Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

Convenience on Three Wheels China-made motor tricycles are transforming the way goods and people are transported in Uganda

In most cities,towns and villages in Uganda,Chinamade motor tricycles have become a game-changer for commuters and entrepreneurs alike.

Changes in the Supply of Public Intermediate Goods,Fixed Wage,and the Relative Price in the Harris-Todaro Model

Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public intermediate goods provided by the government,the increase in the fixed wage rate in the urban sector,and the changes in the relative international prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods on labor employment,unemployment,and the economic welfare in the context of a small open economy.It also proposes relevant policies to reduce the unemployment rate while improving national welfare.

Toward inclusive list-making for trade liberalization in environmental goods to reduce carbon emissions

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)is contemplating expanding its list of environmental goods(EG)for trade liberalization to fight climate change.In support of doing so,this study proposes that a long list that retains controversies is better for carbon emission reduction than a short common list.This study examines four mechanisms of longer lists:enlarging market scales,enriching product mixes,enhancing product sophistication,and enriching trade patterns.Using China’s emerging EG trade during the 2001-2015 period as a case study,this study compares four EG lists with different EG.The results show that:(1)a longer list reduces carbon emissions from both imports and exports,making domestic regions with different advantages have better chances of improving carbon efficiencies.(2)Product sophistication reduces the emission gap between trading partners,regardless of the length of EG lists.(3)China’s EG exports contribute to carbon reduction in leading regions,while EG imports provide laggard regions with better chances of reducing carbon emissions.These findings provide three implications for future list-making:it is important to(1)seek a long and inclusive list rather than a short common list,(2)shift the focus from environmental end-use to the technological contents of products,and(3)balance the demand of laggard regions to import and the capacity of leading regions to export.

Application of Dual-Energy X-Ray Image Detection of Dangerous Goods Based on YOLOv7

X-ray security equipment is currently a more commonly used dangerous goods detection tool, due to the increasing security work tasks, the use of target detection technology to assist security personnel to carry out work has become an inevitable trend. With the development of deep learning, object detection technology is becoming more and more mature, and object detection framework based on convolutional neural networks has been widely used in industrial, medical and military fields. In order to improve the efficiency of security staff, reduce the risk of dangerous goods missed detection. Based on the data collected in X-ray security equipment, this paper uses a method of inserting dangerous goods into an empty package to balance all kinds of dangerous goods data and expand the data set. The high-low energy images are combined using the high-low energy feature fusion method. Finally, the dangerous goods target detection technology based on the YOLOv7 model is used for model training. After the introduction of the above method, the detection accuracy is improved by 6% compared with the direct use of the original data set for detection, and the speed is 93FPS, which can meet the requirements of the online security system, greatly improve the work efficiency of security personnel, and eliminate the security risks caused by missed detection.

Discussion on the Supply of Child-friendly City Construction Based on the Attributes of Public Goods

Child friendliness is the need for a good life in the new era.The problems related to the construction of child-friendly cities were discussed from the perspective of the supply of public goods.Through literature research and summary,the basic concepts,construction factors,sources of supply goods,structure of the main supplies,and supply behavior of public goods supply in child-friendly cities were sorted out.Some effective suggestions were proposed,such as improving the resource conversion and integration ability of the main suppliers,establishing an effective incentive system,optimizing the structure of the main suppliers,improving multi-party collaborative efficiency,ensuring benefits for all parties,raising child-friendly awareness,innovating funding sources for projects,ensuring adequate funding supply,building urban supply system in accordance with local conditions,and ensuring the supply of public goods.

Strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game

The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work proposes a strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm;and an aspiration-driven multiplayer evolutionary game model is established based on the requirement. Then the average abundance function and strategy dominance condition of the model are constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via simulation,and the influences of the multiplication factor r, aspiration levelα, threshold m and other parameters on the strategy dominance conditions were simulated for both linear and threshold public goods games(PGGs) to determine the strategy dominance characteristics;Finally, deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

Research on Culture Goods and the Image of Mixed-blood in The Bluest Eye

The Bluest Eye is Toni Morrison’s maiden work,through which Morrison carried out independent thinking on the question of“What is beauty?”In The Bluest Eye,the image of mixed-blood is characterized as a self-satisfied beautiful girl or lady due to light skin color.However,Morrison shatters their proud aesthetic edifice through satirical techniques.Firstly,this paper starts with the analysis of Shirley Temple on the blue-and-white cup and Mary Jane on candy wrapper as culture goods,in order to reveal the aesthetic standards of the mainstream.Next,through close reading,this paper,taking the example of a high-yellow child Maureen Peal,and the graceful sugar-brown lady Geraldine,makes deep analysis on their sense of superiority and artistic characteristics,and aims to better understand Morrison’s satirical techniques and interpretation of beauty.

Globalization Under the Spells of Breakdowns in Supply Chains, Regime Change, Regime Formation, and Alliance Restructuring: How Much Is Left for Public Goods?

In a paper conceived about five years ago(“Globalization and Public Goods:Too Big to Tackle?”)roughly a dozen factors were linked to explain important causal paths from globalization to the potential output of public goods.The Russian invasion of Ukraine,the corona epidemic,and the increased hegemonic rivalry between China and the U.S.interrupted or even destroyed many of the linkages between globalization and potential public good production.About five important detrimental paths involved in the meantime.In the present article we aim at linking what is left from the previous level of globalization or emerging to form a new and simplified causal model for likely linkages between truncated or(re-)emerging globalization,and the deadly needed output of public goods.These linkages refer to rules of climate control,go to trade linkages and arbitrary tariffs and trade interventions.Regime change,regime formation,and alliance restructuring address aspects of domestic rule and international stability.Selectorate theory,regime type,and exit options for political elites provide key explanatory factors in explaining globalization and public goods productions,or their decay.Where possible we use some data and transformation experiences corroborating our arguments.In other instances need for further empirical macro research will become clear.

Application of the Industry-University-Research Education Model of“Works,Products,and Public Goods”in Design Majors Practical Courses in Colleges and Universities

One of the goals and requirements of China’s educational modernization includes prioritizing,guiding,and promoting the social service capabilities of universities.The teaching of practical courses in design majors in colleges and universities has long been plagued by problems such as being“out of touch with the market and social needs”and“ignoring the cultivation of creativity.”It fails to meet the goals and requirements of educational modernization.This article takes the“Fundamentals of Styling and Comprehensive Expression”course offered by the School of Design of Guangxi Normal University as an entry point to study the industry-university-research education method that combines“social service”with the teaching of design professional practical courses.It also attempts to improve“works,products,and public goods”through the establishment of the theoretical model of“product”and the analysis of practical application paths is carried out to solve the problems existing in the traditional teaching of the design major,enhance the social service capabilities of the design major,promote talent employment and industry and social development,and carry out teaching reform attempts.

曹伟云教授治疗Good’s综合征合并支气管扩张验案1例

Good’s综合征是一种免疫缺陷性疾病,属于少见病,关于本病的报道并不多,尤其是采用中药治疗的报道少之又少。Good’s综合征患者因免疫力欠佳,易合并感染,尤以合并支气管扩张伴感染偏多。目前,西医治疗多为对症治疗,急性期予抗生素控制感染,但患者病情易反复。本文主要从曹伟云教授对Good’s综合征合并支气管扩张病的中医病因病机和辨证论治等方面展开论述,认为Good’s综合征合并支气管扩张或因初感外邪、侵犯肺系,或因痰热日久、消耗阴液,或因久病体虚、伤及阴阳引起,在治疗上或予以清热散邪,或予以养阴清热、化痰排脓,或予以补阳养阴,同时根据伴随症进行药物加减,通过整体观念辨证论治,扶正与祛邪动态调整,尤以扶正为要,增强患者的免疫力,改善患者体质,迅速缓解患者临床症状,减少病情发作次数和患者住院次数。

The Violent Redemption Theme in A Good Man is Hard to Find

Flannery O’Connor is one of the representative figures of American Southern writers.Being recognized as the most outstanding writer of the American South after Faulkner,she has great influence in the literary world.Her works are always shrouded in a strange and grotesque atmosphere and full of death as well as religious metaphors.The protagonists are a series of American Southern freaks struggling with the crisis of spiritual belief.The protagonists of her novel A Good Man is Hard to Find are a hypocritical believer in the world of sinners and a lost man suffering in the midst of real sin,thus O’Connor uses the highest form of violence-death to bring ultimate redemption to them.In people’s conception,violence and redemption are often opposite to each other,but O’Connor uses bloody and violent plots to explore the theme of religious salvation,integrating and unifying the two contrary concepts to form her unique and profound violent redemption writing.

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

Punishment in optional public goods games

In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

The Supply-Demand Analysis and Mechanism Innovation of Chinese Rural Public Goods

The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers' demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers' demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers' demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.

The Theoretical Foundation and its Mode Transformation of Rural Public Goods Supply in the Perspective of Organizational Competition

Theoretical expositions of public goods supply by the liberalism,new institutionalism and the school of public choice are conducted in the perspective of organizational competition.And the theoretical foundation of rural public goods is put forward.Then,the changes of the supply mode of rural public goods are discussed before and after the tax reform,that is,the "Community Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods before the tax reform and the "Organization Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods after the tax reform.Finally,the diversification of rural public goods supply in China in future is forecasted.

Factors Analysis of Affecting Loading and Reinforcing Scheme of Large Goods in Railway

Large goods transported in railway are kinds of special goods and they are very important in national construction. In order to transport safely, loading and reinforcing schemes must be made first. How to design a reasonable scheme will be affected by many factors. This paper presents the characteristic of the large goods, summarizes the process of designing a loading and reinforcing scheme of large good, then probes the factors of affecting the loading and reinforcing scheme and gives a detail analysis. It’s considered that those out-of-gauge and overweight degree of goods, center-of- gravity height of a loaded wagon, position of center-of-gravity of goods, type of wagon for using, reinforcement material and reinforcement method, transport expense and transport organization could affect a scheme in the aspects of safety, economy, rapidity and convenience. This conclusion will instruct and help to make a good scheme.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.