Profile of Managers of Public Funds and Accounting Misappropriations in Cameroon

In order to curb accounting embezzlements,the key idea supported in this paper recommends a revolution from the top and from the bottom.The paper is interested in the managerial policy whose accounting practices serve as launch pad for embezzlement.To succeed in this,the theory of structuro-managerial embezzlement of public funds is mobilized.The subject is the analysis with a view to present the face of managers-embezzlers of public funds and their accounting mechanisms of embezzlement.The loopholes that these actors-embezzlers exploit are judiciously presented.It is therefore important to explain the determining profiles of public funds embezzlers and the accounting mechanisms used.The positivist approach of accounting thus constitutes a second theoretical backing in support of the first one to answer these questions.In order to oppose the idea of embezzlement without accounting evidence,this article adopts an interpretative and explanatory approach of cases of embezzlement of public funds of which accountancy is the secular lever.

Is refinancing solely motivated by misappropriation?

Misappropriation has become the accepted explanation for the refinancing behavior of Chinese listed companies, although the evidence in support of such an explanation is worthy of further discussion. We argue that if a planned refinancing exercise does not become a reality, post-refinancing performance depends on the initial motivation for refinancing, i.e. misappropriation or the maximization of firm value. The success and failure samples provided by the approval system of the Chinese securities market provide us with a natural laboratory in which to distinguish between these two possible motivations for the refinancing behavior of Chinese listed firms. The results show the postrefinancing performance of firms in the success sample to be significantly better than the performance in the failure sample, with the difference even more significant when larger agency costs or more financial constraints exist. These findings indicate that Chinese listed companies do not engage in refinancing for misappropriation purposes alone. Rather, refinancing is more likely to be a rational choice made in full consideration of the costs and benefits. This paper provides new ideas for reexamining the motivations for the refinancing behavior of China's listed firms. It also has one major policy implication. That is, relaxing and/or simplifying the country's refinancing regulations could help to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the Chinese securities market.