In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions...In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value.展开更多
This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the coopera...This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectively. The explicit form of the generalized Owen value for this kind of games is given, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Eklrthermore, two special cases of this kind of games are researched. The corresponding Davoff indices are also stHdied. Fin~.llv ~n ilhl^r~＇i, ~r^l~ to ~展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70771010,71071018)Innovation Ability Promotion of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education(TJSHS201310011004)
文摘In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71201089, 71271217,and 71071018the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province,China,under Grant No. ZR2012GQ005
文摘This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectively. The explicit form of the generalized Owen value for this kind of games is given, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Eklrthermore, two special cases of this kind of games are researched. The corresponding Davoff indices are also stHdied. Fin~.llv ~n ilhl^r~＇i, ~r^l~ to ~
