Risk Sharing Method of PPP Model for Rural Sewage Treatment - Based on Interval Fuzzy Shapley Value

Rural sewage treatment is in need of more capital investment,in which the financing model of PPP(public-private partnership)is able to encourage the investment of social capital in this sector.Risk sharing is one of the core features in the PPP model.In view that the risk loss of projects cannot be accurately estimated,this article describes the uncertainty of risk loss with fuzzy numbers and allocates the distribution of risk loss among the participants of rural sewage treatment PPP projects with interval fuzzy Shapley value to ensure a more reasonable and effective risk distribution.

基于绩效的风险分担协议国内外研究进展及启示

对国内外基于绩效的风险分担协议(performance-based risk-sharing arrangement,PBRSA)的风险分担方案进行系统梳理,全面总结国内外PBRSA的实践进展及经验,提出在我国制定基于绩效的风险分担协议过程中,应根据卫生技术特征制定科学可行的风险分担方案、科学遴选适宜的卫生技术纳入PBRSA、合理制定PBRSA绩效考核支付体系、建立健全PBRSA数据信息采集系统,以期为我国科学应用与推广创新诊疗技术的医疗保险按绩效支付模式提供经验借鉴与理论参考。

New SRLG-diverse path selection algorithm in survivable GMPLS networks

In conventional shared risk link group （SRLG）-diverse path selection （CSPS） algorithm in survivable GMPLS networks, SRLG is taken into account when selecting the backup paths, while the primary path selection method is the sarne as the algorithms without SRLG constraint. A problem of CSPS algorithm is that, after a primary path is selected, the success probability to select an SRLG-diverse backup path for it is low. If SRLG is taken into account when computing the primary path, then the probability to successfully select an SRLG-diverse backup path will be much increased. Based on this idea, an active SRLG-diverse path selection （ASPS） algorithm is proposed. To actively avoid selecting those SRLG links, when computing the primary path, a link that share risk with more links is assigned a larger link cost. To improve the resource utilization ratio, it is permitted that the bandwidth resources are shared among backup paths. What is more, differentiated reliability （DiR） requirements of different customers are considered in ASPS algorithm. The simulation results show that, compared with CSPS algorithm, ASPS algorithm not only increases successful protection probability but also improves resource utilization ratio.

Time-consistent pension policy with minimum guarantee and sustainability constraint

This paper proposes and investigates an optimal pair investment/pension policy for a pay-as-you-go(PAYG)pension scheme.The social planner can invest in a buffer fund in order to guarantee a minimal pension amount.The model aims at taking into account complex dynamic phenomena such as the demographic risk and its evolution over time,the time and age dependence of agents preferences,and financial risks.The preference criterion of the social planner is modeled by a consistent dynamic utility defined on a stochastic domain,which incorporates the heterogeneity of overlapping generations and its evolution over time.The preference criterion and the optimization problem also incorporate sustainability,adequacy and fairness constraints.The paper designs and solves the social planner's dynamic decision criterion,and computes the optimal investment/pension policy in a general framework.A detailed analysis for the case of dynamic power utilities is provided.

Optimal risk allocation in alliance infrastructure projects: A social preference perspective

The mechanism of risk allocation is designed to protect all stakeholders,and it is vital to project success.Qualitative and quantitative ways of optimizing risk allocation have been well documented in extant literature(e.g.,allocation principles,models,and solutions),and the foci of existing research are usually the maximization of rational utility.Few research has focused on partners’social preferences affecting the output of risk allocation.This study presents a quantitative approach based on modeling alliance member(AM)’s inequity aversion(IA)to analyze risk-sharing arrangements in an alliance project.Fehr and Schmidfs inequity-aversion model is integrated into modeling partner’s utility.This paper derives results for an alliance leader(AL)’s optimal risk-sharing ratio and AM's optimal risk-management effort simultaneously.The derivation is based on solving a restrained optimization problem using the conception and methods from Stackel-berg game theory.Results show that an AM’s IA significantly affects risk allocation between AL and AM.Specifically,envious preference is positively related to AL5s optimal risk-sharing ratio,whereas guilty preference negatively affects AL5s optimal risk-sharing ratio.These findings will be of interest to academics and practitioners involved in designing alliance negotiations.