Loan Loss Provisioning Practices

The purpose of this paper is to come up with factors in loan loss provisioning practices on commercial banks that reflect on collectability of defaulted loans. The need for this research is due to failures in the loan loss provisioning practices which resulted in loan loss provisions （LLP） not reflecting on collectability of the defaulted loans. As a consequence, the banks do not capture their loss expectations and do not continuously reassess their loss expectations as the conditions affecting their borrowers may change. Henceforth, in their financial reporting, the banks do not represent relevantly and faithfully their true underlying credit risks conditions. When the banks do not represent relevantly and faithfully their true underlying risk conditions, they contradict the objectives of useful financial reporting. The results showed that among explanatory variables, bad debt recoveries as a factor in loan loss provisioning practices that reflect on collectability of defaulted loans was rejected. Bad debt recoveries was a biased variable and inconsistent estimator. In context of perceived credit risks as the basis to make credit judgments, an estimate of bad debt recoveries had not fulfilled the criteria. On the other hand, non-performing loans （NPL） as a factor in loan loss provisioning practices was not rejected.

An Assessment of the Within-Year Seasonality in the Loan Loss Provisioning Behavior of European Banks

This study aims at assessing whether a significant within-year seasonality exists in the loan loss provisioning behavior of European listed banks observed in the period from 2004 to 2013. Since the accuracy of auditing processes and the level of disclosure requirements in financial reports differ among quarters, during the year, banks may have a leeway to underestimate and postpone the complete provisioning of loan losses in the less regulated and less audited quarters. We hypothesize that those differences are relevant factors which determine non-lower or significantly higher average levels of loan loss provisions in the half-yearly and especially in the annual financial reports than in the interim management statements disclosed in the first and the third quarters of the year. We also investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis and develop a special analysis for the ltalian banks＇ case. The empirical results support our hypotheses, suggesting that, in some cases, a convergence among quarterly levels of auditing processes and disclosure requirements may be needed. Our work contributes to the existing literature by providing additional evidences and considerations on the within-year seasonality in the loan loss provisioning behavior of European listed banks observed in the last decade.

To supervise or to self‑supervise:a machine learning based comparison on credit supervision

This study investigates the need for credit supervision as conducted by on-site banking supervisors.It builds on a real bank on-site credit examination to compare the performance of a hypothetical self-supervision approach,in which banks themselves assess their loan portfolios without external intervention,with the on-site banking supervision approach of the Central Bank of Brazil.The experiment develops two machine learning classification models:the first model is based on good and bad ratings informed by banks,and the second model is based on past on-site credit portfolio examinations conducted by banking supervision.The findings show that the overall performance of the on-site supervision approach is consistently higher than the performance of the self-supervision approach,justifying the need for on-site credit portfolio examination as conducted by the Central Bank.

Auditor Reputation, Audit Opinion, and Eamings Management： Evidence From French Banking Industry

The aim of this research is to study the impact of auditor reputation and audit opinion on earnings management in French banks. This article used a sample of 162 French banks over the period from 2005 to 2012. By using three different tests （loss-avoidance, just-meeting-or-beating prior year＇s earnings, and abnormal loan loss provision）, the findings of this paper show that both high auditor reputation and qualified audit opinion constrain earnings management to avoid loss or to just meet or beat prior year＇s earnings in banks. In separate tests related to earnings management through abnormal loan loss provisions, the paper also finds that high auditor reputation constrains earnings management. Qualified audit opinion has a negative but non-significant effect on abnormal loan loss provisions.

Loan loss provisions and return predictability:A dynamic perspective

This paper examines the impact of loan loss provisions(LLPs)on return predictability during 1994–2017.We find that on average,LLPs are negatively associated with one year ahead stock returns.This effect is particularly significant during the global financial crisis but much weaker during the Basel Ⅱ and Ⅲ periods.Consistent with these findings,a long–short trading strategy based on LLPs generates positive abnormal returns during the Basel Ⅱ and Ⅲ periods but negative abnormal returns during the financial crisis.Cross-sectional tests show that this effect is more pronounced among banks with greater information asymmetry.Decomposition of LLPs suggests that these findings are driven mainly by nondiscretionary LLPs.Overall,our results suggest that the relationship between LLPs and future stock returns is not linear but contingent on bank regulations and macroeconomic conditions.

Regulatory pressure and income smoothing by banks in response to anticipated changes to the Basel Ⅱ Accordq

We examine the effects of the revised Basel II rules on bank managers' discretionary behavior, specifically income smoothing and loan loss provisioning. As the revised rules exert greater regulatory pressure on corporate than retail banking, we predict corporate bank managers to reduce risk-taking activities or increase income smoothing. Analysis of segmental reports reveals greater(less) income smoothing in the corporate banking segments of low-capital(high-capital) banks during the Basel II period, with their managers recognizing loan loss provisions in a less timely fashion. We find no such effects for retail banking. Although we document an initially negative market reaction to the regulatory announcements, that reaction weakens over time. Overall,the study highlights the unintended consequences of the banking rule changes.