According to the differences between operation and correlationship by both sides of the takeover in the market for corporate control, the takeover can be divided into three types--transverse takeover, longitudinal tak...According to the differences between operation and correlationship by both sides of the takeover in the market for corporate control, the takeover can be divided into three types--transverse takeover, longitudinal takeover and mixed takeover. Meanwhile, due to the activities of takeover taken by the companies in the different trade life circles adopting different takeover types, so their performances are different. Seeing about this relationship, you can effectively inspect the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Adopting298 stylebook data from the market for corporate control in China, and through empirical analyzing, it can see that because of the existing of the stock holding, the efficiency of the market for corporate control in China is not very high. The government tempts to adjust the industrial structure through merger and acquisition （M＆A）, but it urged the aim of state-owned economy forward strategic transfer difficult to come true. To solve the contradiction of ＂setting up of the stock holding＂ comes to no time to delay. ＇展开更多
This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific uni...This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific unification of ownership and control on corporate performance. Findings in the paper are based on research that produced empirical data for Croatia which is subsequently compared with evidence from other Asian and European transition countries facing the same issues. Consequently, transitional ownership structures, influenced by actual privatization process, like emergent corporate governance mechanisms, highly concentrated ownership and undeveloped markets for corporate control are also described. Research findings show that direct or indirect managerial ownership are important phenomena in transition countries, research has also shown that stable and concentrated managerial ownership have positive effects on firms＇ profitability in the observed transitional environments.展开更多
文摘According to the differences between operation and correlationship by both sides of the takeover in the market for corporate control, the takeover can be divided into three types--transverse takeover, longitudinal takeover and mixed takeover. Meanwhile, due to the activities of takeover taken by the companies in the different trade life circles adopting different takeover types, so their performances are different. Seeing about this relationship, you can effectively inspect the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Adopting298 stylebook data from the market for corporate control in China, and through empirical analyzing, it can see that because of the existing of the stock holding, the efficiency of the market for corporate control in China is not very high. The government tempts to adjust the industrial structure through merger and acquisition （M＆A）, but it urged the aim of state-owned economy forward strategic transfer difficult to come true. To solve the contradiction of ＂setting up of the stock holding＂ comes to no time to delay. ＇
文摘This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific unification of ownership and control on corporate performance. Findings in the paper are based on research that produced empirical data for Croatia which is subsequently compared with evidence from other Asian and European transition countries facing the same issues. Consequently, transitional ownership structures, influenced by actual privatization process, like emergent corporate governance mechanisms, highly concentrated ownership and undeveloped markets for corporate control are also described. Research findings show that direct or indirect managerial ownership are important phenomena in transition countries, research has also shown that stable and concentrated managerial ownership have positive effects on firms＇ profitability in the observed transitional environments.
