Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking Strategies Under Quantized Communication

This paper is concerned with distributed Nash equi librium seeking strategies under quantized communication. In the proposed seeking strategy, a projection operator is synthesized with a gradient search method to achieve the optimization o players' objective functions while restricting their actions within required non-empty, convex and compact domains. In addition, a leader-following consensus protocol, in which quantized informa tion flows are utilized, is employed for information sharing among players. More specifically, logarithmic quantizers and uniform quantizers are investigated under both undirected and connected communication graphs and strongly connected digraphs, respec tively. Through Lyapunov stability analysis, it is shown that play ers' actions can be steered to a neighborhood of the Nash equilib rium with logarithmic and uniform quantizers, and the quanti fied convergence error depends on the parameter of the quan tizer for both undirected and directed cases. A numerical exam ple is given to verify the theoretical results.

Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking for General Networked Games With Bounded Disturbances

This paper is concerned with anti-disturbance Nash equilibrium seeking for games with partial information.First,reduced-order disturbance observer-based algorithms are proposed to achieve Nash equilibrium seeking for games with firstorder and second-order players,respectively.In the developed algorithms,the observed disturbance values are included in control signals to eliminate the influence of disturbances,based on which a gradient-like optimization method is implemented for each player.Second,a signum function based distributed algorithm is proposed to attenuate disturbances for games with secondorder integrator-type players.To be more specific,a signum function is involved in the proposed seeking strategy to dominate disturbances,based on which the feedback of the velocity-like states and the gradients of the functions associated with players achieves stabilization of system dynamics and optimization of players'objective functions.Through Lyapunov stability analysis,it is proven that the players'actions can approach a small region around the Nash equilibrium by utilizing disturbance observerbased strategies with appropriate control gains.Moreover,exponential(asymptotic)convergence can be achieved when the signum function based control strategy(with an adaptive control gain)is employed.The performance of the proposed algorithms is tested by utilizing an integrated simulation platform of virtual robot experimentation platform(V-REP)and MATLAB.

Nash Equilibrium of a Fixed-Sum Two-Player Game

It is well established that Nash equilibrium exists within the framework of mixed strategies in strategic-form non-cooperative games. However, finding the Nash equilibrium generally belongs to the class of problems known as PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument on Directed graphs), for which no polynomial-time solution methods are known, even for two-player games. This paper demonstrates that in fixed-sum two-player games (including zero-sum games), the Nash equilibrium forms a convex set, and has a unique expected payoff. Furthermore, these equilibria are Pareto optimal. Additionally, it is shown that the Nash equilibrium of fixed-sum two-player games can theoretically be found in polynomial time using the principal-dual interior point method, a solution method of linear programming.

具有加性耦合效用和连续统参与人博弈中的强Nash均衡

本文将研究具有加性耦合效用和连续统参与人博弈中的强Nash均衡。我们首先证明具有加性耦合效用和有限参与人博弈中强Nash均衡的存在性。进一步,对具有加性耦合效用和连续统参与人的博弈,我们引入弱强Nash均衡的概念,并证明它的存在性定理。本文发展了强Nash均衡的研究。

转移概率部分未知的离散时间Markov跳变系统Nash微分博弈

考虑到转移概率矩阵元素无法完全获悉,如何在转移概率部分未知的情境下研究离散时间Markov跳变系统Nash微分博弈是有待解决的问题之一,这一问题可以为转移概率部分未知的Markov跳变系统Nash微分博弈理论在管理问题上的应用提供理论支撑。基于此,本文首先研究单人博弈情形,即ε-次优控制问题,借助自由连接权矩阵和配方法,得到了ε-次优控制策略存在的充分性条件,并给出了成本函数上界的显式表达;然后延伸至双人博弈进行分析,得到了ε-次优Nash均衡策略存在的条件等价于求解双线性矩阵不等式和矩阵不等式的优化问题,并通过启发式算法求解优化问题得到ε-次优Nash均衡策略;最后通过数值算例证明了主要结论的有效性。

Fully Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking for High-Order Players With Actuator Limitations

This paper explores the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium seeking in games, where players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their control inputs constrained within a pre-specified region. A linear transformation for players' dynamics is firstly utilized to facilitate the design of bounded control inputs incorporating multiple saturation functions. By introducing consensus protocols with adaptive and time-varying gains, the unknown actions for players are distributively estimated. Then, a fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is exploited, showcasing its remarkable properties: (1) ensuring the boundedness of control inputs;(2) avoiding any global information/parameters;and (3) allowing the graph to be directed. Based on Lyapunov stability analysis, it is theoretically proved that the proposed distributed control strategy can lead all the players' actions to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, an illustrative example is given to validate effectiveness of the proposed method.

A Penalty Approach for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem （GNEP） is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem （NEP）, in which both the utility function and the strategy space of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players. This problem has been used to model various problems in applications. However, the convergent solution algorithms are extremely scare in the literature. In this paper, we present an incremental penalty method for the GNEP, and show that a solution of the GNEP can be found by solving a sequence of smooth NEPs. We then apply the semismooth Newton method with Armijo line search to solve latter problems and provide some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach.

An Extension of One-Period Nash Equilibrium Model in Non-Life Insurance Markets

This paper deals with an extension of the one-period model in non-life insurance markets (cf. [1]) by using a transition probability matrix depending on some economic factors. We introduce a multi-period model and in each period the solvency constraints will be updated. Moreover, the model has the inactive state including some uninsured population. Similar results on the existence of premium equilibrium and sensitivity analysis for this model are presented and illustrated by numerical results.

On Dynamics and Nash Equilibriums of Networked Games

Networked noncooperative games are investigated,where each player(or agent) plays with all other players in its neighborhood. Assume the evolution is based on the fact that each player uses its neighbors current information to decide its next strategy. By using sub-neighborhood, the dynamics of the evolution is obtained. Then a method for calculating Nash equilibriums from mixed strategies of multi-players is proposed.The relationship between local Nash equilibriums based on individual neighborhoods and global Nash equilibriums of overall network is revealed. Then a technique is proposed to construct Nash equilibriums of an evolutionary game from its one step static Nash equilibriums. The basic tool of this approach is the semi-tensor product of matrices, which converts strategies into logical matrices and payoffs into pseudo-Boolean functions, then networked evolutionary games become discrete time dynamic systems.

Distributed Optimal Variational GNE Seeking in Merely Monotone Games

In this paper, the optimal variational generalized Nash equilibrium(v-GNE) seeking problem in merely monotone games with linearly coupled cost functions is investigated, in which the feasible strategy domain of each agent is coupled through an affine constraint. A distributed algorithm based on the hybrid steepest descent method is first proposed to seek the optimal v-GNE. Then, an accelerated algorithm with relaxation is proposed and analyzed, which has the potential to further improve the convergence speed to the optimal v-GNE. Some sufficient conditions in both algorithms are obtained to ensure the global convergence towards the optimal v-GNE. To illustrate the performance of the algorithms, numerical simulation is conducted based on a networked Nash-Cournot game with bounded market capacities.

Optimal confrontation position selecting games model and its application to one-on-one air combat

In the air combat process,confrontation position is the critical factor to determine the confrontation situation,attack effect and escape probability of UAVs.Therefore,selecting the optimal confrontation position becomes the primary goal of maneuver decision-making.By taking the position as the UAV’s maneuver strategy,this paper constructs the optimal confrontation position selecting games(OCPSGs)model.In the OCPSGs model,the payoff function of each UAV is defined by the difference between the comprehensive advantages of both sides,and the strategy space of each UAV at every step is defined by its accessible space determined by the maneuverability.Then we design the limit approximation of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium(LAMSNQ)algorithm,which provides a method to determine the optimal probability distribution of positions in the strategy space.In the simulation phase,we assume the motions on three directions are independent and the strategy space is a cuboid to simplify the model.Several simulations are performed to verify the feasibility,effectiveness and stability of the algorithm.

Generalized Quantum Games with Nash Equilibrium

We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose a simple scheme to illustrate it.The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and a two-entangled-qubit system.The Nash Equilibrium Theorem is proved for the models.

不连续多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash均衡解的存在性与Hadamard良定性

该文主要考虑不连续多目标博弈问题解的存在性和良定性.首先将不连续条件更优回应保障推广到n人多目标博弈,证明了其弱Pareto-Nash均衡点的存在性定理.更进一步地,研究了此类不连续n人多目标博弈的Hadamard良定性.这些结果推广了P.J.Reny等的研究成果.

Game Analysis of Regulation for Online Prescription Drugs under Customer Feedback Mechanism

Objective To study the way to better regulate the online sales of prescription drugs,and to provide reference for the adjustment of relevant policies since the online sales of prescription drugs has become an inevitable trend.Methods A game model was constructed for the strategy choice of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform,customers and government departments based on differential game theory and Nash equilibrium game model to analyze the pure strategy Nash equilibrium,Nash equilibrium dominant strategy of each subject and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under different conditions.Besides,Matlab was used to carry out simulation analysis.Results and Conclusion The study shows that:(1)Improving the credibility of the government and reducing the cost of government regulation can not only make the pharmaceutical e-commerce platform operate with high quality,but also give greater play to government functions;(2)The greater the influence of social evaluation on pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms,the lower the cost of high-quality operation of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform,and the greater the probability of customer choosing real evaluation strategy;(3)The greater the customers’perception of potential risk,the greater the compensation,and the lower the cost of reporting.Then,the greater the probability that government departments will choose strict regulation.Finally,the model solution and simulation analysis are combined to provide countermeasures and suggestions for the safety regulation of online sales of prescription drugs.

仪器考证Menzies法解Needham-Stavianos谜题找Nash均衡点——记郑和远航科技610年与李凤苞开启中德科技合作140年

"为何工业1.0-4.0都萌发在有千年黑暗时期的欧洲却不在航海辉煌之中华而反受其害?"为解这著名的Needham-Stavianos谜题,本文举例分析了1405郑和的辉煌航海科技与1875海防科技与外交先驱李凤苞贡献嘎然终断的过程,反思甲午之殇两甲子。并介绍了Menzies实地考证法与仪器断代测源补充皇史宬,从中国海洋开发史中探讨当代竞争策略的进化过程:von Nuemann 0和胜败竞争Nash均衡共赢竞争、国际标准平台共利合作。

Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking on Compact Action Sets over Jointly Strongly Connected Switching Networks

This paper studies the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking(DNES)problem for games whose action sets are compact and whose network graph is switching satisfying the jointly strongly connected condition.To keep the actions of all players in their action sets all the time,one has to resort to the projected gradient-based method.Under the assumption that the unique Nash equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the pseudogradient system,an algorithm is proposed that is able to exponentially find the Nash equilibrium.Further,the authors also consider the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for games whose actions are governed by high-order integrator dynamics and belong to some compact sets.Two examples are used to illustrate the proposed approach.

On the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution in the differential game approach to formation control

The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if solvable)can be solved numerically by using the terminal value and the backward iteration.To investigate the solvability and solution of these equations the formation control problem as the differential game is replaced by a discrete-time dynamic game.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,the existence of Nash equilibrium controls for the discretetime formation control problem is shown.Second,a backward iteration approximate solution to the coupled Riccati differential equations in the continuous-time differential game is developed.An illustrative example is given to justify the models and solution.

Fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy n-person non-cooperative game

The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan＇s binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.

A Variational Inequality Approach to a Class of Environmental Equilibrium Problems

In this note we consider a class of environmental games recently proposed in the literature and investigate them by using the powerful tools of variational inequalities. We also consider the case where some data of the problem can depend on a parameter and analyze the regularity of the solution with respect to the parameter. In view of applications to time-dependent or random models, we also introduce the variational inequality formulation in Lebesgue spaces.

QUASI-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINED MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES IN GENERALIZED CONVEX SPACE

A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems are proved in noncompact generalized convex spaces. Then, ar applications of the quasi-equilibrium existence theorem, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact generalized convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literatures.