This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor ...This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor protection, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditors or regulators scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. The study findings are consistent with prediction. Despite being in economies with high investor protection, managers still have bigger discretion in managing earnings through real activities rather than accrual manipulation.展开更多
This paper examines chaebol (Korean business group) firms' earnings management methods in pre-and post-financial crisis periods in Korea. The financial crisis resulted in chaebol firms increasing their reliance on ...This paper examines chaebol (Korean business group) firms' earnings management methods in pre-and post-financial crisis periods in Korea. The financial crisis resulted in chaebol firms increasing their reliance on the external capital markets as chaebol firms achieved internal financing through arbitrary transactions among their affiliated and contracted firms. This produced a higher demand for financial reporting transparency in chaebol firms and strengthened monitoring from investors. These changes in the business environment in Korea following the financial crisis are likely to have led chaebol firms to reduce earnings management by using managers' discretion in accounting accruals and to seek alternative means to manage earnings through abnormal operating decisions which are referred to as real activities manipulation. The authors find that chaebol firms have significantly decreased accrual-based earnings management after the financial crisis of Asian compared to non-chaebol firms. The authors also find that chaebol firms have become more inclined to engage in real earnings management after the financial crisis. The results suggest that chaebol firms have shifted their earnings management methods from accruals manipulation to real activities manipulation which is harder to be detected by external auditors and regulators. This study provides insight into the changes in chaebol firms' earnings management methods triggered by economic shock. The findings suggest that the shift in chaebol firms' financing sources from internal to external capital markets and the increased demand for transparent financial information in the post-financial crisis period are likely to have influenced chaebol firms to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management after the financial crisis.展开更多
There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and rea...There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation. Usually, real activities manipulation is conducted on the going period. The action will increase the loss for the firms at the end of the period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through accruals (discretionary accruals). Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 196 firms from the year 2003 to 2007. The results of this study support the research hypothesis that real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. The higher the real activities manipulation effects, the higher the accruals earnings management at the end of the period.There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation. Usually, real activities manipulation is conducted on the going period. The action will increase the loss for the firms at the end of the period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through accruals (discretionary accruals). Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 196 firms from the year 2003 to 2007. The results of this study support the research hypothesis that real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. The higher the real activities manipulation effects, the higher the accruals earnings management at the end of the period.展开更多
Earnings management is an important topic in modern financial accounting. With the development of social economy, practical circles and theory circles have studied the earnings management more and more carefully. In t...Earnings management is an important topic in modern financial accounting. With the development of social economy, practical circles and theory circles have studied the earnings management more and more carefully. In this paper, we will contrast accrual earnings management with real earnings management in definition, motivation, approach, and economic consequences, and hope to provide some suggestions for our government.展开更多
Earnings management research has a long and rich history. The agency conflict, incentives, rationalization, opportunity plus having the capability among the managers to manipulate the financial statements lead them to...Earnings management research has a long and rich history. The agency conflict, incentives, rationalization, opportunity plus having the capability among the managers to manipulate the financial statements lead them to commit fraud. The loopholes in the standards or the deviation from real operational activities promote this situation to prolong. In relation to this issue, this study examines the earnings management behavior among fraud firms in Malaysia. Further, this study examines the relationship between accruals earnings management as a proxy variable for discretionary accruals and real earnings management as the proxy variable for discretionary cash flow. Sample of 57 alleged fraud firms was selected based on the fraudulent financial reporting offences announced in Bursa Malaysia website. The sample data are collected from public firms which committed fraud from 2001 to 2013. This study found a significant negative relationship between accruals earnings management and real earnings management among the fraud firms in Malaysia suggesting that these firms aggressively manage earnings downwards or upwards essentially to avoid regulators scrutiny apart from aiming to achieve personal incentives. The study significantly finds evidence that fraud firms manage earnings on a sequential basis between accruals earnings management and real earnings management prior to fraud year. The findings indicate that firms opt for real earnings management and make full use of its distinguished features of not easily traceable to continue managing earnings immediately subsequent to fraud year. This study may assist regulators, auditors, and policymakers to curb earnings management patterns that have high likelihood of becoming part of fraud antecedent.展开更多
文摘This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor protection, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditors or regulators scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. The study findings are consistent with prediction. Despite being in economies with high investor protection, managers still have bigger discretion in managing earnings through real activities rather than accrual manipulation.
文摘This paper examines chaebol (Korean business group) firms' earnings management methods in pre-and post-financial crisis periods in Korea. The financial crisis resulted in chaebol firms increasing their reliance on the external capital markets as chaebol firms achieved internal financing through arbitrary transactions among their affiliated and contracted firms. This produced a higher demand for financial reporting transparency in chaebol firms and strengthened monitoring from investors. These changes in the business environment in Korea following the financial crisis are likely to have led chaebol firms to reduce earnings management by using managers' discretion in accounting accruals and to seek alternative means to manage earnings through abnormal operating decisions which are referred to as real activities manipulation. The authors find that chaebol firms have significantly decreased accrual-based earnings management after the financial crisis of Asian compared to non-chaebol firms. The authors also find that chaebol firms have become more inclined to engage in real earnings management after the financial crisis. The results suggest that chaebol firms have shifted their earnings management methods from accruals manipulation to real activities manipulation which is harder to be detected by external auditors and regulators. This study provides insight into the changes in chaebol firms' earnings management methods triggered by economic shock. The findings suggest that the shift in chaebol firms' financing sources from internal to external capital markets and the increased demand for transparent financial information in the post-financial crisis period are likely to have influenced chaebol firms to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management after the financial crisis.
文摘There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation. Usually, real activities manipulation is conducted on the going period. The action will increase the loss for the firms at the end of the period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through accruals (discretionary accruals). Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 196 firms from the year 2003 to 2007. The results of this study support the research hypothesis that real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. The higher the real activities manipulation effects, the higher the accruals earnings management at the end of the period.There are three ways to manage earnings, namely, accruals earnings management, real activities manipulation, and shifting of core expense. The famous methods to manage earnings are accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation. Usually, real activities manipulation is conducted on the going period. The action will increase the loss for the firms at the end of the period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through accruals (discretionary accruals). Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 196 firms from the year 2003 to 2007. The results of this study support the research hypothesis that real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. The higher the real activities manipulation effects, the higher the accruals earnings management at the end of the period.
文摘Earnings management is an important topic in modern financial accounting. With the development of social economy, practical circles and theory circles have studied the earnings management more and more carefully. In this paper, we will contrast accrual earnings management with real earnings management in definition, motivation, approach, and economic consequences, and hope to provide some suggestions for our government.
文摘Earnings management research has a long and rich history. The agency conflict, incentives, rationalization, opportunity plus having the capability among the managers to manipulate the financial statements lead them to commit fraud. The loopholes in the standards or the deviation from real operational activities promote this situation to prolong. In relation to this issue, this study examines the earnings management behavior among fraud firms in Malaysia. Further, this study examines the relationship between accruals earnings management as a proxy variable for discretionary accruals and real earnings management as the proxy variable for discretionary cash flow. Sample of 57 alleged fraud firms was selected based on the fraudulent financial reporting offences announced in Bursa Malaysia website. The sample data are collected from public firms which committed fraud from 2001 to 2013. This study found a significant negative relationship between accruals earnings management and real earnings management among the fraud firms in Malaysia suggesting that these firms aggressively manage earnings downwards or upwards essentially to avoid regulators scrutiny apart from aiming to achieve personal incentives. The study significantly finds evidence that fraud firms manage earnings on a sequential basis between accruals earnings management and real earnings management prior to fraud year. The findings indicate that firms opt for real earnings management and make full use of its distinguished features of not easily traceable to continue managing earnings immediately subsequent to fraud year. This study may assist regulators, auditors, and policymakers to curb earnings management patterns that have high likelihood of becoming part of fraud antecedent.