Antecedents and performance consequences of governance structures in R&D alliances

Traditionally governance structures are classified into ＂hierarchy or market＂ or ＂equity or non-equity.＂ However,such classifications may not be effective in characterizing all governance structures of research and development（R D） alliances.Therefore,the first objective of this study is to investigate why there exist different organizational governance structures in managing R D alliances;the second objective of this study is to give strategic advice in choosing appropriate forms with respect to various characteristics of R D alliances.Through the theoretical lens that integrate both transaction cost economics（TCE） and the resource-based view（RBV）,a model that focuses on six major factors is developed for determining governance structure choices,namely,technological uncertainty,cultural difference,asset specificity,technology complementarity,appropriability of the individual firm＇s know-how,and trust.An R D alliance with higher technological uncertainty,larger cultural differences,and greater concerns for protecting an individual＇s know-how is more likely to adopt non-integrated alliances as the governing structure.An R D alliance with a higher degree of asset-specificity,greater technology complementarity and greater trust among partnering organizations is more likely to adopt integrated alliances as the governing structure;an R D alliance in the face of lower technological uncertainty will tend to adopt integrated alliances.The more aligned the choice of the governance structure with its determinants,the better the R D alliance will perform,and vice versa.

Trust and Structural Response to Natural Disaster： Some Implications to Government Reform

The Philippine government is a representative democracy. It has three co-equal branches of government namely the executive, legislative, and judicial, operating on the principle of check and balance. Issues that had riddled top officials of government remained unresolved hitherto; and, the local government units had their own lingering issues. The government structure therefore did not seem to have the mechanism to correct itself. This paper argues that responses to, as well as the ensuing conditions of the survivors of natural disasters, are affected by how much trust the incumbents of relevant government structures have of each other and that actors outside of the government hierarchy can offer avenues for reform. Tropical Storm Washi that hit Cagayan de Oro City could be a case in point. It left thousands of people dead or missing, millions of dollars in damages, and thousands of internally displaced persons （IDPs）. The local government, tasked by the local government code to handle matters related to social welfare, did not seem to have performed as expected. In an apparent lack of trust, donor agencies preferred to course cash and relief items through conduits others than the local government. While the system remained unable to correct itself, the victims of the disaster continued to suffer. Civil society organizations and non-government organizations were trying to re-establish people’s trust in the system through legal measures, and hope that electoral reforms could be instituted.

Food safety controls in different governance structures in China's vegetable and fruit industry

Food safety issues constitute an international topic discussed by many scholars. Although there is an extensive body of literature on comparisons of food safety control practices across different governance structures, these studies have been conducted mainly in terms of qualitative and descriptive analysis. In addition, little attention has been given to family farms. This study addresses the food safety control practices adopted by firms with different governance structures in China. Food safety control is expressed by the following aspects, i.e., pollution-free, green, organic, and/or geographical indication prod- ucts certification, establishment of production records, and pesticide residue testing. Three types of governance structures that engage in agricultural production are distinguished： farmer cooperatives, agricultural companies, and family farms. The food safety control practices of various governance structures are investigated based on a database that comprises 600 vegetable and fruit enterprises in Zhejiang, China. The results show that （1） pesticide residue testing is adopted by the most firms, followed by products certification, and production records are adopted by the fewest firms, and （2） agricul- tural companies adopt more food safety control practices than family farms, while farmer cooperatives adopt the fewest food safety control practices. Governance structure features of a cooperative in terms of ownership, decision-making, and income distribution are the main reasons for the low level of food safety control in the cooperative.

The Impact of Financial Distress Status and Corporate Governance Structures on the Level of Voluntary Disclosure Within Annual Reports of Firms （Case Study of Non-financial Firms in Indonesia Over the Period of 2009-2011）

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of financial distress status and corporate governance structures on the level of voluntary disclosure. We apply six independent variables, including the firm＇s financial distress status and five components of corporate governance structures, such as board independence, audit committee independence, institutional ownership, board meeting frequency, and audit committee meeting frequency. This research is carried out by examining the annual reports of 114 non-financial firms listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange over the period of 2009-2011. To test hypotheses, we undergo two different analyses, including independent samples t-test and Multiple Linear Regression. We find that： （1） The audit committee independence and the audit committee meeting frequency have significant positive impacts on the level of voluntary disclosure; （2） The financial distress status is negatively related to the level of disclosure at various levels of significance; and （3） All the independent variables are simultaneously related to voluntary disclosure.

Arrangement for Capital Structure in the Framework of Corporate Governance

Using the method of principal component analysis, the paper conducts a systematic study on the issue of how corporate governance influences capital structure. The study manifests the results that the proportion of circulation shares, the ability that other big shareholders contend with the first biggest shareholder, the proportion of corporation-owned shares, and the frequency of directorate meetings all have a positive relationship with the liability level. Meanwhile, the concentration degree of owners＇ equity, the proportion of state-owned shares, the phenomenon that one person serves as both chairman of directorate and general manager, and the intensity of competition in product market are all negatively related to the level of debt. Finally, the scale of directorate, the proportion of independent directors as well as the percentage of management-owned shares have no significant relationship with the capital structure. The statistic analysis also shows that the proportion of independent directors of some Chinese listed companies does not meet the regulation of the CSRC. In addition, the paper tests the impacts of corporate operating characteristics on capital structure.

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value:(1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies;(2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and(3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises(SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.

Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management： Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.

Study on the Current Implementation Situation of the Independent Director System in China＇s Listed Companies

The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.

An Empirical Research About Corporate Governance on Enterprise Innovation

Enterprise innovation is the core driving force of national development.As the core of the modern enterprise system,corporate governance has a significant impact on enterprise innovation.Through particularizing the issue of corporate governance and then analyzing thoroughly about the interaction between the structure of corporate governance and the level of enterprise innovation by means of the method of empirical research,the article aims to ascertain the critical factors in the mode of corporate governance which have an impact on the level of enterprise innovation,thereby providing the relative references for the reform of corporate governance in China and promotion of enterprise innovation.

Farmland Capitalization an Urgen issue in Institutional Reform

Developing modern agriculture is an important aspect of urban and rural integration. Chintz has adopted a new, highly compatible, multipronged approach. Judgingfrom current agricultural and rural policies, factors like capital, labor and land will continue to interact and revolve. The transformation of China＇s rural land tenure system is at a critical posifion in the overall strategy of developing tile rural economy. However, rural institutional reform will inevitably be constrained by the path and pattern China＇s industrialization, urbanization and agricultural modernization take. Creating a new pattern of urban and rural socioeconomic integration requires reform and improvement of rural grassroots governance structure. The interaction and reconsolidation of the factors have again become intertwined with the superstructure of rural society and will inevitably affect the direction and pace of rural grassroots governance structural reJbrm. Protecting the economic interests of farmers while respecting their democratic rights will always be at the heart of agricultural modernization.

The Reordering of Relationship and the Shaping of a National Governance Structure in China

Various government documents tend to put the reordering of relationship together with institutional reform and functional transformation.If we fail to understand this important issue,we will be unable to understand China’s national governance system.The reordering of relationship has four dimensions:government and market;central and local government;the economy and society;and government and society.The routes to this reordering can be divided into separation,retention and postponement.On the one hand,the conflicts between these routes have affected China’s national governance structure,so that it seeks a balance between closure and opening up;on the other,the course taken by the reordering of relationship is rooted in the demands for generality and modernity that coexist within China’s national governance.One could say that the straightening out of relationship has reshaped the distinctive features of this governance.In the course of continuous reordering,some of its important elements have undergone a crucial change.From the perspective of the reordering of relationship,the openness with which these relations have been absorbed into a larger system is crucial to the future transformation of China’s national governance.

Order in Transitional China and Its Institutional Logic

The development of order in transitional China is not merely a matter of institutional supply, hut also a matter of defining the state＇s special roles and functions in the transition period. Since reform and opening up, China has sought to realize the twin governance aims of high speed development of the socialist economy and maintenance of stability, which require that the state simultaneously undertake the dual roles of modern government and national capital. The consequent adjustments to the governance structure are expressed in the state＇s devolution of power to the market while reserving government pricing power; devolution of power to local governments while reserving power over central tasks; and affirming social rights while reserving the power to approve social organizations. At the institutional level, the externalities produced by this ＂quasi-decentralized governance structure＂ are marked by the shrinkage of arrangements for collective welfare, the absence of mechanisms for routine security in ordinary life, and the development of mechanisms that allow the government to profit from the market. This may result in the instrumentalization of government functions and the capitalization of public power, producing imbalances in the distribution of social rights, wealth and risk, or in other words, social instability.