The Relation between Abnormal Main Fund Movements and Subsequent Earnings Management： Political Costs and Political Connections

Movement of major fund1 flows has great impact on capital markets, especially in China. This study investigates the relationship between abnormal main fund movements and firm＇s earnings management behavior, specifically, whether the abnormal main fund movements cause firms to keep a low profile for ＂self-protection＂ from being detected by the government. The empirical results of this study suggest that： （1） The mandatory disclosure of the ＂Top-ten circulating stockholders＂ requirement does not only reduce information asymmetry between investors and listed firms, but also strengthens and improves the efficiency of related government regulations in detecting disclosure of false information. This, in turn, increases the risk of being detected for firms with earnings management activities. （2） After abnormal main fund movements, relevant firms significantly reduce the level of earnings management to avoid attention from the public and regulatory agencies. （3） Using political connections as a proxy for the ＂shield effect＂ to mask political cost, we show that the negative relation between abnormal main fund movements and earnings management exists only for the subsample of firms without political connections. This paper provides a new angle for political cost study, and suggests that traditional political cost hypothesis should be further generalized.

CPI,Cost of Living and Politics

All economic decisions are made basedupon statistics,which are supposed to comefrom facts in real life.However,people aresometimes baffled by the conclusions drawnfrom different statistics,which present differ-ent pictures of our lives and society.Consumer Price Index(CPI),one of theprice indexes that government normally usesto judge the cost of living,measures the pricesof a fixed market basket of some 300 con-sumer goods and services purchased by a“typ-ical”urban consumer(McConnell & Brue,p.

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value:(1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies;(2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and(3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises(SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.