Concerns Affecting Behaviors of Independent Directors

This paper tries to find out whether some individual concerns will affect the behaviors of independent directors, specifically voting against proposals during the board meeting.We analyze career concern,compensation concern,reputation concern and term concern.The results show that individual director with longer career horizon,who is better compensated,with less board seats in other firms,and whose term is earlier than that of the board chairman is more likely to dissent.

Does the system of independent directors help improve the quality of accounting information： From the perspective of earnings conservatism

Based on the sample data of the listed firms on the A stock market, we analyze how the system of independent directors influence the earning conservatism from 4 dimensions designed to measure the monitoring power of these independent directors： Percentage within BDs, professional capacities, stimulation and work conditions. From the empirical results, we conclude that the more powerful of the independent directors, the better the accounting conservatism, and that their positive impact increases along with the improvement on corporate governance, meanwhile the work conditions plays the most important role, and then are the percentage within BDs and their professional capacities, the stimulation and personal reputation appear the least importance.

Board of Directors, Independent Directors and Audit Fees： Based on the Empirical Data of the GEM of China

As one of the alternative variables of audit quality, audit fees have been researched widely in the Mainboard of China stock market, but empirical research based on the GEM （Growth Enterprise Market） of China is very few. From the perspective of GEM of China, this article observes and studies the impact of corporate governance structure represented by board of directors and independent directors on audit fees. This article selects the data of 348 listed companies in the GEM of China in 2012, proves that there is a positive correlation between the number of meetings, independent directors＇ salaries and audit fees through the use of multiple linear regression model, and accordingly proposed suggestions that improve the corporate governance structure of the GEM of China.

Study on the Current Implementation Situation of the Independent Director System in China＇s Listed Companies

The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.

The Criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors

Non-executive directors are now very well established in Chinese business. The uniform and final criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors is not available. It will be valuable to draw an analogy with the criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors in the UK, where over a dozen different criterions are applied.

Coping strategy of independent directors for job-fulfillment risk under different ownership types and enforced legal environments

Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.

Voluntary resignation of independent directors and auditor responses:Empirical evidence from Chinese A-share listed firms

We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit effort.Mechanism tests reveal that independent directors’voluntary resignation leads to increased regulatory sanctions and negative media coverage,these relationships are more pronounced after the New Securities Law.Auditor response strategies follow an order of priority:at an acceptable level of perceived risk,auditors increase audit fees;when perceived risk exceeds this level,auditors will discontinue the client relationship.Auditors associate greater risk with firms that have(vs.have not)experienced consecutive voluntary resignations by independent directors.Mandatory resignation has no such effect.

The Effect of the Board of Directors and Audit Quality on Disclosure of Internal Control Practices: Evidence from European Companies

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.

“监督机制”还是“掏空行为”:超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资

以2007—2021年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,深入探究超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的影响效应及作用机制。研究发现:超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资具有显著的促进作用,验证了超额聘任独立董事属于一种“监督机制”;超额聘任独立董事通过抑制管理层短视和大股东掏空行为来促进企业进行环保投资;在重污染行业、两职合一以及独立董事薪酬较低的企业中,超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的促进作用更显著。

论独立董事虚假陈述民事责任之优化——基于260家上市公司年报的实证研究

独立董事虚假陈述民事责任的核心问题是,一方面过分依赖行政处罚决定书的认定结果,径直认定独立董事需承担民事责任;另一方面在虚假陈述损害后果过分高于独立董事赔偿能力的情况下,尚无适当的责任减免规则。原因在于,现有规则错误地将独立董事定位为“全能型董事”。基于实证研究,我国应当塑造“监督型独立董事”,并构建与监督角色相契合的虚假陈述民事责任规则。在责任认定上,以勤勉义务为基础差异化判断独立董事损害行为,科学计算虚假陈述损害后果,采“相当性”原则认定独立董事损害行为与损害后果的因果关系,并优化无过错抗辩事由。在责任承担上,强制上市公司为独立董事购买责任险,使其覆盖独立董事轻微过错时的赔偿责任;在独立董事具有一般过错时应承担“差额倍数上限”赔偿责任;而在独立董事具有故意、重大过失时不能享受责任减免。

董事网络能促进企业数字化转型吗?——基于独立董事网络中心度的考查

本文基于镶嵌理论和声誉理论,以2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究独立董事所处网络中心度对所任职企业数字化转型的影响。研究发现,独立董事所处的网络中心度越高,企业数字化转型的程度越大,说明董事网络显著促进了企业数字化转型。经稳健性检验后,该结论仍然成立。机制检验表明,独立董事网络中心度通过降低代理成本、缓解融资约束推动企业数字化转型进程。进一步研究发现,对于制度环境较差地区的企业、信息透明度较高的企业以及民营企业,独立董事网络中心度对企业数字化转型的推动作用更显著。研究结论对于如何推动数字经济与实体企业深度融合,实现企业高质量发展有重要的参考价值。

异地独立董事与上市公司高质量发展——基于高铁通车与独立董事履职的视角

独立董事的尽责履职对推动上市公司高质量发展具有重要意义。文章以2004—2020年我国A股上市公司为样本,从独立董事履职的视角,对异地独立董事如何影响上市公司高质量发展进行了实证研究,并考察了高铁通车在其中的调节作用。研究发现,异地独立董事对上市公司高质量发展具有显著负向影响,高铁通车则有效缓解了这一影响。机制检验发现,异地独立董事因为监督、咨询和决策无效而不利于上市公司高质量发展,高铁通车则主要通过改善监督和咨询职能的发挥,缓解上述不利影响。进一步研究发现,高铁通车后不同背景特征的异地独立董事对上市公司高质量发展存在差异化影响。具体而言,高铁开通后,具有行业专长、学术背景、海外背景的异地独立董事比例与上市公司高质量发展显著正相关;而不论高铁是否开通,具有法律、财务背景的异地独立董事比例与上市公司高质量发展显著负相关。

“价值被低估”的独立董事选择离职或是继续留任?——基于组织公平理论和社会交换理论视角的研究

现有研究基于组织公平理论发现,“价值被低估”的独立董事会因感知的不公平而选择离职。但是现有研究不能解释为何还有部分“价值被低估”独立董事没有选择离职,并且那些继续留任的“价值被低估”独立董事后来还会拥有较多的“晋升”机会。为回答上述问题,在组织公平理论基础上引入社会交换理论,认为独立董事的社会交换关系(基于社会交换理论)对独立董事“价值低估”与离职之间的正向关系(基于组织公平理论)具有负向调节作用。并且,价值被低估且没有离职的独立董事此后会拥有更多的“晋升”机会(基于组织公平理论)。基于中国A股上市公司2008~2017年独立董事任职数据,实证研究结果支持了上述理论推断。实证结果如下:①社会交换关系在独立董事“价值低估”与离职之间发挥显著的负向调节作用。具体而言,当“价值被低估”的独立董事是由现任董事长任命,或者“价值被低估”的独立董事具有较好的社交技能时,独立董事价值低估对离职的正向影响较弱。②对于“价值被低估”且没有离职的独立董事而言,其后期获得“晋升”的可能性更大。

董事高管责任险、独立董事履职水平与企业多元化战略--基于沪深A股上市公司数据的实证分析

董事高管责任险是一种重要的公司治理机制,旨在帮助决策者规避部分履职风险,提升其参与公司治理的积极性,从而有利于企业决策科学化水平的提升。本文基于2008-2020年我国沪深A股上市公司的相关数据,实证考察了董责险、独立董事履职水平与企业多元化战略三者之间的关系及影响机制。研究结果表明,企业购买董责险有助于促进其多元化战略的实施,提高企业多元化水平。同时,企业购买董责险还能提升独立董事履职水平,而独立董事履职水平在企业购买董责险进而提升企业多元化战略水平的进程中发挥了中介效应。因此,应促进董责险在国内的推广,适当鼓励相关企业购买董责险;完善独立董事选用、激励和约束机制,以保证独立董事的独立性,提高其履职的积极性和有效性。同时,企业要完善治理结构,发挥独立董事的重要作用,加强内外部监管,建立健全相关法律制度,从而促进社会经济的不断发展。

独立董事民事责任反思与制度完善

当前配套机制缺失现实下,独立董事承担连带责任与其职责义务并不匹配,也背离民事责任的调整目的。基于独立董事民事责任的理论基础与现实难题,根据责任义务匹配、风险收益平衡的逻辑思路,应当建立独立董事主体差异化的宏观责任区分框架与类型化的微观责任认定框架,健全股东大会决议与商业判断规则保护、责任保险与限额赔偿兜底的双层责任限制路径,构建科学合理的独立董事民事责任平衡体系。

Are academic independent directors punished more severely when they engage in violations?

We use a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 to explore the reputation damage and overflow effect of academic independent directors who have received supervisory punishment. We find that when companies violate information disclosure rules, the market punishes academic independent directors more severely than nonacademic independent directors for these violations. Furthermore, companies employing punished academic directors face greater declines in their stock price than companies employing punished nonacademic independent directors during a relatively short window before or after the punishment is announced. The punishment of academic independent directors influences the employment of other scholars in the same field and results in a negative overflow effect. This study provides evidence of the market's differential reactions to independent directors with different backgrounds; the findings reflect the double-edged sword of one individual's reputation on organizations.

Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq

As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.

单层制改革背景下独立董事法律义务与责任研究

我国独董制度长期以上市公司为背景展开规范,2023年12月29日公司法的修订将独董制度延伸至非上市股份公司治理结构,将面临独董规范的立法空白。独董的职能应包括公司内部治理优化和对外投资者保护两个方面,并分别构成独董承担公司法和证券法义务的基础,但在立法与实践中往往将两者混淆。董事信义义务规则可以参照适用于独立董事,但应当正视独董在信息获取渠道上的局限性,较执行董事承担更为宽松的责任标准,以商业判断规则的精神评价独董是否勤勉尽责,且不宜盲目扩大义务范围。在决定独董是否承担自付责任时,应当确立可预期、有合理救济范围的责任减免机制,包括章程豁免条款、董责险和赔偿责任上限规则。

Ownership balance, supervisory efficiency of independent directors and the quality of management earnings forecasts

In the Chinese securities market, with its characteristics of influence through personal relationships(Guanxi) and underdeveloped standards of law and enforcement, can independent directors play the supervisory role expected by securities regulators? In this study we use the degree of precision and accuracy in corporate earnings forecasts as proxies for the quality of information disclosure by listed companies and examine the supervisory efficiency of independent directors with respect to information disclosure. Using data from 2007to 2009, we find that in the absence of ownership balance, independent directors have a significant positive effect on the accuracy of management forecasts.In addition, the personal backgrounds of independent directors have specific effects on management earnings forecasts. Directors with certified public accountant(CPA) expertise significantly improve the precision of management forecasts. However, directors with industrial expertise significantly reduce the precision of management forecasts. In other words, having directors with CPA expertise improves the independence of boards, but having independent directors with industrial expertise has the opposite effect.

Do independent directors play a political role? Evidence from independent directors' death events

We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we investigate whether the stock price reaction to an independent director's death is related to his or her political connection. We find a stronger negative reaction to the death announcements of politically connected than politically unconnected independent directors. The magnitude of the reaction is positively related to directors' political rank, and cannot be offset by their firms' political capital. However,we document no evidence of politically connected independent directors exhibiting superior monitoring or consulting performance. Additional analyses show that firms are more inclined to appoint a politically connected independent director as a successor if his or her predecessor also had political connections. Our study broadens scholarly understanding of independent directors' role in a non-Anglo-American setting.