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Third-party relational governance and collaborative innovation performance:The role of IPR protection 被引量:5
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作者 Ou Bai Jiang Wei +1 位作者 Xiaohua Yang Roger (Rongxin) Chen 《International Journal of Innovation Studies》 2020年第1期1-15,共15页
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of third-party relational governance on the performance of collaborative innovation in China. By integrating the relational view and innovation appropriation perspect... The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of third-party relational governance on the performance of collaborative innovation in China. By integrating the relational view and innovation appropriation perspectives, this study analyses the effects of three mechanisms of third-party relational governancedco-reputation, interorganizational routines, and technological normsdon collaborative innovation performance. Additionally,this study investigates the moderating effects of the protection of intellectual Property Rights(IPR) on the relationship between third-party relational governance and collaborative innovation performance. Survey data of high-technology firms in China are used to empirically test the hypotheses. The results show that third-party relational governance has a positive effect on collaborative innovation performance and that IPR protection has different moderating effects. This study contributes to the relational governance literature by adding the perspective of third parties and analyzing three mechanisms of third-party relational governance in a single model. This study also contributes to the innovation appropriation literature by examining the role of IPR protection in governing collaborative innovation in China. Finally, this study offers suggestions on how Chinese firms should govern their collaborative innovation to remedy the limitations of a weak IPR legal institutional framework. 展开更多
关键词 Third-party relational governance Collaborative innovation IPR protection Chinese high-technology industry
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Ready or Not: Quezon City Mayor Joy Belmonte and Her Crisis Response Strategy During the COVID-19 Pandemic
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作者 Alexander T.Rosete 《Journalism and Mass Communication》 2021年第4期125-160,共36页
Using Situational Crisis Communication Theory(SCCT)by Coombs(2007),this study analyses the case of Quezon City Mayor Joy Belmonte’s CoViD-19 Crisis and her crisis response strategy to address the situation.The study ... Using Situational Crisis Communication Theory(SCCT)by Coombs(2007),this study analyses the case of Quezon City Mayor Joy Belmonte’s CoViD-19 Crisis and her crisis response strategy to address the situation.The study looks at the crisis communication of Quezon City on issues stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic.The SCCT provides a framework for the organization facing a different complex case of crisis to protect the reputational organization’s assets.The organization’s ability to select the most appropriate and beneficial response helps them deal with an emergency and crisis(Coombs,2007).Simultaneously,in this paper,SCCT was used to examine the stakeholder’s perceptions about the organization’s action and response by Mayor Belmonte on the crisis.This paper concludes Mayor Belmonte did not follow the recommendations of SCCT by combining Deny,such as Attacks the Accuser,Deny and Scapegoat tactics,and Diminish strategies such as Excuse and Justice tactics,to respond to the wide variety of stakeholder’s groups.Mayor Belmonte’s crisis response strategies and tactics do not align with the SCCT.The theory recommends corrective action and response such as Rebuild as well as Bolstering strategies are“considered as the most effective communication of crisis response strategy when an organization perceived a strong attribution of crisis responsibility and results in a severe reputational threat”(Coombs,2007).By reviewing the situation that Mayor Belmonte faced,this paper concludes that she was under severe threat.Mayor Belmonte’s CoViD-19 crisis is the preventable cluster based on the overall stakeholder’s perception of the crisis.The preventable cluster considered her primary,secondary,and additional stakeholders.It depicted an organizational misdeed with and without injuries,and the appropriate responses to adapt to re-establish the organization’s reputation is a Rebuild strategy because interventions such as Compensation and Apology should work to improve the organization’s reputation.Conversely,Mayor Belmonte chose to frequently employ Deny strategy(Attacks the Accuser and Scapegoat)and Diminish strategy(Excuse and Justice)to respond to various stakeholders. 展开更多
关键词 Crisis Communication Covid-19 Pandemic Situational Crisis Communication Theory Risk Management REPUTATION Public Relations Local Government
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The research of Chinese Government Public Relations-- Based on the idea of the Balanced Scorecard
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作者 YE Xiao-qing 《International English Education Research》 2014年第7期37-39,共3页
Through analyzing the problems of Chinese government public relations, using the idea of the Balanced Scorecard, we analyze the reasons of these problems and discuss the countermeasures from four aspects that conclude... Through analyzing the problems of Chinese government public relations, using the idea of the Balanced Scorecard, we analyze the reasons of these problems and discuss the countermeasures from four aspects that conclude financial, internal operations, customers, learning and growth to achieve the all-round and balanced development of public relations and establish a high level of government public relations organization, regarding the overall strategic goal of government public relations that aim to strengthen the communication with various public, establish an innovative, pragmatic, honest and efficient government image in the public and the international community as the center. 展开更多
关键词 Government Public Relations Balanced Score Card Strategic Objectives Target Management Performance Evaluation
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Economic governance and marketisation:understanding the institutional roots of China’s achievements and challenges 被引量:1
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作者 Jingyu Sun 《Economic and Political Studies》 2016年第2期171-186,共16页
As an institutional infrastructure for market economy,law is crucial in underpinning market transaction enforcement.However,it is imperative to recognise the gap between legislative reform and marketisation in China.T... As an institutional infrastructure for market economy,law is crucial in underpinning market transaction enforcement.However,it is imperative to recognise the gap between legislative reform and marketisation in China.This paper attempts to explain why China has experienced astonishing marketisation without satisfactory legislative building.It is aimed to explore institutional roots of marketisation by arguing that lawlessness creates challenges to further development while it goes along with the achievement of marketisation in China.Additionally,this research focuses on promoting China’s economic governance.It argues that law is not the only governance mechanism to ensure market transaction enforcement.There are other governance mechanisms such as relational governance and private third-party governance enforcement.Relational governance plays an important role in China’s transition.However,relational governance alone is inadequate in supporting China’s long-term development.Private third-party enforcement can link relational governance with formal governance mechanism.While focusing on the development of institutional infrastructure,it is important to build a governance framework in which the governance mechanism based on formal institution,such as law and government regulations,private third-party enforcement and relational governance are coordinated and complementary. 展开更多
关键词 Economic governance MARKETISATION private third-party enforcement relational governance
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