显、管理混乱,存在较大的风险隐患。我国地方债务的累积及其风险的扩张,将阻碍经济发展方式的转变,降低经济发展质量,对私人投资产生"挤出效应",使经济保持较高的通胀率,引发高房价问题,不利于收入分配的改革,并恶化政府和金融体系的信用。地方债务风险的成因是多元的,包括财政体制、预算软约束、地方财政收入增长困难、投资拉动型的经济增长方式、政绩考核机制等。控制和化解地方债务风险,在短期可通过资产证券化、引进民间资本和出售地方国有资产方式快速筹集偿债资金以尽快偿债;在长期则必须进行实质性改革,如构建市场化的地方政府融资机制、转变政府职能、改革分税体制、加强中央政府对地方政府举债管理约束、建立债务风险预警机制等。