With the implementation of the CPC＇s eight-point regulation as a natural experiment platform, this paper seeks to unravel the causality between rent-seeking and firm performance for SOEs and private firms respectivel...With the implementation of the CPC＇s eight-point regulation as a natural experiment platform, this paper seeks to unravel the causality between rent-seeking and firm performance for SOEs and private firms respectively. Our empirical research has found that after the release of the ＂eight-point regulation ＂, investors responded negatively to private frms and positively to SOEs. Such market response is more significant for firms with a high degree of rent-seeking. Further research has found that rent-seeking helps both SOEs and private firms receive more subsidies from the government. While government subsidy from rent-seeking is conducive to the performance of private firms, it is not the case for SOEs. This implies that rent-seeking activities serve as a ＂lubricant＇for private firms but have a ＂stumbling block＂ effect for SOEs.展开更多
In government procurement, government and suppliers are connected for their interests, government and agencies are connected for commissions. This paper focuses on these two kinds of relationship and use rent-seeking...In government procurement, government and suppliers are connected for their interests, government and agencies are connected for commissions. This paper focuses on these two kinds of relationship and use rent-seeking game model to analyze the behavior of the government.展开更多
As a city–county consolidation with Chinese characteristics,China’s countyto-district(CtD)reform transfers a county’s autonomy to a city,thereby strengthening the administrative,decision-making,fiscal and other pow...As a city–county consolidation with Chinese characteristics,China’s countyto-district(CtD)reform transfers a county’s autonomy to a city,thereby strengthening the administrative,decision-making,fiscal and other powers of the prefecture-level municipal government,which effectively enables the centralization of local governments.Based on this exogenous quasi-natural experiment,we use a difference-in-differences(DID)approach to empirically examine the impact of prefecture-level municipal government centralization on companies’ESG performance.The results show that municipal government centralization can significantly promote corporate ESG performance,which represents environmental protection,social responsibility and corporate governance behavior.The mechanism analysis also shows that the CtD reform can address market segmentation,alleviate policy uncertainty and reduce rentseeking,which further improves ESG performance.展开更多
基金"A Study on the Rent-seeking,Political Capital Burst and Economic Consequences of Private Enterprises,Based on the Perspective of Officials Arrest"(Grant No.71702178),National Natural Sciences Foundation"Anti-Corruption,Reconstruction of the Relationship Between Government and Enterprises Social Capital Investment:An Integrated Research Based on Social Relation Network Theory"(Grant No.17YJC790005),MOE Project of Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation
文摘With the implementation of the CPC＇s eight-point regulation as a natural experiment platform, this paper seeks to unravel the causality between rent-seeking and firm performance for SOEs and private firms respectively. Our empirical research has found that after the release of the ＂eight-point regulation ＂, investors responded negatively to private frms and positively to SOEs. Such market response is more significant for firms with a high degree of rent-seeking. Further research has found that rent-seeking helps both SOEs and private firms receive more subsidies from the government. While government subsidy from rent-seeking is conducive to the performance of private firms, it is not the case for SOEs. This implies that rent-seeking activities serve as a ＂lubricant＇for private firms but have a ＂stumbling block＂ effect for SOEs.
文摘In government procurement, government and suppliers are connected for their interests, government and agencies are connected for commissions. This paper focuses on these two kinds of relationship and use rent-seeking game model to analyze the behavior of the government.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.T2293773 and No.T2293770).
文摘As a city–county consolidation with Chinese characteristics,China’s countyto-district(CtD)reform transfers a county’s autonomy to a city,thereby strengthening the administrative,decision-making,fiscal and other powers of the prefecture-level municipal government,which effectively enables the centralization of local governments.Based on this exogenous quasi-natural experiment,we use a difference-in-differences(DID)approach to empirically examine the impact of prefecture-level municipal government centralization on companies’ESG performance.The results show that municipal government centralization can significantly promote corporate ESG performance,which represents environmental protection,social responsibility and corporate governance behavior.The mechanism analysis also shows that the CtD reform can address market segmentation,alleviate policy uncertainty and reduce rentseeking,which further improves ESG performance.
