Combined Optimal Dispatch of Thermal Power Generators and Energy Storage Considering Thermal Power Deep Peak Clipping and Wind Energy Emission Grading Punishment

Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.

Power,punishment,patriarchy in Shakespeare’s Othello

An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.

An Unusual Punishment

One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Mathematical Neurolaw of Crime and Punishment: The <i>q</i>-Exponential Punishment Function

Whether people tend to punish criminals in a socially-optimal manner (i.e., hyperbolic punishment) or not is unknown. By adopting mathematical models of probabilistic punishment behavior (i.e., exponential, hyperbolic, and q-exponential probability discounting model based on Tsallis thermodynamics and neuroeconomics, Takahashi, 2007, Physica A;Takahashi et al., 2012, Applied Mathematics), we examined 1) fitness of the models to behavioral data of uncertain punishment, and 2) deviation from the socially optimal hyperbolic punishment function. Our results demonstrated that, the q-exponential punishment function best fits the behavioral data, and people overweigh the severity of punishment at small punishing probabilities and underweigh the severity of punishment at large punishing probabilities. In other words, people tend to punish crimes too severely and mildly with high and low arrest rate (e.g., homicide vs. excess of speed limit), respectively. Implications for neuroeconomics and neurolaw of crime and punishment (Takahashi, 2012, NeuroEndocrinology Letters) are discussed.

Role of Reward and Punishment in Education

This essay aims at illustrate the important role, of reward and punishment in education from a psychological viewpoint. According to Stimulus and Response theory, reward and punishment are now commonly used by teachers to encourage both congnitive activities and appropriate behaviour in classroom . Either of them can be used to encourage or supervise the students in learning, and rewarding is fawoured. However reward mechanism must be used properly and under control. It should 't be overused. Also, there is a place for punishment in education because errors need to be pointed out and antisocial behaviour should be corrected. It can be applied only when the intensity, duration and timing are carefully considered. In a word , reward system . is undoubtedly to have positive effect while punishment is proved to cause unpredictable result. Those specific informations are mentioned in the essay that follows.

The Rationale for Victims' Cooperation in Cases of Pleading Guilty and Accepting Punishment from the Perspective of Protecting the Right of Action

In the context of the more frequent application of the leniency system for pleading guilty and accepting punishment,the connotations of the rules on victim involvement should be enriched in the 2018 Criminal Procedure Law.Victims deeply influenced by the concept of cooperative justice will also have an intention to cooperate,thus resulting in a rationale for victims’cooperation.Victims’cooperation features a subjectivity of interactivity,understanding,and constraint.This kind of cooperation faces the accused,the procuratorial organ,and the court.The jurisprudential function of the rationale for cooperation of victims is embodied in such aspects as recognizing the victims as eligible subjects,enhancing the legal force of the recognizance in a case of pleading guilty and accepting punishment,and consolidating the legitimate basis for victim to obtain legal assistance.Oriented to protecting right of action of the victim,understanding and developing the rationale for the cooperation of the victim can start by reaching a judicial consensus on the"two limits"principle,optimizing the right of action system for victims,achieving the interconnection of multi-level litigation systems,and improving the rules on lenient punishment to enrich the plan for protecting victims’right of action in cases of pleading guilty and accepting punishment.

Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance

In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect.

To Blame or Not?Modulating Third-Party Punishment with the Framing Effect

People as third-party observers,without direct self-interest,may punish norm violators to maintain social norms.However,third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame(i.e.,verbally describe)a norm violation.We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon,which we call the“third-party framing effect”.In these experiments,participants observed an anonymous perpetrator deciding whether to keep her/his economic benefit while exposing a victim to a risk of physical pain(described as“harming others”in one condition and“not helping others”in the other condition),then they had a chance to punish that perpetrator at their own cost.Our results showed that the participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame,manifesting a framing effect.Self-reported anger toward perpetrators mediated the relationship between empathy toward victims and the framing effect.Meanwhile,activation of the insula mediated the relationship between mid-cingulate cortex activation and the framing effect;the functional connectivity between these regions significantly predicted the size of the framing effect.These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.

Punishment Mechanism with Self-Adjusting Rules in Spatial Voluntary Public Goods Games

The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research shows that high punishment can improve the cooperation of the population. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into spatial voluntary public goods games with every individual only knowing his own payoff in each round. Using the self-adjusting rules, we find that the different cost for punishment can lead to different effects on the voluntary public goods games. Especially, when the cost for punishment is decreased, a higher contribution region will appear in the case of low r value. It means even for the low r value, individuals can form the contributing groups in large quantities to produce a more efficient outcome than that in moderate r value. In addition, we also find the players' memory can have effects on the average outcome of the population.

Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Abduct and Traffic in or Kidnap Women or Children (Adopted at the 21st Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People'

With a view to severely punishing criminals who abduct and traffic in or kidnap women or children so as to protect the personal safety of women and children and maintain the public security order, the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law are supplemented or amended as follows: 1. Whoever abducts and traffics in a woman or a child shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years and not more than ten years, and shall concurrently be punished with a

Real Punishment For Virtual Theft

Virtual property has attained legal status with the recent conviction of several online thieves, but the issue remains a murky one Zhang Bin, a resident of Ningbo, in Zhejiang Province, began selling online game accounts on the Internet in February 2005. Among his customers was a man surnamed Shen, who bought an account for 4,800 yuan. Several days later, Shen discovered that his account had been embezzled, and

Crime and Punishment

China’s anti-corruption campaign enters 2018 with renewed vigor The government’s anti-graft campaign has made remarkable progress since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC)in late2012,and yet the battle is far from over.This was the message announced loud and clear at the latest session of the CPC’s anticorruption body.

Ideology,Emotionology,and Problems of Shaming Punishments in Early Modern Britain

Shame as a disciplinary weapon constituted a crucial part of premodern British penal regime.But in contrast to the substantial studies of capital punishment,shaming penalties remains relatively unexplored by historians.This article fills this gap by exploring some of the very basic,but rather neglected questions about the nature,mechanism,and problems of shaming punishments in early modern Britain.It argues that the use of shame was not random;behind it was an often unspoken but shared idea that shaming punishments should direct at offences which were customarily deemed“shameful”.Shameful was not just a moral judgement;it represented a disapproving emotion towards the offender,and a moral emotion that the convict and audience were expected to have for the purposes of reformation and deterrence.However,from the eighteenth century,the growing infl iction of shame on offenders whose transgressions were not commonly deemed shameful degraded public shaming into a violent,chaotic,and counter-productive exercise unable to evoke or inculcate the moral sense of shame.These problems made shame a subject of debate among legal writers,who criticized the excessive use of shaming techniques,but continually recognized the importance of shame as a virtuous emotion and an important penal strategy.

Should Petty Criminals Get Light Punishment?

People convicted of petty crimes may be let off with just a slap on the wrist after an amendment to prosecution guidelines

Man Jailed for Daughter's Punishment

11岁的法国女孩因犯了小错,父母竟然让她半夜裸体站立在屋外的雨中。目的是teach her a lesson。父母因此受到惩处。】

环境重罚体系的轻缓化实施研究

我国的环境惩罚体系经历了从“违法成本低、守法成本高”到“重罚主义”的演变。然而,受环境质量改善、治理能力提升、重罚体系的负效应与“重新发现受害者”的需求等因素影响,环境重罚体系基于“传送带理论”的严格、规范执行日渐缺乏社会和经济基础。民事上惩罚性赔偿的限缩使用,行政上的免罚清单与刑事上的合规不起诉等轻缓化举措,是重罚体系短期内难以纠偏背景下的“次优选择”。然而,重罚体系的轻缓化实施存在使法律权威柔性化与环境治理政治化的重大弊端。为此,从立法论视角,应当对不同主体和违法行为构建轻重有别的责任体系,并明确恢复性司法的法效力;从实施论视角,应当激活协调发展原则,将轻缓化实施引入制度化通道,并通过重点监督惩处概率和“地方环境质量”,实现对轻缓化实施的间接审查。

Application of Noise Reduction Method Based on Birgé-Massart Threshold

Flue gas generator set is a kind of large high-speed rotating machinery in petrochemical industry.This research focuses on noise reduction algorithms basis ontheBirgé-Massartthreshold.Obtained the threshold through Penalization Strategy Provided by Birgé-Massart;constructed different modulus maximum vertex neighborhood on different wavelet transform decomposition scales to influence the search process of modulus maximum point;obtained the appropriate modulus maximum points sequence on various wavelet decomposition scales;highlighted state feature information;finally usedMallat staggered projection to reconstruct signals.In order to validate the effectiveness of the algorithm,it was compared with four kinds of threshold noise suppression methods namely Rigrsure,Sqtwolog,Heursure,Minimaxi.The results show that this algorithm has a better signal to noise ratio and mean-square error.