As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a ＂dogmatism paradox＂ which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism ...As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a ＂dogmatism paradox＂ which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant altematives.展开更多
文摘As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a ＂dogmatism paradox＂ which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant altematives.
