Venture Capital Finance-Eliminating Double Sided Moral Hazards through Trade-off between Economic and Behavioural Economic Aspects-A Case Analysis

Venture capital finance has two aspects,the economic aspect and the behavioural economic aspect.The economic aspect includes issues such as conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist(VC),asymmetric information,moral hazard,and compensation issues for both the parties.The behavioural economic aspect is related to relational factors such as empathy and a feeling of fairness and trust shown by both the parties.Therefore,while deciding the financer,entrepreneur should consider both relational aspect and value add services of the financier and strike optimal trade-off.The ensuing case analysis has been carried out focusing on elimination of double-sided moral hazards through a proper trade-off between economy and behavioural economic theories(aspects).The performance of the venture can be enhanced by balancing both of these theories in practice.An equity distribution that represents economic reward is a source of motivation for both the parties to put optimal efforts towards the success of the venture.This was seen in the case analysis,when the parties perceived the initial equity distribution agreement as fair,the satisfaction level of all the parties increased,leading to the reduction in the possibility of double-sided moral hazard and ensuring the success of the venture.Moreover,the analysis shows that information sharing and two-way communication increases trust and improves decision quality.It further focusses on how feedback and proper work distribution results in efficiency of performance for each of the stakeholders,leading to reduced probability of double-sided moral hazards.

A PENALTY FUNCTION METHOD FOR THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM WITH AN INFINITE NUMBER OF INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINTS UNDER MORAL HAZARD

In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.

The Effect of Reputation to the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Market with Game Theory

It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and reduces the efficiency of total market. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between buyer and seller in C2C e-market;because of the influence of information asymmetry, many customers suffered from being cheated by sellers with defective products in practice. These frequent cases will deteriorate long term relationship between sellers and buyers. Here we focus on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on oral risk with repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both firms and customers effectively avoid morality risk and realize a win-win situation.

Research on Credit Default Swaps Pricing Considering Moral Hazard Incentive under Reduce-Form Model

Equilibrium pricing of credit default swaps(CDS)promotes efficient identification of credit risk in the market,which in turn leads to efficient allocation of resources.However,even when CDS have been priced in equilibrium,i.e.,when premiums are equal to anticipated payments,the moral hazard incentives of CDS buyers increase with CDS transactions.Consequentially,it becomes an interesting research direction to study the impact of moral hazard incentives on the trading mechanism or pricing of derivatives(CDS).Most of the existing literature on the impact of moral hazard incentives in CDS pricing on derivatives trading mechanisms takes a macro perspective and focuses on the agreement risk effect.The literature exploring the analysis of the impact of moral hazard on the probability of agreement default from a micro perspective is not yet available.With this in mind,this paper focuses on the mechanisms by which“fraud”,an extreme manifestation of micro-moral hazard incentives,affects the probability of default.This paper introduces for the first time the concept of“claiming fraud”by credit protection buyers,which is different from the macro perspective of moral hazard incentives,and thus defines a specific extreme form of moral hazard incentives.Meanwhile,to address the intrinsic feature of the lack of economic explanatory power of the reduce-form model,this paper introduces a moral hazard incentive factor into the reduce-form model,and proposes a moral hazard state variable as a function of the asset value of the reference entity,which gives the reduce-form model strong economic explanatory power,and the default predictability is reduced by the description of the reduce-form model.In terms of the object of study,this paper considers the issue of moral hazard incentives in the presence of claiming fraud in two reference entities to further explore the impact of moral hazard incentives on default protection at the micro level in terms of cyclic default.Finally,based on the analysis of the results of the numerical simulation experiments,it is proposed that increasing the number of reference assets for CDS buyers will help to reduce the moral hazard incentives of the buyer,and thus the anticipated payments to the buyer,i.e.,we attempt to endogenize the credit risk of an asset by allowing the asset holder to choose the probability of the asset going up or down,which helps to understand the phenomenon of moral hazard incentives in CDS trading.

MORAL HAZARD STRATEGY AND QUALITY CONTRACT DESIGN IN A TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN

Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on how to control product quality and design quality contract in supply chain when moral hazard exists. We set up the supplier and buyer＇s expected profits function model, in which the supplier makes production process investment-level decision and decides on the product quality prevention level, whereas the buyer makes quality evaluation decision and decides on the product quality inspection level. The supplier with a moral hazard of reducing investment level may lack investment in the production process; thus, the buyer will pay the information rent to incentivize the supplier to improve the investment level. The buyer creates the moral hazard of exaggerating the product quality defective rate, who may overinvest in the inspection process. We use the optimal condition to solve supplier＇s first-best investment level, product quality prevention level, and buyer＇s first-best quality inspection level, internal penalty, and apportionment ratio of external failure cost. We also conduct a simulation test that shows the following： When the supplier improves its investment level, its product quality prevention level will increase, and the buyer＇s quality inspection level will decrease. With the improvement in the buyer＇s product quality inspection level, its internal penalty will increase, and the supplier＇s external failure cost will also increase while its expected profits will decrease. Hence, the buyer will design an incentive contract, the expected profits of which will increase, and the whole supply chain＇s joint expected profits function may become an inverse U shape. Finally, we develop a simulation example and propose suggestions for quality control strategy and contract design in the supply chain under the conditions of asymmetric information.

Non-performing loans(NPLs),liquidity creation,and moral hazard:Case of Chinese banks

This study analyzes the impact of non-performing loans(NPLs)on bank liquidity creation to investigate the existence of moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.It uses data from 197 listed and unlisted Chinese banks,spanning the period 2005 to 2014.Total liquidity creation by Chinese banks is declining,and NPLs ratio has started to increase following a continuous decline between 2005 and 2012.Using one-step system GMM estimation,fixed and random effect model,and pool data analysis,we find that liquidity creation by Chinese banks does not depend on NPLs ratio,i.e.,we did not find the evidence of moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.We repeated the analysis for small and large banks and the results of these sub-samples reinforced our findings for the aggregate sample.

融资道德风险下订单农业供应链成员信任决策研究

基于订单农业供应链中农户转移资金用途的道德风险问题,考虑农户受资金约束和农户互惠动机,构建公司与农户的序贯互惠信任博弈模型,通过农户完全理性、农户具有互惠动机但公司不提供担保融资、农户具有互惠动机且公司提供担保融资3种情形,分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对供应链成员信任的影响及信任决策问题.结果发现:当公司不提供担保融资时,无论农户是否具有互惠动机,双方都不能建立信任互惠关系;当公司提供担保融资且农户具有互惠动机时,则存在3种序贯互惠均衡,在互惠动机满足一定条件时可以实现双方互信;最后,通过算例分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对农户互惠敏感程度和守信用概率的影响,提出增强农户互惠动机,设置合理的利益共享和监督机制及丰富订单农业融资服务等建议.

基于双边道德风险的社区团购平台动态契约研究

基于社区团购模式中平台和团长之间的委托代理关系,构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,将社区团购平台的解聘补偿和团长的过度自信引入模型中,通过博弈推导和数值仿真给出两阶段最优动态契约设计,并分析这些因素对委托和代理方行为选择的影响,探讨其对双边道德风险的规制作用。结果表明:解聘补偿机制增加了社区团购平台的违约成本,降低平台道德风险。同时解聘倾向弱化了棘轮效应的负面影响,提高了团长第一期的努力程度,对团长第二期的努力程度没有直接作用,但会通过影响第二期的固定支付来影响双方的委托代理关系,对团长的道德风险起到间接规制作用。团长的过度自信倾向在一定程度上可以提高团长的努力程度,降低团长的道德风险,增加其收益。平台对团长资质和能力的动态修正可以影响团长的努力程度及其分成比例。因此,需要严把团长资质能力的早期识别,加强动态考核和定期培训以提升团长的业务能力和努力水平;同时设置合理的团长解聘补偿机制,完善动态激励契约;通过规制双边的道德风险,完善社区团购模式。

绿色生产背景下经营规模对农户技术效率的影响研究——基于福建省葡萄种植户的调查数据

基于当前农业绿色生产的重要发展背景,以福建省内六地市314个葡萄种植户的微观调查数据为支撑,运用面向投入规模报酬可变的DEA模型测度农户技术效率水平,并构建Tobit模型,实证避雨栽培的绿色生产模式下经营规模对农户技术效率的影响。结果表明:适度规模化经营有助于农户提高绿色生产的技术效率,葡萄种植面积的适度区间为0.67~3.33 hm^(2),但随着经营规模增加,要素配置难度和雇工道德风险上升将会给农户造成一定的效率损失。因此,农户在实际生产中应根据自身要素禀赋状况选择合适的经营规模,不宜盲目扩张。

沉默的羔羊:畜牧代管下的道德风险与弱监管

熟人社会规范向契约市场规范过渡的背景下,传统牧区畜牧代管现象开始普遍化。代理人利用信息优势实现事后机会主义行为,委托人则采用弱监管策略应对道德风险。以新疆克拉玛依市小拐乡为案例,深入分析代牧人道德风险和委托人自发性弱监管行为的背景、发生机制和收益分配。通过分析契约设计并构建嵌入非正式制度的博弈模型,研究发现:代牧弱监管的产生与村庄产业结构、农牧户收入结构以及代牧市场类型有关。对比市场化下的工资制与承包制契约,弱违约和弱监管主要存在于工资制代牧合同中,“沉默的羔羊”本质是代牧契约中的收益分配问题,代牧人以“固定工资+浮动工资”形式获取更多剩余。委托人监督策略受到契约惩罚机制和道德声誉机制相对强度的调节,道德声誉机制占优时,委托人弱监管行为符合经济理性。促进传统农牧村庄转型,既要尊重村庄及其产业发展的自然规律,正视非正式制度的重要作用,也要适度优化契约设计,探索新型合作托养模式。

传统银行借贷、金融科技与中小企业融资

针对中小企业具有显著的现金流不确定和信息非对称的特征,本文基于连续时间合约理论建立一个理论模型,研究传统银行借贷与互联网金融两种方式下的最优贷款合约及其对中小企业融资影响的区别。模型推导发现:两种借贷方式下最优融资合约存在,均是企业家与债权人在私有收益与长期贷款激励下权衡的结果;最优贷款合约比市场贷款合约更能提高企业价值,且企业现金流的波动率越高,最优贷款利率越高、企业价值越低;两种借贷方式的最优贷款利率无实质差别,借助金融科技不会降低企业贷款的违约风险溢价,但能够降低融资边际成本;金融科技可以将企业信誉成本这一内生性资产作为类抵押资产,有效降低中小企业获得贷款的门槛,提高金融普惠性。此外,企业家应当面临适度的市场风险暴露以激励其尽职工作,从而提高借贷双方的期望总收益。

我国社区居民医疗健康保障体系的多元委托代理关系探析

在我国人口老龄化、居民健康保健意识增强和医疗保健服务需求不断增加的背景下,政府加快了社区居民医疗健康保障体系建设。在该体系中,居民作为最终需求者与政府和社区基层医疗机构之间形成了复杂的多元委托代理关系。本文从经济学角度出发,首先运用委托代理理论探讨社区居民医疗健康保障主体之间的委托代理关系;其次分析多元委托代理关系各主体之间的博弈行为;再次揭示社区居民健康保障体系建设中由于参与主体间信息不对称、监管不到位而产生的道德风险行为;最后从解决信息不对称问题和完善监督约束机制两个角度提出降低我国社区健康保障体系中道德风险的有效途径。

我国灵活就业群体的工伤保障研究——政策现状与发展方向

数字经济的快速发展推动灵活就业群体的迅速扩张,灵活就业占比已经超过全部就业人群的1/4。灵活就业群体的工伤保障缺失问题愈发凸显。对中国灵活就业群体的发展壮大历程和工伤保险政策演变进行了梳理研究,对工伤保险存在的整体覆盖面低、参保人数高和享受保障人数少、低风险职业参保比例高和高风险职业参保比例低以及保险基金结余高的突出问题作了分析。以平台就业为例,发现灵活就业工伤保障缺失的原因包括劳动关系的缺失、社会保险缴纳成本较高并存在明显的道德风险问题。基于引导灵活就业群体社会保障正规化的角度,从顶层法律完善、机制设计、加强保障水平和强化配套等方面提出政策建议。

考虑道德风险的突发事件政府治理路径研究

道德风险和瞒报行为对突发事件应对将产生不利影响,探究政府治理路径对应对突发事件具有重要意义。基于道德风险视角,利用演化博弈理论,在综合考虑企业道德风险、政府奖励、政府惩罚、政府监督等多个影响政府治理的因素基础上,构建了政府突发事件治理演化博弈模型,探究了突发事件应对过程中政府治理路径的演变情况。研究发现:政府治理突发事件行为的演化与其初始构建的支付矩阵密切相关,也与支付矩阵的初始参数选择有关。在一定范围内,增大对企业瞒报行为的处罚、降低政府强监管成本、减少企业道德风险可以有效促使系统的最终策略稳定于(强监管,实报)状态。研究结论可为政府在突发事件治理过程中形成联动治理局面提供一定参考和建议。

公众参与下的PPP项目道德风险防范研究基于双重委托代理视角

基于双重委托代理理论探析PPP项目中政府和企业的道德风险问题,研究公众作为双重委托代理中的最终委托方,其参与对防范公私合作道德风险生成的作用.运用演化博弈的方法,构建政企双方博弈和公众参与下的三方博弈模型,比较两个模型演化结果发现:(1)对企业来说,企业不采取道德风险行为的概率与政府严格监管、公众参与监督的概率正相关;(2)对政府来说,公众参与使得政府严格监管的概率和企业采取道德风险的概率由正相关转为负相关;(3)对公众来说,公众参与主要受到参与成本、政府举报奖励的影响.由此提出相关建议促进公众参与,防范政企道德风险.

混合所有制改革视阈下考虑努力互补的融资机制研究

基于混合所有制改革背景下国有企业引入民营资本可能出现事前和事后道德风险的情形,考虑努力互补因素构建了股权融资和含控制权安排的可转换债券融资契约模型,论证了各契约方存在努力互补时可转换债券融资相对于普通股权融资更有利于激励各契约方的努力水平,各契约方的期望收益更高,是一个严格的帕累托改进;采用可转换债券融资时,投资者行权前后存在不同的控制权安排比始终保持由同一契约方绝对控制更有利于解决双边道德风险问题。

长期护理保险利益相关主体行为规范研究

长期护理保险制度正在试点阶段,各利益主体基于自身诉求,会选择利益最大化的行为路径。本文通过分析长期护理保险制度的四大利益相关方——政府、保险经办机构、长期护理供给者、参保人的利益诉求,绘制地图,剖析利益相关方之间的利益冲突,提出规范其行为的策略,为实现长期护理保险的可持续发展提供参考。

基于两阶段多任务道德风险模型的失业参保职工激励机制研究

现有文献大多侧重于劳动经济学视角,针对失业保险道德风险的间接影响因素进行研究。并未针对现实的失业保险道德风险问题深入研究。论文基于委托代理理论,以失业参保职工为研究对象,结合国家失业保险的最新政策,针对企业参保职工失业过程中,在资格审查和待遇发放两个阶段,自愿失业、延缓就业和隐性就业三种最可能发生的道德风险行为,构建了失业参保职工两阶段多任务激励模型,并借助Matlab2017b数值仿真展示了主要影响因素与最优激励因子之间的关系。研究得出了若干防范失业参保职工失业道德风险的有益结论和建议。