Comparative Analysis of Managerial Ownership and Its Effect on Corporate Performance in Selected Asian and European Transition Economies

This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific unification of ownership and control on corporate performance. Findings in the paper are based on research that produced empirical data for Croatia which is subsequently compared with evidence from other Asian and European transition countries facing the same issues. Consequently, transitional ownership structures, influenced by actual privatization process, like emergent corporate governance mechanisms, highly concentrated ownership and undeveloped markets for corporate control are also described. Research findings show that direct or indirect managerial ownership are important phenomena in transition countries, research has also shown that stable and concentrated managerial ownership have positive effects on firms＇ profitability in the observed transitional environments.

Ownership Structure and Earnings Quality of Listed Financial Firms in Nigeria

The study determined the effect of ownership structure on earnings quality of listed financial firms in Nigeria.The study employed secondary data.The study population comprised all the 16 listed financial firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.Purposive sampling technique was adopted to select top 10 banks whose shares are consistently traded on the stock market.Data for ownership structure and earnings quality were sourced from the audited financial statements of the selected firms and the Nigerian Stock Exchange Factbook over a period of 10 years(2009-2018).Collected data were analyzed using pooled ordinary least square,fixed effect and random effect estimation techniques.The result from the study showed that institutional ownership(t=4.3,p˂0.05)had a positive and statistically significant relationship with earnings quality while ownership concentration(t=-2.5,p˂0.05)had a negative and significant relationship with earnings quality.The study recommended that the institutional ownership which shows a positive relationship with earnings quality enables improved earnings of the sampled listed banks.More institutional participation should be allowed in the Nigerian listed banks as it was proved that they have the power to monitor the affairs of managers as this will have a positive impact on earnings.Concentration ownership gives managers incentives to manage earnings to achieve short term opportunistic interest;therefore it should not be encouraged.

The Effects of Director Ownership on Capital Adequacy and Risk Taking Among Private Commercial Banks in Bangladesh Within the Basel Capital Adequacy Framework

The study examines the effect of director’s ownership on capital adequacy and risk taking of private commercial banks in Bangladesh within the Basel capital adequacy framework.The secondary panel data were obtained from annual report of quoted 20 private commercial Banks in Bangladesh as compiled in the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period 2015 to 2019.The study finds the director’s ownership concentration plays an important role in capital formation that contributes to reducing excess risk taking.However,the presence of director’s ownership in capital adequacy influences risk-taking practices of banking industries.These results support the research on capital formation and risk taking.The study adds a new dimension to the capital mechanism research that could be a valuable source of knowledge for policy makers and regulators of financial industries.As this study covers the role of director’s ownership on capital adequacy and risk taking,it could be useful for capital formation,regulation,and policy making.

Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management： Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.

Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality： The Experience of Listed Companies in Iran

This study examines the relationship among independent boards of directors, board size, managerial share ownership （MSO）, and earnings quality. The study of these relationships is controlled by firm size based on a sample of 114 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange （TSE） for the period from 2008 to 2010. The results demonstrate that there was an insignificant positive relationship among independent boards of directors, managerial ownership, and earnings quality. Subsequent analysis shows an insignificant negative relationship between board size and earnings quality. It also provides evidence of the negative relationship between firm size as a control variable and earnings quality. This can be attributed to the fact that large firms are claimed to be politically sensitive and thus have the incentive to lessen variances in changes in their reported earnings.