The Nature of Normal Science： Arthur Compton＇s Research Programme as an Exemplar

Thomas S. Kuhn＇s theory of normal science （NS）, aside from being a provocative philosophical reconstruction of the relatively conservative phase of scientific research, contains useful ideas for systematic analysis of specific episodes in the history of science. Therefore, although the theory has been looked at from different angles since the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （TSSR） was published in 1962, its detailed exploration of the cumulative phase of research in mature science is of abiding relevance in the philosophy of science. This is because NS provides a compelling account of how and why members of scientific communities succeed, largely, to produce reliable knowledge about an incompletely known phenomenal world. Again, the theory elucidates special features of scientific research that differentiate it from other creative enterprises. In that regard, this paper reconstructs Arthur Compton＇s research into x-ray scattering as a good instantiation of NS. Discussion of Compton＇s convincing demonstration of the particulate properties of electromagnetic radiation within the framework of NS showcases the elucidatory power of Kuhn＇s theory with respect to selected episodes in science, and corroborates the notion that the bulk of scientific work is a conservative puzzle-solving activity with the potential for precipitating scientific revolutions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that Compton＇s groundbreaking work on x-ray scattering has been analysed within the framework of Kuhn＇s philosophy of science.

Beyond Logic of Discovery and Paradigmatic Consensus： A Reanalysis of the Popper-Kuhn Debate in the Philosophy of Science

There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century philosophy of science. Just as Popper＇s fundamental work on the subject, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, marked a decisive break with inductivist epistemologies, Kuhn＇s magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （1962, enlarged ed. 1970）, inaugurated the coming of age of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Some scholars seem to consider the main doctrines of both philosophers as irreconcilables or contradictories. This explains why, for example Popper and Popperians such as Imre Lakatos and John Watkins describe themselves as ＂critical rationalists＂, whereas they refer to Kuhn as an ＂irrationalist＂ or ＂relativist＂-appellations that the latter has consistently rejected. The debate between Popper and Kuhn, especially as contained in an important work, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge （1970）, highlights some of the knotty problems connected with philosophical appraisals of science. It also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of logistic approaches in the philosophy of science, on the one hand, and of historically informed socio-psychological analysis of science, on the other. In this paper, we reexamine the Popper-Kuhn controversy from an experimentalist perspective. In other words, we argue that the ideas of testing and normal science can be systematically accommodated by fine-structure dissection of empirical research through which scientists learn about the world, based on the assumption that the progress of science is the growth of experimental knowledge-a fact often neglected in theory-dominated philosophies of science. Taking discovery of the cosmic background radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson as example, the paper argues that important scientific discoveries have been accomplished even in the absence of theory in any obvious sense, a situation that conflicts with the theory-dominated models of Popper and Kuhn. Thus, it offers an account of how practicing scientists learn from research to control errors and avoid blind alleys. The paper affirms, in conclusion, that going beyond the theories of Popper and Kuhn requires that philosophers of science should take what scientists learn from experiments seriously when theorising about science, by taking into account normal testing or error detection and control strategies through which scientific knowledge is acquired and extended

The missing hydrogen ion,Part-3:Science and the human flaws that compromise it

The purpose of this research was to use a historical method and core principles from scientific philosophy to explain why mistakes were made in the development of the lactic acidosis construct.On a broader scope,this research explains what science is,why some scientists despite good intention,often get it wrong,and why it takes so long(decades)to correct these errors.Science is a human behaviour that consists of the identification of a problem based on the correct application of prior knowledge,the development of a method to best resolve or test the problem,completion of these methods to acquire results,and then a correct interpretation of the results.If these steps are done correctly there is an increased probability(no guarantee)that the outcome is likely to be correct.Thomas Kuhn proposed that you can understand what science is from how it has been performed,and from his essays he revealed a very dysfunctional form of science that he called‘normal’(due the preponderance of its presence)science.Conversely,Karl Popper was adamant that the practice of‘normal’science revealed numerous flaws that deviate from fundamental principles that makes science,science.Collectively,the evidence reveals that within the sports medicine and health sciences,as with all disciplines,errors in science are more frequent than you might expect.There is an urgent need to improve how we educate and train scientists to prevent the pursuit of‘normal’science and the harm it imparts on humanity.

Socio-ecological dynamics and challenges to the governance of Neglected Tropical Disease control

The current global attempts to control the so-called“Neglected Tropical Diseases(NTDs)”have the potential to significantly reduce the morbidity suffered by some of the world’s poorest communities.However,the governance of these control programmes is driven by a managerial rationality that assumes predictability of proposed interventions,and which thus primarily seeks to improve the cost-effectiveness of implementation by measuring performance in terms of pre-determined outputs.Here,we argue that this approach has reinforced the narrow normal-science model for controlling parasitic diseases,and in doing so fails to address the complex dynamics,uncertainty and socio-ecological context-specificity that invariably underlie parasite transmission.We suggest that a new governance approach is required that draws on a combination of non-equilibrium thinking about the operation of complex,adaptive,systems from the natural sciences and constructivist social science perspectives that view the accumulation of scientific knowledge as contingent on historical interests and norms,if more effective control approaches sufficiently sensitive to local disease contexts are to be devised,applied and managed.At the core of this approach is an emphasis on the need for a process that assists with the inclusion of diverse perspectives,social learning and deliberation,and a reflexive approach to addressing system complexity and incertitude,while balancing this flexibility with stability-focused structures.We derive and discuss a possible governance framework and outline an organizational structure that could be used to effectively deal with the complexity of accomplishing global NTD control.We also point to examples of complexity-based management structures that have been used in parasite control previously,which could serve as practical templates for developing similar governance structures to better manage global NTD control.Our results hold important wider implications for global health policy aiming to effectively control and eradicate parasitic diseases across the world.