Evolutionary analysis of green credit and automobile enterprises under the mechanism of dynamic reward and punishment based on government regulation

To explore the green development of automobile enterprises and promote the achievement of the“dual carbon”target,based on the bounded rationality assumptions,this study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of gov-ernment,commercial banks,and automobile enterprises;introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism;and analyzed the development process of the three parties’strategic behavior under the static and dynamic reward and punish-ment mechanism.Vensim PLE was used for numerical simulation analysis.Our results indicate that the system could not reach a stable state under the static reward and punishment mechanism.A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively improve the system stability and better fit real situations.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechan-ism,an increase in the initial probabilities of the three parties can promote the system stability,and the government can im-plement effective supervision by adjusting the upper limit of the reward and punishment intensity.Finally,the implementa-tion of green credit by commercial banks plays a significant role in promoting the green development of automobile enter-prises.

Combined Optimal Dispatch of Thermal Power Generators and Energy Storage Considering Thermal Power Deep Peak Clipping and Wind Energy Emission Grading Punishment

Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.

Criminalization and the Improvement of the Punishment System

China’s existing punishment system is rational in that it accords with realities and is based on historical continuity.Any adjustments should only be premised on maintaining its basic framework and upholding the spirit of the rule of law while promoting equitable human rights protection and efficient social governance.That is,the administrative detention stipulated in such administrative laws as the Public Security Administrative Penalties Law should be abolished;the type of penalty in these laws should optimized;and at the same time all penalties aimed at depriving people of their liberty should be transferred to the Criminal Law.Whether deprivation of liberty is involved should be made the criterion for distinguishing the range of adjustments to the Criminal Law and those administrative laws that stipulate penalties.Therefore,judgments of the punishability(strafbarkeit)of criminal penalties should be made the main basis for adjusting the de jure boundaries of the scope of the Criminal Law.We should develop a rational and balanced criminalization path and a reasonable and just system of punishment.

Analysis on the Significance of Ancient Chinese Corporal Punishment Reform to the Progress of the Penalty System

Since the ＂five -punishment＂ system was established from the period of the slavery society of the Western Zhou Dynasty, corporal punishment has been always in existence as a tool used by the rulers to punish people in ancient China. Although corporal punishment was abolished in the punishment sentencing reform of Emperor Wen of Han, it was further developed and improved in the penalty system of the Sui and Tang dynasties. However, it was restored in the Song, Liao, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties, etc. From the studies of the corporal punishment change, the reform law of the penal system in ancient China can be found, and also the significance of ancient Chinese corporal punishment reform to the progress of criminal penalty can be sought. Meanwhile, it is of vital significance to knowing well the development of China＇s legal history and improving the current penal system.

Power,punishment,patriarchy in Shakespeare’s Othello

An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.

An Unusual Punishment

One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Mathematical Neurolaw of Crime and Punishment: The <i>q</i>-Exponential Punishment Function

Whether people tend to punish criminals in a socially-optimal manner (i.e., hyperbolic punishment) or not is unknown. By adopting mathematical models of probabilistic punishment behavior (i.e., exponential, hyperbolic, and q-exponential probability discounting model based on Tsallis thermodynamics and neuroeconomics, Takahashi, 2007, Physica A;Takahashi et al., 2012, Applied Mathematics), we examined 1) fitness of the models to behavioral data of uncertain punishment, and 2) deviation from the socially optimal hyperbolic punishment function. Our results demonstrated that, the q-exponential punishment function best fits the behavioral data, and people overweigh the severity of punishment at small punishing probabilities and underweigh the severity of punishment at large punishing probabilities. In other words, people tend to punish crimes too severely and mildly with high and low arrest rate (e.g., homicide vs. excess of speed limit), respectively. Implications for neuroeconomics and neurolaw of crime and punishment (Takahashi, 2012, NeuroEndocrinology Letters) are discussed.

Corporal Punishment of Minors in the Muslim Family in Israel

Corporal punishment was always considered a valid disciplinary measure in Muslim Arab culture to be used as deemed necessary to shape a minor＇s behavior. Applying physical force against children as punishment for unwanted behavior has become a normative part of parents＇ routine interaction with their children, despite the fact that it is forbidden by Israeli law. Psychologists that work with the Muslim Arab population find it difficult to convince parent of the difficulties and conflicts that they create by enforcing corporal punishment on their children. Parents tend to reject professional advice because it is viewed as conflicting with their cultural mentality and traditions and ignore the vast research that proves the ineffectiveness of this type of discipline and the complications that it may lead to. What＇s more, Sharia law, the religious Muslim legal code that governs the lives of Muslim Arabs in Israel, advocates and even encourages corporal punishment. Legislation and further professional intervention is necessary to change this harmful practice and to protect Muslim Arab children.

Muted Message： Capital Punishment in the Hollywood Cinema

Contemporary Hollywood films seem at first glance to be opposed to capital punishment. However, this article＇s consideration of five surprisingly similar films （Dead Man Walking, The Chamber, Last Dance, True Crime, and The Life of David Gale） finds that they do not truly and consistently condemn capital punishment. Instead of suggesting that the practice of capital punishment is fundamentally immoral and should in general be ended, the films champion only worthy individuals on death row and delight primarily in the personal growth of other characters who attempt to aid the condemned. In the end, Hollywood offers only a muted message regarding the on-going use of capital punishment.

Role of Reward and Punishment in Education

This essay aims at illustrate the important role, of reward and punishment in education from a psychological viewpoint. According to Stimulus and Response theory, reward and punishment are now commonly used by teachers to encourage both congnitive activities and appropriate behaviour in classroom . Either of them can be used to encourage or supervise the students in learning, and rewarding is fawoured. However reward mechanism must be used properly and under control. It should 't be overused. Also, there is a place for punishment in education because errors need to be pointed out and antisocial behaviour should be corrected. It can be applied only when the intensity, duration and timing are carefully considered. In a word , reward system . is undoubtedly to have positive effect while punishment is proved to cause unpredictable result. Those specific informations are mentioned in the essay that follows.

The Rationale for Victims' Cooperation in Cases of Pleading Guilty and Accepting Punishment from the Perspective of Protecting the Right of Action

In the context of the more frequent application of the leniency system for pleading guilty and accepting punishment,the connotations of the rules on victim involvement should be enriched in the 2018 Criminal Procedure Law.Victims deeply influenced by the concept of cooperative justice will also have an intention to cooperate,thus resulting in a rationale for victims’cooperation.Victims’cooperation features a subjectivity of interactivity,understanding,and constraint.This kind of cooperation faces the accused,the procuratorial organ,and the court.The jurisprudential function of the rationale for cooperation of victims is embodied in such aspects as recognizing the victims as eligible subjects,enhancing the legal force of the recognizance in a case of pleading guilty and accepting punishment,and consolidating the legitimate basis for victim to obtain legal assistance.Oriented to protecting right of action of the victim,understanding and developing the rationale for the cooperation of the victim can start by reaching a judicial consensus on the"two limits"principle,optimizing the right of action system for victims,achieving the interconnection of multi-level litigation systems,and improving the rules on lenient punishment to enrich the plan for protecting victims’right of action in cases of pleading guilty and accepting punishment.

Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance

In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect.

Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward andpunishment in a public goods game

In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation ofcostly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society,specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruisticpunishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numericalcalculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages thantraditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads toa higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.

Bayesian prestack seismic inversion with a self-adaptive Huber-Markov random-field edge protection scheme

Seismic inversion is a highly ill-posed problem, due to many factors such as the limited seismic frequency bandwidth and inappropriate forward modeling. To obtain a unique solution, some smoothing constraints, e.g., the Tikhonov regularization are usually applied. The Tikhonov method can maintain a global smooth solution, but cause a fuzzy structure edge. In this paper we use Huber-Markov random-field edge protection method in the procedure of inverting three parameters, P-velocity, S-velocity and density. The method can avoid blurring the structure edge and resist noise. For the parameter to be inverted, the Huber- Markov random-field constructs a neighborhood system, which further acts as the vertical and lateral constraints. We use a quadratic Huber edge penalty function within the layer to suppress noise and a linear one on the edges to avoid a fuzzy result. The effectiveness of our method is proved by inverting the synthetic data without and with noises. The relationship between the adopted constraints and the inversion results is analyzed as well.

Application of Noise Reduction Method Based on Birgé-Massart Threshold

Flue gas generator set is a kind of large high-speed rotating machinery in petrochemical industry.This research focuses on noise reduction algorithms basis ontheBirgé-Massartthreshold.Obtained the threshold through Penalization Strategy Provided by Birgé-Massart;constructed different modulus maximum vertex neighborhood on different wavelet transform decomposition scales to influence the search process of modulus maximum point;obtained the appropriate modulus maximum points sequence on various wavelet decomposition scales;highlighted state feature information;finally usedMallat staggered projection to reconstruct signals.In order to validate the effectiveness of the algorithm,it was compared with four kinds of threshold noise suppression methods namely Rigrsure,Sqtwolog,Heursure,Minimaxi.The results show that this algorithm has a better signal to noise ratio and mean-square error.

Effects of Probability of Revelation of Defection and Penalty to Defection on Cooperative Behavior in 2-Person Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game

In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

基于奖惩和协商主题优先级的多Agent多问题协商模型——MMNAPP

文章针对多Agent系统(multi-agent system,MAS)中Agent之间的协商问题提出了一个基于奖惩和协商主题优先级的多Agent多问题协商模型———MMNAPP,对Agent间的协商问题进行了有益的探索,为多A-gent系统中协商问题的最终解决提出了一种新的方法。