The central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) system in China is a significant institutional innova‐tion in national environmental governance. The CEPI applies a joint supervision strategy to address salient...The central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) system in China is a significant institutional innova‐tion in national environmental governance. The CEPI applies a joint supervision strategy to address salient en‐vironmental issues and strictly enforce the environmental responsibilities of local governments. This study col‐lects and organizes CEPI inspection reports covering three stages that encompass the first round, the “look back”, and the second round, applying text analysis to obtain sample data and conduct statistical quantifica‐tion of word frequency in inspection reports and identify notable changes. The study explores the allocation of CEPI attention between policy objectives and the intensity of policy instruments. We determine that in con‐junction with public opinion feedback, the CEPI conducts targeted inspections and focuses more on pollutant governance, which has high severity and can be addressed quickly. The CEPI fills the gap of normalized gover‐nance with a campaign-style governance approach. Regarding the intensity of policy measures, the CEPI pri‐marily uses economic incentive policy instruments, supplemented by command-and-control and public guid‐ance approaches, advancing the sustainability of regulatory effectiveness through economic, social, and politi‐cal activities. This study extends knowledge in the field of CEPI policy priorities and implementation, expand‐ing the literature related to outcomes of environmental policy in developing countries.展开更多
Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore ...Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.展开更多
This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences appr...This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences approach,it finds evidence that environmental regulation decreased the per capita income and enlarged the gap between urban and rural income while showing an insignificant effect on employment.Although the policy can reduce pollution levels and bring environmental benefits in aggregate,the findings of this study suggest that the regulations appear to have reduced the proportion of manufacturing industry and hindered general innovation and investment from entrepreneurs,which resulted in greater inequality.Rural residents suffered more from environmental regulation due to relatively high migration costs and their disadvantaged human resources on the aspects of health,education level,and skills.The local government's execution incentive can also play a key role in the effectiveness of environmental policy.Regions with lower GDP growth targets and younger government leaders were affected significantly with regard to the income growth of local residents and the urban-rural income gap.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China[Grant No.72304124]Spring Sunshine Collaborative Re‐search Project of the Ministry of Education in China[Grant No.202201660]+2 种基金Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation[Grant No.22JR5RA542]General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation[Grant No.2022YB014]Fundamental Re‐search Funds for the Central Universities[Grant No.2023lzdxjb‐kyzx008].
文摘The central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) system in China is a significant institutional innova‐tion in national environmental governance. The CEPI applies a joint supervision strategy to address salient en‐vironmental issues and strictly enforce the environmental responsibilities of local governments. This study col‐lects and organizes CEPI inspection reports covering three stages that encompass the first round, the “look back”, and the second round, applying text analysis to obtain sample data and conduct statistical quantifica‐tion of word frequency in inspection reports and identify notable changes. The study explores the allocation of CEPI attention between policy objectives and the intensity of policy instruments. We determine that in con‐junction with public opinion feedback, the CEPI conducts targeted inspections and focuses more on pollutant governance, which has high severity and can be addressed quickly. The CEPI fills the gap of normalized gover‐nance with a campaign-style governance approach. Regarding the intensity of policy measures, the CEPI pri‐marily uses economic incentive policy instruments, supplemented by command-and-control and public guid‐ance approaches, advancing the sustainability of regulatory effectiveness through economic, social, and politi‐cal activities. This study extends knowledge in the field of CEPI policy priorities and implementation, expand‐ing the literature related to outcomes of environmental policy in developing countries.
基金the financial support from the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China(2022M720131)Spring Sunshine Collaborative Research Project of the Ministry of Education(202201660)+3 种基金Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation(22JR5RA542)General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation(2022YB014)National Natural Science Foundation of China(72034003,72243006,and 71874074)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2023lzdxjbkyzx008,lzujbky-2021-sp72)。
文摘Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.72173085 and 71973094)support from a China Postdoctoral Science Foundation funded project(No.2023M743896).
文摘This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences approach,it finds evidence that environmental regulation decreased the per capita income and enlarged the gap between urban and rural income while showing an insignificant effect on employment.Although the policy can reduce pollution levels and bring environmental benefits in aggregate,the findings of this study suggest that the regulations appear to have reduced the proportion of manufacturing industry and hindered general innovation and investment from entrepreneurs,which resulted in greater inequality.Rural residents suffered more from environmental regulation due to relatively high migration costs and their disadvantaged human resources on the aspects of health,education level,and skills.The local government's execution incentive can also play a key role in the effectiveness of environmental policy.Regions with lower GDP growth targets and younger government leaders were affected significantly with regard to the income growth of local residents and the urban-rural income gap.
