An improving energy efficiency cooperation algorithm based on Nash bargaining solution in selfish user cooperative networks

A bandwidth-exchange cooperation algorithm based on the Nash bargaining solution （NBS） is proposed to encourage the selfish users to participate with more cooperation so as to improve the users＇ energy efficiency. As a result, two key problems, i.e. , when to cooperate and how to cooperate, are solved. For the first problem, a proposed cooperation condition that can decide when to cooperate and guarantee users＇ energy efficiency achieved through cooperation is not lower than that achieved without cooperation. For the second problem, the cooperation bandwidth allocations （CBAs） based on the NBS solve the problem how to cooperate when cooperation takes place. Simulation results show that, as the modulation order of quadrature amplitude modulation （QAM） increases, the cooperation between both users only occurs with a large signal-to-noise ratio （SNR）. Meanwhile, the energy efficiency decreases as the modulation order increases. Despite all this, the proposed algorithm can obviously improve the energy efficiency measured in bits-per-Joule compared with non-cooperation.

Multi-user Symmetric Cooperation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution in Cooperative Relay Networks

This paper presents a symmetric cooperation strategy for cooperative relay networks with multiple users. The multi-user symmetric cooperation model and the relay selection algorithm are proposed. Then, the time slot allocation problem is cast into a bargaining problem, and the optimal time slot allocation solution is obtained by Nash bargaining solution （NBS）. Moreover, we also consider the implementations of the cooperation strategy, i.e., the grouping and admission control algorithm. Simulation results show that users can obtain larger rates under the symmetric cooperation strategy than the non-cooperative case.

Optimal Time and Bandwidth Allocation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution for Cooperative Cognitive Systems

In this paper,we propose a cooperative spectrum sharing strategy based on the Nash bargaining solution.Specifically,the primary system leases a fraction of its transmission time to the secondary system in exchange for cooperation to improve its transmission performance.To gain access to the spectrum of the primary system,the secondary system needs to split a fraction of its transmission bandwidth to help to forward the primary signal.As a reward,the secondary system can use the remaining bandwidth to transmit its own signal.We find a unique solution for this time and bandwidth allocation using the Nash bargaining solution.Simulation results demonstrate that the performance of the primary and secondary systems can both be improved by the proposed spectrum sharing strategy.

A novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game in cognitive radios

According to the utility function and spectrum demand of the cognitive users,a novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game was proposed under the wireless environment of Rayleigh fading.On the basis of this mechanism,we proposed a new distributed bargaining algorithm based on Nash product;then the spectrum prices and system utilities were obtained.Theoretical analysis results showed that with a close total utility to the optimal,the Nash bargaining mechanism cannot only improve the fairness between primary systems remarkably,but also reach to the stable equilibrium in finitely repeated games.Finally,simulation results were given to demonstrate the correctness of these conclusions and the efficiency of the algorithm.

基于Nash-Bargaining的区域内水权交易合作议价模型研究

针对江苏省水量水质双缺型水资源冲突问题,基于准市场交易模式,考虑水权交易决策主体各自议价能力,引用合作博弈理论方法,构建区域内跨行业水权交易Nash-Bargaining议价模型,并给出准市场条件下水权交易的最优价格。以江苏省工业、农业之间跨产业水权交易为例开展实例研究,分析交易水量、议价能力对水权交易价格的影响。研究成果表明:水权交易总量与水权交易单价呈现正向相关关系,但水权交易单价存在上限,价格天花板受政府部门调控影响;水权交易能够有效提升江苏省工农业主体的收益,同时交易水量与交易价格的升高均能够有效提升江苏省整体社会福利;在高交易水量情况下,水权交易购买方的议价能力对提升水权交易整体福利具有更强的作用。

A COMPARISON OF A SIMPLE PROCUREMENT AUCTION AND GENERALIZED NASH BARGAINING

This paper presents a comparison mechanism for a simple procurement auction and generalized Nash bargaining solution in a procurement circumstance. The buyer who hopes to fulfill a project has two options. First, she may award the project to the old provider with an efficient quality by bargaining Second, she may give the project to the firm who submits the lowest bid through a simple procurement second-price sealed-bid auction with a pre-fixed quality. We compare the expected revenue in the auction with the deterministic profit of the bargaining. In different parameters cases, we find the borderline functions between the two options with respect to the buyer＇s bargaining power and the amount of bidders. We also compare our simple procurement auction （SPA） with the optimal multidimensional bid auction by Che （1993）, and find our model protects the buyer＇s private valuation information by forfeiting some profits. Some properties of the difference between the two auctions are proposed, especially there is no revenue difference when the amount of bidders approaches infinity.

Ordering policies and coordination in a twoechelon supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns

This paper investigates the ordering policies of two competitive retailers,and the coordination status of a two-echelon supply chain by considering the fairness concerns of channel members.We consider that two retailers compete with each other over price,where overstock and shortage are allowed.We assume that the demand is stochastic and considered with additive form.First,based on the Nash bargaining fairness reference point,we obtain the optimal decisions of the fairness-concerned channel members in both the centralized and the decentralized cases using a two-stage game theory.Secondly,we analyze the coordination status of the supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns using ideas of optimization.Finally,numerical experiments are used to illustrate the influence of some parameters,the fairness-concerned behavioral preference of the channel members on the optimal decisions and the coordination status of supply chain.Some managerial insights are obtained.

Nash bargaining solution based multi-cell and multi-user interference alignment scheme for cellular networks

In wireless cellular networks, the interference alignment （IA） is a promising technique for interference management. A new IA scheme for downlink cellular network with multi-cell and multi-user was proposed, in the proposed scheme, the interference in the networks is divided into inter-cell interference （ICI） among cells and inter-user interference （IUI） in each cell. The ICI is aligned onto a multi-dimensional subspace by multiplying the ICI alignment precoding matrix which is designed by the singular value decomposition （SVD） scheme at the base station （BS） side. The aligned ICI is eliminated by timing the interference suppression matrix which is designed by zero-forcing （ZF） scheme at the user equipment （UE） side. Meanwhile, the IUI is aligned by multiplying the IUI alignment precoding matrix which is designed based on Nash bargaining solution （NBS） in game theory. The NBS is solved by the particle swarm optimization （PSO） method. Simulations show that, compared with the traditional ZF IA scheme, the proposed scheme can obtain higher data rate and guarantee the data rate fairness of UEs with little additional complexity.

UAV rendezvous based on Nash bargain

Purpose–The purpose of this paper is to find a solution for the unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV)rendezvous problem,which should be feasible,optimal and not time consuming.In the existing literatures,the UAV rendezvous problem is always presented as a matter of simultaneous arrival.They focus only on the time consistency.However,the arrival time of UAVs can vary according to the rendezvous position.The authors should determine the best rendezvous position with considering UAVs’maneuver constraint,so that UAVs can construct a formation in a short time.Design/methodology/approach–The authors present a decentralized method in which UAVs negotiate with each other for the best rendezvous positions by using Nash bargain.The authors analyzed the constraints of the rendezvous time and the UAV maneuver,and proposed an objective function that allows UAVs to get to their rendezvous positions as fast as possible.Bezier curve is adopted to generate smooth and feasible flight trajectories.During the rendezvous process,UAVs adjust their speed so that they can arrive at the rendezvous positions simultaneously.Findings–The effectiveness of the proposed method is verified by simulation experiments.The proposed method can successfully and efficiently solve the UAV rendezvous problem.Originality/value–As far as the authors know,it is the first time Nash bargain is used in the UAV rendezvous problem.The authors modified the Nash bargain method and make it distributed,so that it can be computed easily.The proposed method is much less consuming than ordinary Nash bargain method and ordinary swarm intelligence based methods.It also considers the UAV maneuver constraint,and can be applied online for its fast calculation speed.Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

区县级国土空间总体规划中的新增建设用地指标分解方法研究-基于不对称Nash谈判模型

在存量发展、建设用地指标趋紧的背景下,面对中心城区和各乡镇强烈的发展诉求,区县政府决策者迫切需要一套客观公正的评价标准和技术框架指导建设用地指标分解。文章运用多因素综合分析法、对比分析法,耦合了发展潜力评价和用地效率评价两种情景,构建了定量定性相结合的指标体系,提出了运用不对称Nash谈判模型对指标分解的初步结果进行博弈优化的技术方法。新增指标分解应遵循高质量发展、差异性公平、弹性可操作3条基本原则,在实操层面应兼顾自上而下的区县政府意向和自下而上的乡镇利益诉求。文章以我国T市W县为例开展实证研究,结果证明基于耦合情景权重的指标分解方案可以在保障重点发展地区增长空间的同时促进三生空间均衡布局,有助于提高最终决策的客观公正性和综合满意度。

基于随机-Nash-Harsanyi讨价还价博弈的光伏-氢储能多主体分散协同调度

将光伏(PV)主体与氢储能(HES)主体结合,形成PV-HES联合系统,是促进可再生能源就地消纳,实现能源低碳转型的有效措施。针对光伏出力随机干扰及主体互异等问题,提出PV-HES的分散协同调度模型。首先,基于Nash-Harsanyi讨价还价理论建立PV-HES的多主体合作运行模型,并将其等效转换为电能交易量确定子问题和电能交易成本确定子问题;然后,为了保护各主体隐私,运用改进的交替方向乘子法对上述两个子问题进行分布式求解;最后,在一个典型的PV-HES联合系统中进行算例仿真,以验证所提分散协同调度模型以及分布式求解算法的有效性。仿真结果表明,氢储能主体的运营成本分别降低了11.67%和10.48%,光伏运营商的收益提高了15.72%。此外,通过对交替方向乘子法的改进也提高了系统的求解效率。

Nash讨价还价公平参考下的供应链优化决策

基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平参考框架,构建公平关切效用体系,以此为基础对报童模型展开行为研究,探讨零售商的公平关切行为倾向对供应链的影响.通过数值分析说明了模型的应用,并通过比较静态分析进一步分别讨论了零售商的最优决策和供应链系统最优决策的性质.

一种基于DEA与Nash讨价还价博弈的固定成本分摊方法

结合DEA和Nash讨价还价博弈方法研究固定成本分摊问题。本文证明了如果将分摊成本作为新的投入,存在某些分摊方案在绩效评估中可以同时满足组织的整体理性和组织内子决策单元的个体理性。在此基础上,本文引入Nash讨价还价博弈模型,给出了唯一的分摊方案。最后经过算例说明该方法的有效,以及与现有DEA分摊方法相比在可实施方面具有一定的优势。

Nash谈判解的预测能力——中国被试的实验证据

讨价还价是人们最基本的交易制度之一。在非结构化的讨价还价中,Nash谈判解具有重要的预测意义,但现有的实验研究表明,Nash谈判解的第4公理,即效用线性变换无关性公理,并没有很好地得到实验结果支持。本文的实验表明,信息问题并没有影响Nash谈判解的预测能力,即在完全信息条件下,第4公理仍然是不可拒绝的。但在信息完全框架中加上谈判者不同的效用评价,Nash谈判解的预测能力被折扣掉一部分,这也说明不能笼统地将信息和效用评价放在一起来界定第4公理。

风险规避下基于Stackelberg博弈与Nash讨价还价博弈的供应链契约比较

以批发价契约与回购契约为例,分析与比较风险规避型供应链分别采取Stackelberg博弈和Nash讨价还价博弈时的最优化决策,探讨供应链主导方如何根据合作伙伴的风险规避水平选择契约与博弈机制。研究表明,当零售商与供应商风险规避水平相同时,供应链的最优选择是采用Nash讨价还价博弈的批发价契约或者回购契约,二者等价;当零售商与供应商风险规避水平比较接近时,采用Nash讨价还价博弈下的回购契约要优于相同博弈机制下的批发价契约;当零售商与供应商风险规避水平相差较大时,供应商不会选择Nash讨价还价博弈下的任一契约,而是选择Stackelberg博弈下的回购契约。与风险中性假设下的结论相比,风险规避下的研究结论更符合供应链管理实践。

基于NashCC-Q学习的两交叉口信号灯协调控制

提出一种NashCC-Q学习算法用于解决两交叉口信号灯协调控制问题。根据博弈论概念,相邻两交叉口之间的协调控制问题属于二人非零和合作博弈类型。在Nash-Q学习算法的基础上,将Q值函数的更新建立在Nash合作博弈中提出的Nash"公理方法"求博弈谈判解的基础上,进而解决合作博弈的问题,实现两交叉口信号灯协调控制。采用Paramics仿真软件进行仿真,结果表明该方法的有效性。

基于Nash协商模型的回购契约机制

在考虑零售商销售边际成本以及供应链缺货惩罚成本的前提下,针对市场为一般随机需求的情况,本文首先论证了传统回购契约在协调供应链时的不合理性,然后在考虑供应链参与双方谈判能力的基础上,建立了基于不对称Nash协商模型的回购契约机制,并证明了此机制在协调供应链的同时可以使得零售商和供应商的收益都得到改善,最后通过数值分析验证了所得到的理论成果.

动态非光滑Nash协商解必要条件的研究

本文利用非光滑分析理论，采用公理化方法研究了非光滑情形下的动态协商对策问题，给出其Ｎａｓｈ协商解的必要条件，并给予了严格的数学证明．

商业银行融资对药品批发企业供给价格的影响——基于Nash讨价还价模型的分析

考虑到药品供应链资金流通困境对药价虚高矛盾的加剧效应,讨论了商业银行融资对药品批发企业供给价格的影响。区分目录药和非目录药,构建了商业银行和药品批发企业的Nash讨价还价模型,得出了3种情况下药品批发企业的最优供给价格和商业银行的最佳收益分配比例,分析了商业银行融资通过改变目录药应收账款周期,对两种药品供给价格可能产生的影响。研究表明,商业银行融资未改变两种药品最优供给价格之间的影响关系,应以非目录药为参照合理约定融资周期。当目录药应收账款周期较长时,商业银行融资能够降低药品供给价格;当目录药应收账款周期较短时,可通过判断周期成本系数的归属区间,预估供给价格的变动,引导两种药品的良性竞争与协调经营。

基于Nash讨价还价公平偏好的收益共享契约分析

本文在随机市场需求的一般情形下,同时引入零售商和供应商的公平偏好,以Nash讨价还价为博弈框架,研究公平偏好对收益共享契约协调性的影响,并进行数值模拟分析,结果表明:只有公平偏好强度满足相应条件时,公平偏好才能使收益共享契约实现供应链的协调;当收益共享契约协调供应链时,公平偏好虽然不会改变契约参数以及节点企业最优决策和利润,但是会改变供应链中各主体的预期和效用,因而改变了供应商和零售商协调供应链的心理意愿。