The Myerson value introduced by Mayerson(Math Oper Res 2:225-229,1977)is a solution for cooperative games under the partial cooperation structures described by graphs,in which feasible coalitions are connected but the...The Myerson value introduced by Mayerson(Math Oper Res 2:225-229,1977)is a solution for cooperative games under the partial cooperation structures described by graphs,in which feasible coalitions are connected but their structures are ignored.To extend the Myerson value,we define a mapping to describe local structures of coalitions and obtain a new solution for cooperative games,called Myerson value with local structures.We propose an ax iomatic characterization of the Myerson value associated with local cooperative structures.展开更多
A class of cooperative games with graph communication structure is studied in this paper by considering some important players,namely essential players.Under the assumption that only connected coalitions containing es...A class of cooperative games with graph communication structure is studied in this paper by considering some important players,namely essential players.Under the assumption that only connected coalitions containing essential players are able to cooperate and obtain their worths,the class of graph games with essential players is proposed as well as an allocation rule.The proposed value follows the spirit of the Myerson value defined by applying the Shapley value on a modified game.Three properties,feasible component efficiency,the inessential component property,and fairness,are provided to fully characterize this value,where feasible component efficiency and fairness follows the same ideas of component efficiency and fairness for classical graph games,and the inessential component property says that the total payoffs of the players in a non-feasible component is zero.Moreover,some computational aspects of the proposed value and comparisons with disjunctive permission value for games with permission structure are also studied,respectively.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.11571222).
文摘The Myerson value introduced by Mayerson(Math Oper Res 2:225-229,1977)is a solution for cooperative games under the partial cooperation structures described by graphs,in which feasible coalitions are connected but their structures are ignored.To extend the Myerson value,we define a mapping to describe local structures of coalitions and obtain a new solution for cooperative games,called Myerson value with local structures.We propose an ax iomatic characterization of the Myerson value associated with local cooperative structures.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71901145)the Shanghai Planning Project of Philosophy and Social Science(No.2019EGL010).
文摘A class of cooperative games with graph communication structure is studied in this paper by considering some important players,namely essential players.Under the assumption that only connected coalitions containing essential players are able to cooperate and obtain their worths,the class of graph games with essential players is proposed as well as an allocation rule.The proposed value follows the spirit of the Myerson value defined by applying the Shapley value on a modified game.Three properties,feasible component efficiency,the inessential component property,and fairness,are provided to fully characterize this value,where feasible component efficiency and fairness follows the same ideas of component efficiency and fairness for classical graph games,and the inessential component property says that the total payoffs of the players in a non-feasible component is zero.Moreover,some computational aspects of the proposed value and comparisons with disjunctive permission value for games with permission structure are also studied,respectively.
