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Romanian legal management rules limit wood production in Norway spruce and beech forests 被引量:1
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作者 Olivier Bouriaud Gheorghe Marin +2 位作者 Laura Bouriaud Dominik Hessenmoller Ernst-Detlef Schulze 《Forest Ecosystems》 SCIE CSCD 2017年第1期1-11,共11页
Background: The quantitative impact of forest management on forests' wood resource was evaluated for Picea and Fagus mixed forests. The effects on the productivity of tendering operations, thinnings and rotation len... Background: The quantitative impact of forest management on forests' wood resource was evaluated for Picea and Fagus mixed forests. The effects on the productivity of tendering operations, thinnings and rotation length have seldom been directly quantified on landscape scale. Methods: Two sites of similar fertility but subject to contrasted forest management were studied with detailed inventories: one in Germany, the other in Romania, and compared with the respective national forest inventories. In Romania, regulations impose very long rotations, low thinnings and a period of no-cut before harvest. In contrast, tending and thinnings are frequent and intense in Germany. Harvests start much earlier and must avoid clear cutting but maintain a permanent forest cover with natural regeneration. While Germany has an average annual wood increment representative for Central Europe, Romania represents the average for Eastern Europe. Results: The lack of tending and thinning in the Romanian site resulted in twice as many trees per hectare as in the German site for the same age. The productivity in Romanian production forests was 20 % lower than in Germany despite a similar fertility. The results were supported by the data from the national forest inventory of each country, which confirmed that the same differential exists at country scale. Furthermore, provided the difference in rotation length, two crops are harvested in Germany when only one is harvested in Romania. The losses of production due to a lower level of management in Romania where estimated to reach 12.8 million m3.y-1 in regular mountain production forests, and to 15 million m3.y-1 if managed protection forest is included. Conclusions: The productivity of Picea and Fagus mountain forests in Romania is severely depressed by the lack of tending and thinning, by overly long rotations and the existence of a 25-years no-cut period prior to harvest. The average standing volume in Germany was 50 % lower than in Romania, but the higher harvesting rate resulted in more than doubling wood production. Considering the mitigation effects of climate change by forests, it emerges that the increase in standing volume of forests in Romania is smaller than the additional harvest in Germany which serves fossil fuel substitution. 展开更多
关键词 Forest management Forest productivity legal rules Sylviculture FOREST Operations Wood resource
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SPECIAL ISSUE: ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA-- Criminal Sanctions against Non-state Functionaries Who Accept Bribes and Abuse Public Power
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作者 Li Huaisheng 《Social Sciences in China》 2011年第4期148-161,共14页
In order to penalize the acceptance of bribes by non-state functionaries who abuse public power, the anti-corruption system of China's criminal law has undergone successive transformations: from punishing non-state ... In order to penalize the acceptance of bribes by non-state functionaries who abuse public power, the anti-corruption system of China's criminal law has undergone successive transformations: from punishing non-state functionaries who accept bribes in accordance with the joint crime model to punishing them in accordance with the model for a single crime, and from seeking the rules of punishment in judicial interpretations to having the criminal code directly prescribe the criteria for determining a charge. Judicial interpretations have been particularly concerned with the punishment of non-state functionaries who have a relationship of common interests with a state functionary. The crime of accepting bribes given in return for trading in influence was established to solve the problem of the judicial vacuum created by judicial interpretations, but new legal obstacles have emerged. To generalize the class of offenders who accept bribes in return for using their influence is the route future improvement should take. 展开更多
关键词 non-state functionary particular affiliate close affiliates rules for closing off legal loopholes
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