Strategy Selection for Moving Target Defense in Incomplete Information Game

As a core component of the network,web applications have become one of the preferred targets for attackers because the static configuration of web applications simplifies the exploitation of vulnerabilities by attackers.Although the moving target defense(MTD)has been proposed to increase the attack difficulty for the attackers,there is no solo approach can cope with different attacks;in addition,it is impossible to implement all these approaches simultaneously due to the resource limitation.Thus,the selection of an optimal defense strategy based on MTD has become the focus of research.In general,the confrontation of two players in the security domain is viewed as a stochastic game,and the reward matrices are known to both players.However,in a real security confrontation,this scenario represents an incomplete information game.Each player can only observe the actions performed by the opponent,and the observed actions are not completely accurate.To accurately describe the attacker’s reward function to reach the Nash equilibrium,this work simulated and updated the strategy selection distribution of the attacker by observing and investigating the strategy selection history of the attacker.Next,the possible rewards of the attacker in each confrontation via the observation matrix were corrected.On this basis,the Nash-Q learning algorithm with reward quantification was proposed to select the optimal strategy.Moreover,the performances of the Minimax-Q learning algorithm and Naive-Q learning algorithm were compared and analyzed in the MTD environment.Finally,the experimental results showed that the strategy selection algorithm can enable defenders to select a more reasonable defensive strategy and achieve the maximum possible reward.

Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution

This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.

Cooperative maneuver decision making for multi-UAV air combat based on incomplete information dynamic game

Cooperative autonomous air combat of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs)is one of the main combat modes in future air warfare,which becomes even more complicated with highly changeable situation and uncertain information of the opponents.As such,this paper presents a cooperative decision-making method based on incomplete information dynamic game to generate maneuver strategies for multiple UAVs in air combat.Firstly,a cooperative situation assessment model is presented to measure the overall combat situation.Secondly,an incomplete information dynamic game model is proposed to model the dynamic process of air combat,and a dynamic Bayesian network is designed to infer the tactical intention of the opponent.Then a reinforcement learning framework based on multiagent deep deterministic policy gradient is established to obtain the perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium solution of the air combat game model.Finally,a series of simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method,and the simulation results show effective synergies and cooperative tactics.

Comparison Research on Anti-dumping Duty Rates between Administrative Review and Welfare Maximization under Dynamic Game of Perfect Information

Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model is for calculating Anti-dumping rate which is obtained according to current regulations of Anti-dumping, but it is not optimal. The other is an optimal model of Anti-dumping which is obtained according to the maximum principle of domestic social welfare. Then, through the comparison of this two models in detail, several shortages have been revealed about Anti-dumping rate model based on current regulations of Anti-dumping. Finally, a suggestion is indicated that WTO and China should use the optimal model to calculate Anti-dumping rate.

On Positional Games With Perfect Information and Their Applications

The game theory was firstly used for description of economic phenomena and social interaction. But there are certain type of perfect information games （PI-games）, the so-called positional game or Banach-Mazur games, which so far have not been applied in economy. The perfect information positional game is defined as the game during which at any time the choice is made by one of the players who is acquainted with the previous decision of his opponent. The game is run on a sequential basis. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected Banach-Mazur games and to present some applications of positional game. This paper also shows new theoretical example of a determined PI-game, based by theoretical overview. All considerations are pure theoretical and based by logical deduction.

EVOLUTION OF DYNAMIC GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION

As an efficient method of solving subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,the backward induction is analyzed from an evolutionary point of view in this paper,replacing a player with a population and turning a game into a population game,which shows that equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models in the limit.

Balance between education and game-play— A case study of design and optimization of the mini-game book classification

Purpose： Based on our experience of designing and testing a computer-based game for teaching undergraduate students information literacy （IL） concepts and skills, this paper summarizes the basic strategies for striking a balance between education and entertainment for the designers of quality IL games. Design/methodology/approach： The project team recruited 10 college students to play the game and post-game group interviews revealed problems and optimization priorities. The optimized game was tested among 50 college students. Based on a comparison of testing results of the two versions of the game, basic strategies for designing quality 1L games were summarized. Findings： The following 5 basic strategies can effectively promote combination of education and entertainment： l） using adventure games to enhance gaming experience, 2） plotting an intriguing story to attract players, 3） motivating players to engage in game play with game components such as challenge, curiosity, fantasy and control, 4） presenting learning materials through game props, and 5） assigning players tasks to be completed with subject knowledge. Research limitations： The 5 basic strategies have been tested only in the development process of one game, and the book classification knowledge in the mini-game is limited to the 22 major categories of the Chinese Library Classification. Practical implications： University libraries may refer to our experience to design and utilize educational games to promote the IL education for college students. Originality value： Few empirical studies tested and summarized strategies for combining learning and fun in the design of IL games for university students. The 5 strategies, which are summarized in the process of design and optimization of the mini-game book classification, are valuable for other designers of IL games.

儿童家庭游戏信息化特征、影响及引导策略

信息化游戏产品趣味性强对儿童吸引力大,但多以"静态游戏""人机互动"为主,包含信息量大但内容成人化,缺少人与人、人与自然的交流。儿童家庭游戏信息化在为儿童的生活、游戏、学习带来便利的同时,使得传统儿童家庭游戏面临"失传"可能,影响儿童身体和心理的健康成长,对儿童意志力、思维能力、认知能力的提高具有一定的负面作用,也可能导致儿童家长"榜样力量"的缺失,甚至传导形成青少年时期的"网瘾"。因此,引导儿童有限度的接触家庭信息化游戏,重视玩伴的力量,提高儿童的传统家庭游戏比重,制定"家规"营造良好的家庭生活环境,将有利于儿童家庭游戏的科学开展。

农业信息化参与主体间的博弈分析

农业信息化建设对农业现代化进程的推动起着至关重要的作用,但其准公共物品的特性,对参分主体的行为具有一定的限制性.本研究运用博弈论的相关知识,对农业信息化参与主体:政府、涉农组织和农户之间的关系建立双方及三方博弈模型,并对决策结果进行探讨,试图寻求各个参与主体在农业信息化进程中的关系.

校企合作构建ERP沙盘实验教学及实习体系

ERP沙盘模拟实验教学不仅是教学手段的创新,而且突破教学瓶颈,成为一种值得借鉴的人才培养模式,为经管类高校打造各专业毕业实习平台奠定良好基础。在网络时代企业管理信息化的背景下,经管院校应顺应趋势,从课程设计、教学内容、考核形式各方面构建ERP沙盘实验教学及实习体系,为学生突破就业之阻,搭建一座从学校到企业的桥梁。

企业信息化投资的博弈策略探讨

从一个基本博弈矩阵入手,主要考察在不同的收益预期下,投资信息化建设对企业的影响,探讨企业在应对市场竞争时采取的相应策略。通过分析可以知道,信息化投资虽然面临巨大的风险,但依然是很多企业最优的选择;另外,在市场处于胶着不前的状态时,必要的外力推动不可或缺。

On-ramp merging strategy for connected and automated vehicles based on complete information static game

Improper handling of vehicle on-ramp merging may hinder traffic flow and contribute to lower fuel economy,while also increasing the risk of collisions.Cooperative control for connected and automated vehicles(CAVs)has the potential to significantly reduce negative environmental impact while also improve driving safety and traffic efficiency.Therefore,in this paper,we focus on the scenario of CAVs on-ramp merging and propose a centralized control method.Merging sequence(MS)allocation and motion planning are two key issues in this process.To deal with these problems,we first propose an MS allocation method based on a complete information static game whereby the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is calculated for an individual vehicle to select its strategy.The on-ramp merging problem is then formulated as a bi-objective(total fuel consumption and total travel time)optimization problem,to which optimal control based on Pontryagin's minimum principle(PMP)is applied to solve the motion planning issue.To determine the proper parameters in the bi-objective optimization problem,a varying-scale grid search method is proposed to explore possible solutions at different scales.In this method,an improved quicksort algorithm is designed to search for the Pareto front,and the(approximately)unbiased Pareto solution for the bi-objective optimization problem is finally determined as the optimal solution.The proposed on-ramp merging strategy is validated via numerical simulation,and comparison with other strategies demonstrates its effectiveness in terms of fuel economy and traffic efficiency.

北京奥运会对我国运动会信息管理的影响分析

奥运会在全球的巨大影响力使得其一直走在时代的前列,非常敏感地把握着科技发展的脉搏,特别是进入信息时代后,国际奥委会开始要求用科技信息技术全面地包装奥运会,信息化管理和相应的信息系统服务渗透到了盛典的每一个微小细节。在北京2008年奥运会的组织过程中,我们越来越深刻地感受到奥运会对我国体育信息化管理带来的新观念、新技术,但同时也带来了许多新问题。针对奥运会信息化管理的研究、分析成为了我国体育信息化,特别是运动会信息化管理发展的急迫要求,并将在今后很长一段时间内成为我国体育工作者的一项重要任务。本文将着重分析研究奥运会的信息化管理和服务的特点,结合本人参与奥运会信息化管理方面工作的经验,使用文献资料法、专家访谈法、比较分析法和SWOT分析法等手段,探讨奥运会对我国体育行业信息化,特别是大型运动会信息化管理带来的影响,国内运动会、体育产业的信息化管理与国际接轨的方式方法,及其奥运会后的发展方向、发展模式。

Hierarchical Hypergames and Bayesian Games:A Generalization of the Theoretical Comparison of Hypergames and Bayesian Games Considering Hierarchy of Perceptions

This paper discusses the relationship of two independently developed models of games with incomplete information,hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games.It can be considered as a generalization of the previous study on the theoretical comparison of simple hypergames and Bayesian games(Sasaki and Kijima,2012) by taking into account hierarchy of perceptions,i.e.,an agent's perception about the other agents' perceptions,and so on.The authors first introduce the general way of transformation of any hierarchical hypergames into corresponding Bayesian games,which was called as the Bayesian representation of hierarchical hypergames.The authors then show that some equilibrium concepts for hierarchical hypergames can be associated with those for Bayesian games and discuss implications of the results.

Inter-operator spectrum sharing scheme for reconfigurable system

Bargaining based mechanism for sharing spectrum between radio access networks （RANs） belonging to multioperators is studied, to improve spectrum utilization efficiency and maximize network revenue. By introducing an intelligent agent, each RAN has the ability, which includes trading information exchanging, final decision making, and so on, to trade the spectrum with other RANs. The proposed inter-operator spectrum sharing mechanism is modeled as an infinite-horizon bargaining game with incomplete information, and the resulting bargaining game has unique sequential equilibrium. Consequently, the implementation is refined based on the analysis. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism outperforms the conventional fixed spectrum management （FSM） method in network revenue, spectrum efficiency, and call blocking rate.