In this paper,we investigate the incentive equilibrium strategies of two neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game set...In this paper,we investigate the incentive equilibrium strategies of two neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.Our paper can be viewed as an extension of the work of Yeung[2007.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution.Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,134,143-160]in the context of the transboundary industrial pollution.Compared with the work of Yeung[2007.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution.Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,134,143-160],our research significant features(i)introduce the emission permits trading into the transboundary industrial pollution control;(ii)take into account the pollution abatement investment;(iii)examine the incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control;and(iv)design an allocation mechanism for regions’cooperative profits.Furthermore,we illustrate the results of the paper with a numerical example.The utility of this paper is how to make incentive equilibrium strategies in a situation where the neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.展开更多
基金This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China[grant number 71373263]and[grant number 71673275].
文摘In this paper,we investigate the incentive equilibrium strategies of two neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.Our paper can be viewed as an extension of the work of Yeung[2007.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution.Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,134,143-160]in the context of the transboundary industrial pollution.Compared with the work of Yeung[2007.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution.Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,134,143-160],our research significant features(i)introduce the emission permits trading into the transboundary industrial pollution control;(ii)take into account the pollution abatement investment;(iii)examine the incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control;and(iv)design an allocation mechanism for regions’cooperative profits.Furthermore,we illustrate the results of the paper with a numerical example.The utility of this paper is how to make incentive equilibrium strategies in a situation where the neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.
