Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings： Evidence from Chinese Public Corporation

This paper studies incentive effect and entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder. Author investigates 763 listed companies in SHSE, explores the statistical relationship between the largest shareholding and corporate performance. Author observes that the largest shareholder has the incentive effect and entrenchment effect on corporate valuation. Empirical relationship between the largest shareholding and corporate valuation shows that the firm value decreases with the equity ownership of the largest shareholders, consistent with a negative entrenchment effect, when the largest equity ownership is below 40.28% of the whole share. Then firm value rises when the proportion of the largest shareholder＇s rights was increased to 69.29%, being consistent with a positive incentive effect. But with the increase of the share of the largest shareholding, firm value falls again.

Analysis on The Incentive Effect of Occupational Pension in The Human Resource Strategy of Private University

Occupational pension can play an active role in the management of human resources at the present stage,and has the good effect.As a human resource strategy,the active application of occupational pension in private universities can effectively improve the traditional salary management work,promote the salary management work smoothly,and provide effective conditions for human resource assessment.In private university human resources strategy,the positive application of occupational pension,need to continue to play its incentive function and effect,to attract more excellent teachers to participate in school construction,to improve the overall teaching achievements.This paper mainly starts with the connotation and the definition of occupational pension,introduces and analyzes the relevant situation of occupational pension comprehensively,and gives a detailed description of the incentive effect of occupational pension in the human resource strategy of private universities.

Influence of government subsidies on western enterprise technology innovation

With the deepening of the western development,supports of the country for the western region of China continued to increase.It also includes the support for enterprise innovation activities,by reducing the tax,exemption,subsidies and other means.Due to the effect of government subsidies on enterprise innovation activities is different in different regions,industries and so on,there is a big controversy.Therefore,we use the panel data of listed companies in manufacturing industry of western region as samples for empirical research,to research the effect of government subsidies on enterprise innovation activities in the western of China,the study found that overall,the current government subsidies has a positive effect on Enterprise R&D investment,whereas the last year's government subsidy has a negative effect on R&D investment,but it's incentive effect is greater than the crowding out effect.The study also found there are different effects between the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,the crowding out effect of private enterprises is very small and not significant.

Stimulating Start-up Investment Through Government-Sponsored Venture Capital:Theory and Chinese Evidence

Government-sponsored venture capital(GVC)has been used to support financially constrained start-ups as an important policy tool in China.Typically,to motivate the social capital to invest in start-ups,GVC provides subsidies for them to bridge the funding gap in the early-stage venture capital market.However,the effect and mechanism of GVC affecting social capital investment have not been clearly studied.In this paper,the authors not only develop a game model to analyze this issue in theory,but conduct an empirical study by analyzing the 14741 records matched by propensity score matching(PSM)of Chinese venture capital market data from 2011 to 2021.The proposed findings are as the follows.Firstly,the subsidies offered by GVC will simultaneously increase the returns and risks of investments in start-ups of social capital with more volatile incentive effect of GVC.The incentive effect of GVC is only effective when the returns resulting from the subsidies outweigh the risks they introduce.In the context of the Chinese venture capital market,the incentive effect of GVC is effective.Secondly,the incentive effect of GVC is more pronounced in high-tech industries,which can be attributed to the signaling effect facilitated by GVC.In this context,the subsidy mainly helps social capital to bear the costs associated with screening potential investments.Thirdly,the incentive effect of GVC is more significant in underdeveloped venture capital markets,which can be explained by the“virtuous cycle”effect,in which GVC plays a pioneering role in establishing a more robust early-stage market trading system.By examining these three points,this study contributes to a better understanding of how GVC can effectively guide social capital investment,especially in the Chinese landscape.